Security

Worst-Case to Average-Case Reductions for Module Lattices

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Executive Summary

Most lattice-based cryptographic schemes are built upon the assumed hardness of the Short Integer Solution (SIS) and Learning With Errors (LWE) problems. Their efficiencies can be drastically improved by switching the hardness assumptions to the more compact Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE problems. However, this change of hardness assumptions comes along with a possible security weakening: SIS and LWE are known to be at least as hard as standard (worst-case) problems on euclidean lattices, whereas Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE are only known to be as hard as their restrictions to special classes of ideal lattices, corresponding to ideals of some polynomial rings. In this paper, the authors define the Module-SIS and Module-LWE problems, which bridge SIS with Ring-SIS, and LWE with Ring-LWE, respectively.

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