Security

On the Impossibility of Instantiating PSS in the Standard Model

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Executive Summary

In this paper the authors consider the problem of securely instantiating Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) in the standard model. PSS, proposed by Bellare and Rogaway is a widely deployed randomized signature scheme, provably secure (unforgeable under adaptively chosen message attacks) in Random Oracle Model. The main result is a black-box impossibility result showing that one can not prove unforgeability of PSS against chosen message attacks using blackbox techniques even assuming existence of ideal trapdoor permutations (a strong abstraction of trapdoor permutations which inherits all security properties of a random permutation, introduced by Kiltz and Pietrzak in Eurocrypt 2009) or the lossy trapdoor permutations.

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