A CCA2 Secure Variant of the McEliece Cryptosystem
The McEliece Public-Key Encryption scheme has become an interesting alternative to cryptosystems based on number-theoretical problems. Differently from RSA and ElGamal, McEliece PKC is not known to be broken by a quantum computer. Moreover, even though McEliece PKC has a relatively big key size, encryption and decryption operations are rather efficient. In spite of all the recent results in coding theory based cryptosystems, to the date, there are no constructions secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model the de facto security notion for public-key cryptosystems. In this paper, the authors show the first construction of a McEliece based public-key cryptosystem secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model. Their construction is inspired by a recently proposed technique by Rosen and Segev.