Analysis of Peer-to-Peer Service Provider in Queuing Networks
In this paper, the authors anatomize incentive structures in peer assisted services with multiple content providers and focus on stability issues from two different angles: stability at equilibrium of Shapley value and convergence to the equilibrium. They first define a coalition game in a peer assisted service with multiple content providers by classifying the types of coalition structures as separated, where a coalition includes only one provider, and coalescent, where a coalition is allowed to include more than one provider. They show that the Shapley payoff scheme may lead to unstable coalition structure and propose a different notion of payoff distribution scheme, value, under which peers and providers stay in the stable coalition as well as better fairness, is guaranteed.
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