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Data breaches are epidemic. Microsoft wants to help secure our PII, whether it's stored in the private or public sector. Find out how they are helping.
total rewrite of the Windows kernel and
1. limit it to ONLY the items required for an Operating System;
2. remove all the code related to the applications and back doors for applications they have in the existing version of Windows;
3. tighten up the code to close out all the vulnerabilities they know of, many of which have only been patched over for over a decade, instead of having the core code rewritten to close it out;
4. use only Industry Standard command sets and code, where it exists;
5. set up user security the same way Unix and Linux have it;
6. have everything turned off and closed down by default, instead of their existing default of everything turned on.
These six simple task will boost security of MS systems so much it's not funny, yet they've constantly refused to do so for over a decade, so I doubt they'll actually do it. What they really want to do is come up with some sort of government sanction MS proprietary code or method that appears to give improved security while pouring money into MS coffers from government and business coffers.
ND: Please don't forget that the long term MS goal has been, and still is, a complete Trusted Computing environment where all the major players are totally locked into using MS software and paying them big annual fees to use it.
1. limit it to ONLY the items required for an Operating System;
2. remove all the code related to the applications and back doors for applications they have in the existing version of Windows;
3. tighten up the code to close out all the vulnerabilities they know of, many of which have only been patched over for over a decade, instead of having the core code rewritten to close it out;
4. use only Industry Standard command sets and code, where it exists;
5. set up user security the same way Unix and Linux have it;
6. have everything turned off and closed down by default, instead of their existing default of everything turned on.
These six simple task will boost security of MS systems so much it's not funny, yet they've constantly refused to do so for over a decade, so I doubt they'll actually do it. What they really want to do is come up with some sort of government sanction MS proprietary code or method that appears to give improved security while pouring money into MS coffers from government and business coffers.
ND: Please don't forget that the long term MS goal has been, and still is, a complete Trusted Computing environment where all the major players are totally locked into using MS software and paying them big annual fees to use it.
But, I was more concerned about working within existing boundaries. Until recently, I did not know there was dialogue of this scale going on between .govs and Microsoft.
and scale for over a decade, as they see getting a strong grip on government software needs as being the way to get a similar grip on the rest of the business and personal market.
I just have a different viewpoint. I work with both Linux and MS products. More to the point, I am a realist and have to work with what the client wants.
I give MS credit for working with the government rather than not.
I give MS credit for working with the government rather than not.
but I'm just a bit cynical about MS activities now days, simply because they make big noises about what they're doing about security etc, after spending more than a decade doing nothing realistic about security - except push their Trusted Computing concept to lock people into using MS products. Thus, I don't see their actions as being client focussed or client helpful, but market strategy actions.
In the past I've seen this from software companies as they 'help' you to write your business needs paper so that it ends up stating you need one of their products - despite it NOT meeting many of the needs set out in the initial version.
In the past I've seen this from software companies as they 'help' you to write your business needs paper so that it ends up stating you need one of their products - despite it NOT meeting many of the needs set out in the initial version.
Not doing anything? MS reinvented themselves when Mr. Gates said that security was paramount. Can you imagine what the cost MS?
You have to remember that they are going places no one else has been. I being an optimist, will give them some slack.
You have to remember that they are going places no one else has been. I being an optimist, will give them some slack.
change of marketing strategy. If they had truly reinvented themselves they'd have totally rewritten the Windows code to make it tight and clean, remove all known vulnerabilities, and removed all apps from the core code - which they have NOT done. Yes, they have added overlays with some security features, but they are NOT built into the core code - which is where anyone serious about security would put it.
Because they have NOT addressed any of these important issues, I see this all as being a marketing ploy - or maybe I'm just a paranoid cynic.
Because they have NOT addressed any of these important issues, I see this all as being a marketing ploy - or maybe I'm just a paranoid cynic.
Maybe you have explained this (to me) before, but exactly how does the Microsoft "Trusted Computing" concept "lock people into using MS products"??
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Computing
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next-Generation_Secure_Computing_Base
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module
................
Summary Analysis of the Situation
I'm putting this before the quotes, as there's a lot of them.
The whole Trusted Computing concept is intended to make every data transfer and communication immediately identifiable with a specific sender, a secondary aspect is to restrict communications to only those using the same approved system. This means you have to tie in with the specifically approved hardware and software.
