JSTOR

Displaying 1 - 10 of 13 results

  • Rationalizability, Learning, And Equilibrium In Games With Strategic Complementarities

    White Papers // Dec 2010 // provided by JSTOR

    The authors study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and ...

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  • Strategic Information Transmission

    White Papers // Dec 2010 // provided by JSTOR

    This paper develops a model of strategic communication, in which a better-informed Sender (S) sends a possibly noisy signal to a Receiver (R), who then takes an action that determines the welfare of both. The authors characterize the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria under standard assumptions, and show that equilibrium ...

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  • Rationalizable Strategic Behavior And The Problem Of Perfection

    White Papers // Dec 2010 // provided by JSTOR

    This paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game, from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess. The answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability. Strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always Nash equilibria; ...

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  • An Approach To Communication Equilibrium

    White Papers // Dec 2010 // provided by JSTOR

    The Nash equilibrium concept may be extended gradually when the rules of the game are interpreted in a wider and wider sense, so as to allow preplay or even intraplay communication. A well-known extension of the Nash equilibrium is Aumann's correlated equilibrium, which depends only on the normal form of ...

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  • Invariant Distributions And The Limiting Behavior Of Markovian Economic Models

    White Papers // Dec 2010 // provided by JSTOR

    Equilibria in stochastic economic models are often time series which fluctuate in complex ways. But it is sometimes possible to summarize the long run, average characteristics of these fluctuations. For example, if the law of motion determined by economic interactions is Markovian and if the equilibrium time series converges in ...

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  • Asset Prices Under Habit Formation And Catching Up With The Jones

    White Papers // Dec 2010 // provided by JSTOR

    This paper introduces a utility function that nests three classes of utility functions: time-separable utility functions; "Catching up with the Joneses" utility functions that depend on the consumer's level of consumption relative to the lagged cross-sectional average level of consumption; and utility functions that display habit formation. Incorporating this utility ...

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  • Learning By Doing And The Introduction Of New Goods

    White Papers // Dec 2010 // provided by JSTOR

    A dynamic general equilibrium model is developed in which goods are valued according to the characteristics they contain, the set of goods produced in any period is endogenously determined, and learning by doing is the force behind sustained growth. It is shown that the set of produced goods changes in ...

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  • A New Approach To Consumer Theory

    White Papers // Dec 2010 // provided by JSTOR

    The theory of consumer behavior in deterministic situations as set out by, say, Debreu (1959, 1960) or Uzawa (1960) is a thing of great aesthetic beauty, a jewel set in a glass case. The product of a long process of refinement from the nineteenth-century utility theorists through Slutsky and Hicks-Allen ...

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  • Growth And Indeterminacy In Dynamic Models With Externalities

    White Papers // Dec 2010 // provided by JSTOR

    The authors study the indeterminacy of equilibria in infinite horizon capital accumulation models with technological externalities. The investigation encompasses models with bounded and unbounded accumulation paths, and models with one and two sectors of production. Under reasonable assumptions they find that equilibria are locally unique in one-sector economies. In economies ...

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  • International Lending With Moral Hazard And Risk Of Repudiation

    White Papers // Dec 2010 // provided by JSTOR

    In this paper, the author examines the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts. The first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed ...

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