Beyond Secret Handshakes: Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Key Exchange

The authors consider a very strong notion of Secret Handshakes, namely Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Key Exchange protocols (AH-AKE), which guarantee security under arbitrary composition of protocol sessions, including man-in-the-middle attacks. The contribution of their paper is three-fold: first, they extend existing notions of AH-AKE security to Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), which guarantees session security even if its participants are later corrupted or any other sessions are compromised. Second, in parallel to PFS security, they specify the exact level of privacy protection, which they call Linkable Affiliation-Hiding (LAH) that an AH-AKE protocol can provide in the face of player corruptions and session compromises. Third, they show an AH-AKE protocol that achieves both PFS and LAH properties, under the RSA assumption in ROM, at minim
Provided by: University of Calgary Topic: Security Date Added: Jan 2013 Format: PDF

Find By Topic