It is another topic I tend to be vocal on. The other bit that I giggle over is remembering how often I argued for hidden SSID until learning a bit more (not to suggest you have more learning to do).
With Network A:
The unconcerned user is going to stick with the list of Wifi from the Windows Taskbar hosted utility or from the various "available networks" utilities for other platforms. They are not going to see a SSID unless it is broadcast because the very basic connectivity utility is only showing broadcasting AP. The extent of this users interest in networks not owned by them is ?can I get on that wireless while in the hotel room?? This is maybe to avoid paying or because the hotel offers no wifi. Perhaps they have a geeky kid at home that is seeing wifi for the first time and won?t know about the other tools yet for five to ten minutes (long enough to try once or twice then hit the internet search).
Anyone beyond the unconcerned user starting with the technically inclined ?lazy bum? user you mention is going to be using more than the ?available networks? OS provided discovery tool. If I believed otherwise, I wouldn?t dare call myself a security geek; perhaps if only to err on the safer side. Even the lazy bum is going to do a search online for how to scan wifi broadcasts else they?d be in the first group of ?available network? only users.
Anything beyond the basic connectivity utility is going to do a few things pretty much by default these days with the first packet it plucks; read the MAC of AP and client node unless the frame is only an AP announcement, read the SSID hidden or not as it has to be included in the frame, read the IP issued to those machines from the packet in the frame, read the wifi?s broadcast channel, confirm that the wifi is wide open or guess the encryption used. I say ?guess? because I?ve one scanner that will initially identify some networks as WEP then correct itself to the actual encryption/authentication as it collects more frames. I believe there is one wifi scanner that does not ?decloak? and it?s a Windows prog (I thought I was netstumbler actually but I can confirm later).
So, anyone beyond John P Niceguy is going to be using something beyond ?Available Visible Networks? connection manager.
It gets worse. The client nodes know that Network A is set to not broadcast the SSID. As such, they know not to listen for the AP coming into range and instead continually call out for it with the hidden SSID. When at home, your connected and all is good. When away from home, your device is announcing your network to everyone within range. An example; I sometimes popup a wifi scanner to glance at while I?m working the way most normal people would turn on the radio beside them (no capture files written encase someone is wondering). I also like to look at the wifi noise when I?m in a new place I?m not familiar with the traffic in the way one would flip through a book when waiting for a friend at the local coffee shop; again, just to see the wifi noise and keep up with the unseen trends. In both cases, I get a ton of ?probe? nodes appearing along with AP. These are devices unattached to a wifi network with radios left turned on calling out for hidden SSID. Perhaps there is little danger in knowing your cloaked SSID since they?d have to stalk you home to find out where it was actually useful to them. The point is that the cloaking does nothing, nada, zip, zero. It only serves a false sense of security by doing something that feels safer rather than something that is actually safer.
With Network B
The unconcerned user can see your SSID as an available network. Your WPA2/AES keeps them off your network though being John P Niceguy, they only care to connect too there own anyway. In a perfect world like this, everybody could run wide open WIFI with no security and no threat.
Here?s the key though; WPA2. WEP doesn?t cut it with my being able to break my own WEP key with not enough packets captured and my machine chewing on it overnight. Had I used a noisy method, I could have popped my WEP in under fifteen minutes. As it was, I?d left it running in the cracker over night just as a CPU burn in figuring it wouldn?t find a key in reasonable time anyhow. To my surprises and in place of a chart and ?time running? counter, I was greeted with my WEP key and an idle CPU. WPA2 is still considered strong though (or, not breakable in a reasonable amount of time).
Forgoing the usual pages long discussion on the correct uses of the title Hacker and suffice to say; you use it incorrectly. The Hacker would be the person saying hello to there neighbor over the back fence and mentioning that they notice the wireless wide open then offering to help the owner lock it down. The person breaching wifi networks without owner?s consent has nothing to do with Hacking. There?s no skill or ingenuity required for popping wireless; just persistence and patience. Let?s call them what they are; the Criminal trying to breach the low hanging broadcasting fruit is screwed by the WPA2 so knowing the SSID does nothing and the wifi owner does not develop false senses of security because they feel hidden by a cloaked SSID.
Further, and part of my own intentions, other wifi owners in the area will hopefully see the broadcast SSID and what channel it is on and pick a different channel. I know I do this to choose the least populated channel (I included broadcast and cloaked SSID populating channels though). And, the client nodes know that the SSID is broadcast and that they should quietly wait for it to come into range rather than constantly call at for it.
Network B may have more attempts purely by people accidentally connecting or hoping to score a quick connection rather than pay the coffee shop. I wouldn?t even consider them high enough up the food chain to be ?Lazy Bum? crackers.
Anyone who is intentionally looking for wifi to pop is already using the tools that negate any benefit of a cloaked SSID. The result, Network A hidden and Network B announced are both going to get hit just as much by those with malicious intentions.
I do understand the popularity of Windows but I just can?t agree that popularity is a measure of the system security nor should it be part of the security strategy. If it?s icing on the cake after then fine but leave it out of business plan and any other planning documents; it has no place there.
By contrast, other markets where Windows is not the most popular platform; it?s still showing the highest number of attempts and, of far more concern, the higher number of successful attempts. The system design itself is broken in terms of safe computing for the lazy end user who takes no extra effort to be safe. By simply improving the importance of secure design that popularity of attempted and successful breaches could be greatly reduced the way it is with other platforms.
If anything, the easy of breach is what makes it such a popular target, not the market share making it a popular target.