Joint Pricing and Power Allocation for Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks With Stackelberg Game Model

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Executive Summary

In this paper, the authors study the joint pricing and power allocation for Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) networks with Stackelberg game. In their model, Primary User (PU) is the game leader and jointly determines its power allocation (to guarantee its QoS requirement) and the interference price charged to Secondary User (SU) (to reap revenue). Meanwhile, SU is the game follower and determines its power demand in response to PU's decisions (to get the transmission opportunity). They analytically show the benefit that PU and SU can obtain through deriving the Stackelberg equilibrium. The results show PU's equilibrium profit is asymptotically upper bounded with its marginal power cost as well as its rate requirement.

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