Cryptographically Sound Security Proofs for Basic and Public-Key Kerberos

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Executive Summary

The authors present a computational analysis of basic Kerberos with and without its public-key extension PKINIT in which the authors consider authentication and key secrecy properties. The proofs rely on the Dolev-Yao-style model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner, which allows for mapping results obtained symbolically within this model to cryptographically sound proofs if certain assumptions are met. This work was the first verification at the computational level of such a complex fragment of an industrial protocol. By considering a recently fixed version of PKINIT, they extend symbolic correctness results they previously attained in the Dolev-Yao model to cryptographically sound results in the computational model.

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