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Okamoto-Tanaka Revisited: Fully Authenticated Diffie-Hellman With Minimal Overhead

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Executive Summary

The Diffie-Hellman Protocol (DHP) is one of the most studied protocols in cryptography. Much work has been dedicated to armor the original protocol against active attacks while incurring a minimal performance overhead relative to the basic (unauthenticated) DHP. This line of work has resulted in some remarkable protocols, e.g., MQV, where the protocol's communication cost is identical to that of the basic DHP and the computation overhead is small. Unfortunately, MQV and similar 2-message "Implicitly authenticated" protocols do not achieve full security against active attacks since they cannot Provide Forward Secrecy (PFS), a major security goal of DHP, against active attackers.

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