Back in the early 1990s, Microsoft signed on to the concept of Industry Standard Command Sets to simplify the writing of Operating Systems, Application Software, and Hardware Controllers. When this was done, it meant new hardware designed around this could be plugged into a system which had an Operating System using the standard commands and no device driver needed to be installed to make it work, also applications would be able to be installed on any Operating System. This worked well in Windows 3 and 3.11 - but MS stepped right away from this industry agreed unifying process with the release of Win 95 and set up their own Command Set. MS then pressured some hardware manufacturers to use the MS command set and not the industry command set, which is why you can get hardware that needs no drivers to work with some versions of Windows, but drivers for other operating systems and other versions of Windows. Since then, MS have often used different Command Sets for different versions of Windows. The main reason for this attitude has been to increase profits by forcing people to upgrade software and applications to work with the new operating systems.
Since MS have done this with general hardware, in order to put their profitability ahead of user needs or ease, no one expects them to use any industry agreed commands or standards for the Trusted Computing processes. In fact, much of the existing Trusted Computing software already available is proprietary MS software. Once this is activated, the ability to switch to another company will cease to be.
..................
Please note the following quotes from the above articles, in order:
Quotes from the first link:
Trusted Computing opponents such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Free Software Foundation claim trust in the underlying companies is not deserved and that the technology puts too much power and control into the hands of those who design systems and software. They also believe that it may cause consumers to lose anonymity in their online interactions, as well as mandating technologies Trusted Computing opponents deem unnecessary. They suggest Trusted Computing as a possible enabler for future versions of mandatory access control, copy protection, and digital rights management.
Users unable to modify software
A user who wanted to switch to a competing program might find that it would be impossible for that new program to read old data, as the information would be "locked in" to the old program. It could also make it impossible for the user to read or modify their data except as specifically permitted by the software.
Remote attestation could cause other problems. Currently web sites can be visited using a number of web browsers, though certain websites may be formatted such that some browsers cannot decipher their code. Some browsers have found a way to get around that problem by emulating other browsers. With remote attestation a website could check the internet browser being used and refuse to display on any browser other than the specified one (like Internet Explorer), so even emulating the browser would not work.
[edit] Users have no control over data
Sealed storage could prevent users from moving sealed files to the new computer. This limitation might exist either through poor software design or deliberate limitations placed by publishers of works. The migration section of the TPM specification requires that it be impossible to move certain kinds of files except to a computer with the identical make and model of security chip.[citation needed]
[edit] Users unable to override
Some opponents of Trusted Computing advocate allowing owner overrides to allow the computer to use the secure I/O path to make sure the owner is physically present, to then bypass restrictions. Such an override would allow remote attestation to a user's specification, e.g., to create certificates that say Internet Explorer is running, even if a different browser is used. Instead of preventing software change, remote attestation would indicate when the software has been changed without owner's permission.
Trusted Computing Group members have refused to implement owner override.[19] Proponents of trusted computing believe that Owner override defeats the trust in other computers since remote attestation can be forged by the owner. Owner override offers the security and enforcement benefits to a machine owner, but does not allow him to trust other computers, because their owners could waive rules or restrictions on their own computers. Under this scenario, once data is sent to someone else's computer, whether it be a diary, a DRM music file, or a joint project, that other person controls what security, if any, their computer will enforce on their copy of those data. This has the potential to undermine the applications of trusted computing to enforce Digital Rights Management, control cheating in online games and attest to remote computations for grid computing.
[edit] Loss of anonymity
Because a Trusted Computing equipped computer is able to uniquely attest to its own identity, it will be possible for vendors and others who possess the ability to use the attestation feature to zero in on the identity of the user of TC-enabled software with a high degree of certainty.
Such a capability is contingent on the reasonable chance that the user at some time provides user-identifying information, whether voluntarily or indirectly. One common way that information can be obtained and linked is when a user registers a computer just after purchase. Another common way is when a user provides identifying information to the website of an affiliate of the vendor.
While proponents of TC point out that online purchases and credit transactions could potentially be more secure as a result of the remote attestation capability, this may cause the computer user to lose expectations of anonymity when using the Internet.
Shutting out of competing products
People have voiced concerns that trusted computing could be used to keep or discourage users from running software created by companies outside of a small industry group. Microsoft has received a great deal of bad press surrounding their Palladium software architecture, evoking comments such as "Few pieces of vaporware have evoked a higher level of fear and uncertainty than Microsoft's Palladium", "Palladium is a plot to take over cyberspace", and "Palladium will keep us from running any software not personally approved by Bill Gates".[25] The concerns about trusted computing being used to shut out competition exist within a broader framework of consumers being concerned about using bundling of products to obscure prices of products and to engage in anti-competitive practices.[2] Trusted computing is seen as harmful or problematic to small and open source software developers
Quotes from the second link:
The Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB), formerly known as Palladium, is a software architecture designed by Microsoft which is expected to implement parts of the controversial "Trusted Computing" concept on future versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. NGSCB is part of Microsoft's Trustworthy Computing initiative. Microsoft's stated aim for NGSCB is to increase the security and privacy of computer users,[1] but critics assert that the technology will not only fail to solve the majority of contemporary IT security problems, but also result in an increase in vendor lock-in and thus a reduction in competition in the IT marketplace.
