On Pseudorandomization of Information-Theoretically Secure Schemes without Hardness Assumptions

A recent work by Nuida and Hanaoka provided a proof technique for security of information-theoretically secure cryptographic schemes in which the random input tape is implemented by a PseudoRandom Generator (PRG). In this paper, the authors revisit their proof technique and generalize it by introducing some trade-off factor, which involves the original proof technique as a special case and provides a room of improvement of the preceding result. Also they consider two issues of the preceding result; the requirement of some hardness assumption in their proof and the gap between non-uniform and uniform computational models appearing when transferring from the exact security formulation adopted in the preceding result to the usual asymptotic security.

Provided by: National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) Topic: Security Date Added: Sep 2012 Format: PDF

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