A Relaying Incentive Scheme in Multihop Cellular Networks Based on Coalitional Game With Externalities

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Executive Summary

Cooperative multihop communication can greatly increase network throughput, yet packet forwarding for other nodes involves opportunity and energy cost for relays. Thus one of the pre-requisite problems in the successful implementation of multihop transmission is how to foster cooperation among selfish nodes. Existing researches mainly adopt monetary stimulating. In this manuscript, the authors propose instead a simple and self-enforcing forwarding incentive scheme free of indirect monetary remunerating for asymmetric (uplink multihop, downlink single-hop) cellar network based on coalitional game theory, which comprises double compensation, namely, Inter-BEA, global stimulating policy allotting resources among relaying coalitions according to group size, and Intra-BEA, local compensating and allocating rule within coalitions.

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