NGSCB and Trusted Computing can be used to intentionally and arbitrarily lock certain users out from use of certain files, products and services, for example to lock out users of a competing product, potentially leading to severe vendor lock-in. This is analogous to a contemporary problem in which many businesses feel compelled to purchase and use Microsoft Word in order to be compatible with associates who use that software. Today this problem is partially solved by products such as OpenOffice.org which provide limited compatibility with Microsoft Office file formats. Under NGSCB, if Microsoft Word were to encrypt documents it produced, no other application would be able to decrypt them, regardless of its ability to read the underlying file format.
NGSCB and Trusted Computing are ineffectual at solving the majority of contemporary security problems, for example computer viruses and trojans. Despite this fact, Microsoft has in the past claimed that NGSCB was necessary to combat the threat of future virus outbreaks against Microsoft Windows users.[4] Microsoft is no longer making claims that NGSCB will solve these virus problems.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next-Generation_Secure_Computing_Base
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module
................
Summary Analysis of the Situation
I'm putting this before the quotes, as there's a lot of them.
The whole Trusted Computing concept is intended to make every data transfer and communication immediately identifiable with a specific sender, a secondary aspect is to restrict communications to only those using the same approved system. This means you have to tie in with the specifically approved hardware and software.
Back in the early 1990s, Microsoft signed on to the concept of Industry Standard Command Sets to simplify the writing of Operating Systems, Application Software, and Hardware Controllers. When this was done, it meant new hardware designed around this could be plugged into a system which had an Operating System using the standard commands and no device driver needed to be installed to make it work, also applications would be able to be installed on any Operating System. This worked well in Windows 3 and 3.11 - but MS stepped right away from this industry agreed unifying process with the release of Win 95 and set up their own Command Set. MS then pressured some hardware manufacturers to use the MS command set and not the industry command set, which is why you can get hardware that needs no drivers to work with some versions of Windows, but drivers for other operating systems and other versions of Windows. Since then, MS have often used different Command Sets for different versions of Windows. The main reason for this attitude has been to increase profits by forcing people to upgrade software and applications to work with the new operating systems.
Since MS have done this with general hardware, in order to put their profitability ahead of user needs or ease, no one expects them to use any industry agreed commands or standards for the Trusted Computing processes. In fact, much of the existing Trusted Computing software already available is proprietary MS software. Once this is activated, the ability to switch to another company will cease to be.
..................
Please note the following quotes from the above articles, in order:
Quotes from the first link:
Trusted Computing opponents such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Free Software Foundation claim trust in the underlying companies is not deserved and that the technology puts too much power and control into the hands of those who design systems and software. They also believe that it may cause consumers to lose anonymity in their online interactions, as well as mandating technologies Trusted Computing opponents deem unnecessary. They suggest Trusted Computing as a possible enabler for future versions of mandatory access control, copy protection, and digital rights management.
Users unable to modify software
A user who wanted to switch to a competing program might find that it would be impossible for that new program to read old data, as the information would be "locked in" to the old program. It could also make it impossible for the user to read or modify their data except as specifically permitted by the software.
Remote attestation could cause other problems. Currently web sites can be visited using a number of web browsers, though certain websites may be formatted such that some browsers cannot decipher their code. Some browsers have found a way to get around that problem by emulating other browsers. With remote attestation a website could check the internet browser being used and refuse to display on any browser other than the specified one (like Internet Explorer), so even emulating the browser would not work.
[edit] Users have no control over data
Sealed storage could prevent users from moving sealed files to the new computer. This limitation might exist either through poor software design or deliberate limitations placed by publishers of works. The migration section of the TPM specification requires that it be impossible to move certain kinds of files except to a computer with the identical make and model of security chip.[citation needed]
[edit] Users unable to override
Some opponents of Trusted Computing advocate allowing owner overrides to allow the computer to use the secure I/O path to make sure the owner is physically present, to then bypass restrictions. Such an override would allow remote attestation to a user's specification, e.g., to create certificates that say Internet Explorer is running, even if a different browser is used. Instead of preventing software change, remote attestation would indicate when the software has been changed without owner's permission.
