Universally Composable Secure Computation With (Malicious) Physically Uncloneable Functions
The use of Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs) in Cryptography is a recent breakthrough that has caught the interest of both theoreticians and practitioners. A major step towards understanding and securely using PUFs has been done where Brzuska, Fischlin, Schr?der and Katzenbeisser augmented the Universal Composition (UC) Framework of Canetti by considering Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs). Their model considers trusted PUFs only (i.e., adversaries are assumed to be unable to produce fake/malicious PUFs). Moreover, they assumed that the simulator can observe queries made by an adversary to a PUF (i.e., an adversary can access a PUF only in a prescribed detectable way).