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Internet and Networked Voting

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Both security experts and the N.I.S.T. are concerned about the potential for any computer based voting system to be hijacked or even programmed to change the outcome if the election is close.

http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,114398,tk,dn012204X,00.asp

http://tinyurl.com/2fsbx

http://vote.nist.gov/index.html

With the past history of voting irregularities throughout the US (Florida, Louisiana and Chicago come to mind) the concept of any computer based voting system that does not create a paper trail backup to verify that the tally is correct scares me.

How easy do you think it would be for a politically connected company to design software that would pass general testing but could adjust the results of a close election?

What can be done to assure that the results from computer based systems match what the voters actually voted for?

Chas

4 replies

by road-dog

I am suspicious of these online voting mechanisms. Voter fraud would be nearly impossible to prove and certainly will cause questions about the veracity of the results.

Voting should be done via optically read cards and the cards retained for at least a year after election day. If a card cannot be read by the machine, the card is set aside. This would be a mechanical and impartial arbiter of voter intent.

Any moron who cannot properly fill in an oval next to a name deserves to be mute on election day. Think of it as Darwinian theory applied to voting.

Just as importantly, voting rules should be set before election day, where votes not marked or submitted properly set aside and not counted. This BS of trying to count half punched or unpunched cards as votes does nothing to insure the integrity of the system.

Palm Beach County Florida was a problem again in the primaries of 2002, when democrats were duking it out. This is symptomatic of an incompetent Supervisor of elections (also a democrat).

by oldefar

Illinois in 1960 and Texas earlier (when LBJ first went to Congress) makes the paper trail a lousy piece of security.

How about biometrics for all voters? The card, the voter's retina or palm print, bounced off a master database for confirmation of a registered voter (no other details needed) and a count of having voted (to stop any repeat voters).

The card would not have to identify the voter, only that the individual is a valid voter. The database indicates a vote placed and unlocks the voting I/O. This keeps the voting private.

End of election, the total votes had better not exceed the total of voters. To keep the tally square, a "no vote" option can be added to every ballot item.

by thechas

Okay, Biometrics and other measures can take care of the one person 1 vote and should eliminate those that vote from cemetery plots.

How do you ensure that the software does not adjust the vote numbers for the individual candidates so that one candidate is assured to win?

It would not be too hard to envision a disguised algorithm that would adjust the vote totals only for a close election, and only if the pattern of votes cast followed a "normal" 12 hour progression.

Further, knowing how difficult it is to test and qualify complex software code, would we ever be able to have a reasonable degree of confidence that the software was correct?

At work, we just found a few math errors in some test software that has been in use for over 10 years!

Chas

by oldefar

The issue of stealth software is tough. Who do you trust to validate it? How big a pool of checkers is needed to prevent a conspiracy risk?

If we agree on the national database to insure 1 person 1 vote and prevent ineligible voters, that is a big hurdle in itself.

Now, what if the vote tabulation occurs at a state, or even precent, level and is then bounced against the count of valid voters? This makes the manipulation effort increase by at least 50 locations. As a double blind, the counts are also sent to at least two audit agencies from each of the 50 states. Now we have to have a tally agree across 3 independent groups, only one of which is a government agency.

The software from any given state could be from any number of sources, so to steal an election would again reguire a larger conspiracy.

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