Trusted Computing Group members have refused to implement owner override.[19] Proponents of trusted computing believe that Owner override defeats the trust in other computers since remote attestation can be forged by the owner. Owner override offers the security and enforcement benefits to a machine owner, but does not allow him to trust other computers, because their owners could waive rules or restrictions on their own computers. Under this scenario, once data is sent to someone else's computer, whether it be a diary, a DRM music file, or a joint project, that other person controls what security, if any, their computer will enforce on their copy of those data. This has the potential to undermine the applications of trusted computing to enforce Digital Rights Management, control cheating in online games and attest to remote computations for grid computing.
[edit] Loss of anonymity
Because a Trusted Computing equipped computer is able to uniquely attest to its own identity, it will be possible for vendors and others who possess the ability to use the attestation feature to zero in on the identity of the user of TC-enabled software with a high degree of certainty.
Such a capability is contingent on the reasonable chance that the user at some time provides user-identifying information, whether voluntarily or indirectly. One common way that information can be obtained and linked is when a user registers a computer just after purchase. Another common way is when a user provides identifying information to the website of an affiliate of the vendor.
While proponents of TC point out that online purchases and credit transactions could potentially be more secure as a result of the remote attestation capability, this may cause the computer user to lose expectations of anonymity when using the Internet.
Shutting out of competing products
People have voiced concerns that trusted computing could be used to keep or discourage users from running software created by companies outside of a small industry group. Microsoft has received a great deal of bad press surrounding their Palladium software architecture, evoking comments such as "Few pieces of vaporware have evoked a higher level of fear and uncertainty than Microsoft's Palladium", "Palladium is a plot to take over cyberspace", and "Palladium will keep us from running any software not personally approved by Bill Gates".[25] The concerns about trusted computing being used to shut out competition exist within a broader framework of consumers being concerned about using bundling of products to obscure prices of products and to engage in anti-competitive practices.[2] Trusted computing is seen as harmful or problematic to small and open source software developers
Quotes from the second link:
The Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB), formerly known as Palladium, is a software architecture designed by Microsoft which is expected to implement parts of the controversial "Trusted Computing" concept on future versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. NGSCB is part of Microsoft's Trustworthy Computing initiative. Microsoft's stated aim for NGSCB is to increase the security and privacy of computer users,[1] but critics assert that the technology will not only fail to solve the majority of contemporary IT security problems, but also result in an increase in vendor lock-in and thus a reduction in competition in the IT marketplace.
NGSCB and Trusted Computing can be used to intentionally and arbitrarily lock certain users out from use of certain files, products and services, for example to lock out users of a competing product, potentially leading to severe vendor lock-in. This is analogous to a contemporary problem in which many businesses feel compelled to purchase and use Microsoft Word in order to be compatible with associates who use that software. Today this problem is partially solved by products such as OpenOffice.org which provide limited compatibility with Microsoft Office file formats. Under NGSCB, if Microsoft Word were to encrypt documents it produced, no other application would be able to decrypt them, regardless of its ability to read the underlying file format.
NGSCB and Trusted Computing are ineffectual at solving the majority of contemporary security problems, for example computer viruses and trojans. Despite this fact, Microsoft has in the past claimed that NGSCB was necessary to combat the threat of future virus outbreaks against Microsoft Windows users.[4] Microsoft is no longer making claims that NGSCB will solve these virus problems.
I have copied the entire text of your message to an offline text file for future reference. (Now I just have to remember that, where it is, and perhaps the file name -- aside from whether I can recall all of the content, if only the gist.)
I suppose the ultimate question is: can we trust Microsoft and its TC associates? Are Microsoft and its TC associates trustworthy?
If TC indeed "locks" its practitioners into using only Microsoft software and/or the software of its associates, then it seems to me that it would inherently violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.
I suppose the ultimate question is: can we trust Microsoft and its TC associates? Are Microsoft and its TC associates trustworthy?
If TC indeed "locks" its practitioners into using only Microsoft software and/or the software of its associates, then it seems to me that it would inherently violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.
total lock in via TC - that was over a decade ago he first stated that, and reiterated it on a number of occasions since. As to the Anti-trust Act, well, that only applies in the US - and there could be a case to argue it doesn't apply when the people have the option of choosing TC or no TC at all. Kind of like choosing a petrol car ties you into Texaco etc.
