Side-Channel Attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter Public-Key Cryptosystems

Research within "Post-quantum" cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, the authors investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by and novel countermeasures against such attack. The availability of a heterogeneous, i.e., structurally diverse, range of cryptosystems has significant advantages. For example, diversity in security properties that underpin said cryptosystems helps to insulate users from advances in cryptanalysis.

Provided by: University of Bristol Topic: Security Date Added: Sep 2010 Format: PDF

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