as not all automated factory floors(or other infrastructures) are quite that integrated with networking. However; many isolated PLC work centers, are accessed by technicians who repair/reprogram controllers during routine maintenance. If a carefully crafted worm or Stuxnet variant were to infect the laptops, that are typically used for such purposes; it doesn't take much imagination to dream up a scenario where a timed attack could bring a factory floor, to what amounts to, a dead stop. Physical damage can be realized by this scenario as well.
I've also seen at least a certain percentage of machines actually controlled by Windows operating systems, so an even easier attack could be imagined in those instances. Fully networked factory floors were existent and growing by the year 2000; but I haven't been working in that area since. It is easy to assume this trend has continued and that we are even more vulnerable in this science by now.
It would be interesting if someone could weigh into the discussion, with any knowledge or theory on how this could affect the interface to the G code popularly used in machining centers in the factory environment.
Discussion on:
View:
Show:
PLC still vulnerable. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programmable_logic_controller
Many larger commercial and government buildings have Johnson controls or other brands of PLC integration. Valves, motors and vents all tied to computer monitoring. More so than the fully networked factory the building infrastructure seems to me more vulnerable.
My machines that use G code are only vulnerable from the sense that their program files are on the corporate network. Factory floors may contain a dozen different PLC and machine control types so the chance that one is vulnerable is there but in most cases the "Infected laptop" scenario would be needed since they are not integrated with the LAN. If the are on the LAN then standard penetration techniques are needed before accessing the Industrial side is possible. Even then useful control requires either a specialized programming package determined by what brand and type of PLC or specially crafted malware focussed on the same (See Stuxnet vs Siemens.)
Many larger commercial and government buildings have Johnson controls or other brands of PLC integration. Valves, motors and vents all tied to computer monitoring. More so than the fully networked factory the building infrastructure seems to me more vulnerable.
My machines that use G code are only vulnerable from the sense that their program files are on the corporate network. Factory floors may contain a dozen different PLC and machine control types so the chance that one is vulnerable is there but in most cases the "Infected laptop" scenario would be needed since they are not integrated with the LAN. If the are on the LAN then standard penetration techniques are needed before accessing the Industrial side is possible. Even then useful control requires either a specialized programming package determined by what brand and type of PLC or specially crafted malware focussed on the same (See Stuxnet vs Siemens.)
- Keyboard Shortcuts:
- Prev
- Next
- Toggle