In the late 1990s Billy put forth his view of the computer future with TC, his concept of TC got trashed. The same happened again about five years later. Interestingly, a few months after each of these trashings of Bill's idea, there was a dramatic increase in the number of virus attacks against Windows and concern about security on the Internet got a major spike in the media. Each time the security concerns about trojans etc gets a spike, the more people seem willing to accept TC.
It is interesting that a lot of the security holes in Windows are used again and again during attacks as the source code is NEVER re-written to close the hole, just a patch put in place to make it harder to access. Also, MS never closes off the security holes it put in Windows to allow it's own applications to work better and faster because it can bypass the main security screens.
Now, if I was REALLY paranoid, I'd be concerned that Billy was behind this in some way, so he can get people to accept TC.
In the late 1990s Billy put forth his view of the computer future with TC, his concept of TC got trashed. The same happened again about five years later. Interestingly, a few months after each of these trashings of Bill's idea, there was a dramatic increase in the number of virus attacks against Windows and concern about security on the Internet got a major spike in the media. Each time the security concerns about trojans etc gets a spike, the more people seem willing to accept TC.
It is interesting that a lot of the security holes in Windows are used again and again during attacks as the source code is NEVER re-written to close the hole, just a patch put in place to make it harder to access. Also, MS never closes off the security holes it put in Windows to allow it's own applications to work better and faster because it can bypass the main security screens.
Now, if I was REALLY paranoid, I'd be concerned that Billy was behind this in some way, so he can get people to accept TC.
In the realm of the high assurance world, MS is not a player.
Look up Roger Schell, Orange book, TCSEC, etc. and you will find out about the world of trusted operating systems etc..
Nice job Deadly E.
Look up Roger Schell, Orange book, TCSEC, etc. and you will find out about the world of trusted operating systems etc..
Nice job Deadly E.
Roger Grimes Infoworld Security Advisor blog as he started a 3 part series on Windows 7 security enhancements. I will see if I can get my CTO to comment on the topic after the final post of the series (Jan 22)
@ Come On post- Michael Kassner,
MS has probably passed on the costs of security to consumers, but even if they did not, don't you think that since they cost the world billions of dollars every year in clean up and recovery, maintenance etc., that it is the least they can do?
@ Come On post- Michael Kassner,
MS has probably passed on the costs of security to consumers, but even if they did not, don't you think that since they cost the world billions of dollars every year in clean up and recovery, maintenance etc., that it is the least they can do?
Otherwise, as probably the best example of what not to do, partnered with another good example of what not to do.
MS should have a massive volume of "learn from our mistakes", but it is hardly a finished work. The federal gov is a study in contrasts: Some of the best security and security practices mixed with some of the worst.
"...and NGOs..."
Oh. Of course.
MS should have a massive volume of "learn from our mistakes", but it is hardly a finished work. The federal gov is a study in contrasts: Some of the best security and security practices mixed with some of the worst.
"...and NGOs..."
Oh. Of course.
Hi Michael. I read this with interest. I'd like to highlight the work Huddle (www.huddle.net) has been doing with private and public sector organisations to help them collaborate securely with people outside of their own IT networks. This is a major problem and one that we have solved at many levels - our customer base reflects this with major global corporates coming on board all the time. If you want to have an interview with a young, fast growing company that is operating in this space then we'd be very happy to oblige. Best Regards Charlie Blake Thomas - Huddle.net
Microsoft helping gov with security. So one eyed leading the blind?
...although I think it's been going on for some time. Generally, groups like this shun any kind of publicity, so we have not seen their activity. I've worked closely with Microsoft in their labs and on various projects over the years, finding them to be dedicated and professional.
It's unfortunate that some people here love to hate Microsoft...the people, technology and standards they've brought to this industry are priceless. Of course, I'll be villified for saying so.
It's unfortunate that some people here love to hate Microsoft...the people, technology and standards they've brought to this industry are priceless. Of course, I'll be villified for saying so.
The amount of money does say a lot...more than some small countries. Putting that kind of time and treasure into R&D is something that few organizations can do. It's good to see their management team believes in R & D enough to fund it at that level.
Not doing R & D in this country is the one thing that is scaring many experts. So, I certainly agree with you on that point.
where do you see any hate from me. I don't hate Microsoft. It more likely seems to be you hating whomever does not share your point of view. I'm just not interested in sweet talk and patting on backs. The only thing I'm interested in are RESULTS.
Microsoft has lot of interesting and cool technologies, which they either developed, or bought. ActiveDirectory for instance is one of the greatest things that they have, and Linux is seriously lacking this for the big leap of conquering enterprise desktops. On the other hand they waste lot of resources on useless stuff and flame wars.
