Pseudorandom Functions and Permutations Provably Secure Against Related-Key Attacks

This paper fills an important foundational gap with the first proofs, under standard assumptions and in the standard model, of the existence of Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs) and Pseudorandom Permutations (PRPs) resisting rich and relevant forms of Related-Key Attacks (RKA). An RKA allows the adversary to query the function not only under the target key but under other keys derived from it in adversary-specified ways. Based on the Naor-Reingold PRF the authors obtain an RKA-PRF whose keyspace is a group and that is proven, under DDH, to resist attacks in which the key may be operated on by arbitrary adversary-specified group elements.

Provided by: University of California, San Diego Topic: Security Date Added: Jul 2010 Format: PDF

Download Now

Find By Topic