I can't argue against that at all. Between trying to lock the user out of there own property on through to being more of a hinderance to paying customers than criminals.
With my office system example it was meant simply as an example. The use case is indeed invalidated by insider threat. Boot the notebook in the office environemnt, open the document, copy/paste. At minimum, it would have to be part of a framework that kept the user from installing or accessing programs that did not support the DRM system; a task that's nearly impossible.
Admittedly, my thinking was based on outsider threat. I boot the device and do my work with everything happy inside the office or over the vpn. Someone else takes the machine outside the network then tries to open any contained documents and all they get is unusalbe cyphertext due to lost contact with the key server.
There are better ways to accomplish the task. I was just trying to develop a DRM specific example.
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