What I really meant with one eyed leading blind is, that neither govt, nor Microsoft have any right to preach about security.
Teenager is able to crack his way into Pentagon, and look at whatever pleases him. Response from govt? Fire the team which failed to prevent that? Officially apologize to the public for doing lousy job? Geez no! Just sentence the kid for life of course!! Afghan peasants are watching live feed from remote controlled planes, which cost astronomical amounts of taxpayers dollars to develop. How ridiculous is that??
And Microsoft? Hardly a month passes without Microsoft fixing bug that allows >remote code execution in products, which they claimed were secure. Blaster and Conficker viruses spread like lightning, causing major havoc everywhere, and bringing down computers without even any need for users to run as administrators (awful design flaw that Microsoft didn't care about for years). There were actually viruses that could get past MS firewall in XP SP1, and disable it from the inside, I mean what the hell??? Truly trusted computing indeed.
What Microsoft really needs is cut down on marketing and sales staff, and hire more developers, to get ahead of things with fixing security holes, and quick. If there is already working exploit for security hole, then its too late.
Colorful powerpoint presentations and patting on backs never fixed a single security hole, nor did it improve any software. Actual WORK is required.
Microsoft has lot of interesting and cool technologies, which they either developed, or bought. ActiveDirectory for instance is one of the greatest things that they have, and Linux is seriously lacking this for the big leap of conquering enterprise desktops. On the other hand they waste lot of resources on useless stuff and flame wars.
What I really meant with one eyed leading blind is, that neither govt, nor Microsoft have any right to preach about security.
Teenager is able to crack his way into Pentagon, and look at whatever pleases him. Response from govt? Fire the team which failed to prevent that? Officially apologize to the public for doing lousy job? Geez no! Just sentence the kid for life of course!! Afghan peasants are watching live feed from remote controlled planes, which cost astronomical amounts of taxpayers dollars to develop. How ridiculous is that??
And Microsoft? Hardly a month passes without Microsoft fixing bug that allows >remote code execution in products, which they claimed were secure. Blaster and Conficker viruses spread like lightning, causing major havoc everywhere, and bringing down computers without even any need for users to run as administrators (awful design flaw that Microsoft didn't care about for years). There were actually viruses that could get past MS firewall in XP SP1, and disable it from the inside, I mean what the hell??? Truly trusted computing indeed.
What Microsoft really needs is cut down on marketing and sales staff, and hire more developers, to get ahead of things with fixing security holes, and quick. If there is already working exploit for security hole, then its too late.
Colorful powerpoint presentations and patting on backs never fixed a single security hole, nor did it improve any software. Actual WORK is required.
They can't help me with a simple question in networking... They think they can help? I read a post from another site about suggesting Linux to the government. I can't find the link from that post anymore.
I don't want to do the debate thing. My intent was to point out that MS is working hard to improve and share their research with the government.
aware of Unix and Linux. There are a number of government projects going on about the feasibility of converting certain major government applications to run on Linux or Unix instead of Windows, as they currently do. Also, a number of small specialised military programs are based on Unix or Linux, mostly to do with embedded software for weapons.
Edit: Check out the info here too:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evaluation_Assurance_Level
Edit: Check out the info here too:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evaluation_Assurance_Level
I am not one of those that it's all or nothing. I know the people in charge of those projects are doing the best thing. I feel the same way when the decision to use MS products is made.
at USJFCOM was C2MR, and that was just a rehearsal of present rescue systems listed in the 2009 Orientation Guide.
I've heard of Trusted Computing, but I think it has been a concept that has been around a while.
I've always figured it was a marketing stunt as well.
I've heard of Trusted Computing, but I think it has been a concept that has been around a while.
I've always figured it was a marketing stunt as well.
in the mid 1990s, it's had a few name changes since then - at one stage they called it Palladium and it got thoroughly trashed by all the security and privacy experts. I did a more detailed post on it elsewhere in this thread, see this post:
http://techrepublic.com.com/5208-12846-0.html?forumID=102&threadID=323594&messageID=3222569
http://techrepublic.com.com/5208-12846-0.html?forumID=102&threadID=323594&messageID=3222569
I'm playing catchup - after a video card failure.
I was never impressed with Trusted Computing, but then, the whole though of "Trusted" and "Microsoft" put together has always been difficult for me.
Don't get me wrong, I use Microsoft, but I don't have to like it either. When I look at alternatives, I look at huge projects that I just don't have time for right now.
