Core-Selecting Auctions for Dynamically Allocating Heterogeneous VMs in Cloud Computing

Provided by: University of Calcutta
Topic: Cloud
Format: PDF
In a cloud market, the cloud provider provisions heterogeneous Virtual Machine (VM) instances from its resource pool, for allocation to cloud users. Auction-based allocations are efficient in assigning VMs to users who value them the most. Existing auction design often overlooks the heterogeneity of VMs, and does not consider dynamic, demand-driven VM provisioning. Moreover, the classic VCG auction leads to unsatisfactory seller revenues and vulnerability to a strategic bidding behavior known as shill bidding. This work presents a new type of core-selecting VM auctions, which are combinatorial auctions that always select bidder charges from the core of the price vector space, with guaranteed economic efficiency under truthful bidding.

Find By Topic