I've always been a sucker for "all-in-one" solutions.
I was never impressed with Trusted Computing, but then, the whole though of "Trusted" and "Microsoft" put together has always been difficult for me.
Don't get me wrong, I use Microsoft, but I don't have to like it either. When I look at alternatives, I look at huge projects that I just don't have time for right now.
I've always been a sucker for "all-in-one" solutions.
As long as the "solution" for IT Security remains software focused, the "solution" will only ever be as good as the latest version of whatever software is being used.
MS can help itself by "helping" the government, but at the end of the day no software solution will ever keep pace with the malware underworld.
The solution is hardware.
MS can help itself by "helping" the government, but at the end of the day no software solution will ever keep pace with the malware underworld.
The solution is hardware.
freedom. Software leaves some freedom, the hardware solutions provided to date, like the Trusted Module, lock down the system and lock them into a limited number of software providers as well.
If the options are worry about some spam etc, ot be locked up in an Alcatraz type set up, I'll take the concerns coming with the software, thanks.
If the options are worry about some spam etc, ot be locked up in an Alcatraz type set up, I'll take the concerns coming with the software, thanks.
If you can work with open source tools (office, firefox, etc...) there is a hardware solution that will provide the freedom you're looking for. In addition to that the flexibility and freedoms allowed are not dictated by the hardware but by the admin.
If you're talking about IT Security for your home PC, the solution is overkill, but as an enterprise wide solution hardware is the way to go.
It's the only way to have a truly secure web browser, eliminates the need for NAC solutions as well as VPN solutions, protected online transactions, and guest user access. The next version will include secure online communications (VOIP, chat, email)
To opt for the software solution is to ignore the true size and nature of the threat.
If you're talking about IT Security for your home PC, the solution is overkill, but as an enterprise wide solution hardware is the way to go.
It's the only way to have a truly secure web browser, eliminates the need for NAC solutions as well as VPN solutions, protected online transactions, and guest user access. The next version will include secure online communications (VOIP, chat, email)
To opt for the software solution is to ignore the true size and nature of the threat.
I am trying to understand what you mean by a hardware solution? Could you please expand on what you mean? Thanks.
perimeter of the network or segments of the network, which are mostly software anyway, but of providing security at all levels within the network as well.
Remember this is a process. People and organizations are working on things that have have never been done before. The fact that they are willing to try means something.
I spent most of the 1980s and 1990s and a trouble shooter, and one of the first things about fixing a problem and finding new solutions is to identify and correct what's wrong with the current situation - which MS have NOT done and shy away from. This attitude is a real worry.
with windows 7. Our mad scientist has looked at it and says it has some serious problems.
Oh well, the real interesting question is how long this will go on before someone in big business or government bites the bullet and dumps MS big time; then we may see some real action on security.
will include secure online communications (VOIP, chat)."
The next version of what, i.e., what piece of hardware?
The next version of what, i.e., what piece of hardware?
If security is an issue. Why not lock down the computers.
You are trying to have one size fit all. I don't think it can be accomplished that way.
You are trying to have one size fit all. I don't think it can be accomplished that way.
can't put more software on that unit, it's another to 'lock down' ALL the computers so that you have total loss of privacy and anonymity and are permanently 'locked in' to using a limited range of software and hardware products. Especially when the offered solution, once activated, means you can NOT interact or communicate with any other system not utilising the 'locked' system. And that's the final aim of Trusted Computing, and why so many object to it.
If the work is sensitive, lock the computers down. I don't see that as an issue. MS will not be the only solution. Not comfortable, don't use their OSs.
locking down a specific computer or computers is one thing, but good computer security still needs to follow the basics of good physical security - I've worked in and out of physical security systems for nearly forty years - not always in the security side, but more so than not. Starting with banks in 1970 , and some aspects of security in the Aust Dept of Defence in the 1990s. I've worked with Tempest systems and other classified systems as well; but most of my work with them has been on the physical and policy side, not as an IT security guy setting up and Intrusion Detection System or the like. The closest I got to that was in the early 2000 building some secure gateway servers for a DoD classified gateway where the servers had to be 'hardened' against intrusion and mis-use, and that's a real chore.
Each security situation should be evaluated on its own needs and the right tools selected and used, and they can come from many sources. True security is more an attitude that's applied to the whole system, not JUST the perimeter and the odd important room. The MS approach is perimeter and the odd room.
As to database data security, that starts with the operating system of the computer it sits on and the operating system of the computers that have access to it, and includes all the links between. Yet, the approach used by MS that I gather from your article is focussed on the database and their Trusted Computing policy; this is NOT a good security approach policy.
It matters not how great the database is designed if it can be improperly accessed due to a vulnerability in the operating system it sits on or the operating system of a system that has approved access is vulnerable. Secure these first and you've quintupled the security on the database without even touching it.
...............
Let's take this into a physical security situation. A database is a file of records, let's swap them to physical files.
The current MS process is to build a fence around the base put armed guards on the gateway, check people coming in the gate, lock the doors of the building, place a guard at the front door, and lock the room with the files stored in it. But nor effort is put into ensuring people can't climb the fence, the base isn't patrolled by guards, the ventilation exit of the building doesn't have a grill, and the ventilation grills are big enough for people to easily crawl through. Thus, it's easy to enter the base via an unapproved point, enter the building and make your way to the room, avoiding all guards in the process. Once in the room, you have full access to all the files, as long as you hide when someone comes to the room.
A building to be used for the storage and or use of classified material is secured from the ground up, starting with the plans, when done properly. Ventilation ducts are too small to be used by people and have sensors in them to detect radio controlled equipment being used in them. All rooms are locked and have a number of sensors on them, all corridors and rooms are checked by patrols, as are the base, and patrols check the fence line, even though they also have sensors on them.
What MS are wanting to do is to build a huge fortress like set up and then stick the files in a locked room within a warehouse and have all the guards on the fortress walls - that's the aim of the Trusted Computing policy. The current MS approach is better than their intended aim, because what they intend is to lock everyone into their products and then relax on their laurels because they'll 'KNOW' no one can mis-use or abuse their TC systems. And that's the point when they'll be most vulnerable, as they'll be slack. Also, the TC approach is no good until they fix all the problems in their current software.
BTW Not all the current available versions of Unix or Linux are absolutely secure or high security either, but the majority do have a higher basic security than what MS has in theirs. As you often say, select the best to suit the purpose, at present, for a security situation MS is NOT even the third best. An OS should be reasonably secure in its default installation, something that can NOT be said for any version of Windows sold new today.
Each security situation should be evaluated on its own needs and the right tools selected and used, and they can come from many sources. True security is more an attitude that's applied to the whole system, not JUST the perimeter and the odd important room. The MS approach is perimeter and the odd room.
As to database data security, that starts with the operating system of the computer it sits on and the operating system of the computers that have access to it, and includes all the links between. Yet, the approach used by MS that I gather from your article is focussed on the database and their Trusted Computing policy; this is NOT a good security approach policy.
It matters not how great the database is designed if it can be improperly accessed due to a vulnerability in the operating system it sits on or the operating system of a system that has approved access is vulnerable. Secure these first and you've quintupled the security on the database without even touching it.
...............
Let's take this into a physical security situation. A database is a file of records, let's swap them to physical files.
The current MS process is to build a fence around the base put armed guards on the gateway, check people coming in the gate, lock the doors of the building, place a guard at the front door, and lock the room with the files stored in it. But nor effort is put into ensuring people can't climb the fence, the base isn't patrolled by guards, the ventilation exit of the building doesn't have a grill, and the ventilation grills are big enough for people to easily crawl through. Thus, it's easy to enter the base via an unapproved point, enter the building and make your way to the room, avoiding all guards in the process. Once in the room, you have full access to all the files, as long as you hide when someone comes to the room.
A building to be used for the storage and or use of classified material is secured from the ground up, starting with the plans, when done properly. Ventilation ducts are too small to be used by people and have sensors in them to detect radio controlled equipment being used in them. All rooms are locked and have a number of sensors on them, all corridors and rooms are checked by patrols, as are the base, and patrols check the fence line, even though they also have sensors on them.
What MS are wanting to do is to build a huge fortress like set up and then stick the files in a locked room within a warehouse and have all the guards on the fortress walls - that's the aim of the Trusted Computing policy. The current MS approach is better than their intended aim, because what they intend is to lock everyone into their products and then relax on their laurels because they'll 'KNOW' no one can mis-use or abuse their TC systems. And that's the point when they'll be most vulnerable, as they'll be slack. Also, the TC approach is no good until they fix all the problems in their current software.
BTW Not all the current available versions of Unix or Linux are absolutely secure or high security either, but the majority do have a higher basic security than what MS has in theirs. As you often say, select the best to suit the purpose, at present, for a security situation MS is NOT even the third best. An OS should be reasonably secure in its default installation, something that can NOT be said for any version of Windows sold new today.
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