Discussion Locked

Continuum

0 helpful
65 replies
Closed to new repliesThis discussion is closed. It stays readable, but it takes no new replies.
blog root

65 replies

by badams

When you print stuff like the following: "This difficult is compounded by the face . . ." it makes me less than motivated to continue reading the article.  You need a proofreader. :)

by rosearch

Gday Badams, thanks for the correction.  Yes I used to have a proofreader, but hadn't used him recently as I'd thought I'd got on top of that 'brain running ahead of the hand' thing.  I'm curious though, the text you quoted sounded like my 'usual drivel' but I can't track it back to any of the articles, I'm wondering if there's a cached version kicking around.  Let me know (if you're inclined).  


It's an interesting debate though.  Some would say that you might be 'too pernicky', but I tend to agree with you that something that aspires to being 'quality' should aim for a pretty high standard on all fronts


Regards, John McCann

by local support

All system users are individuals - different people. Some of our end users ask me to help them phone the help desk.

Help desk staff mostly speak our own language. but the end users do not understand anyway.

/Local support 

by rosearch

Gday Local, when I talk about help desks forming strong alliances with system users that's just 'one version' of how the 'relationship flows' arrange themselves. The 'help desk at war with the system users' and 'not speaking the same language' are defective versions. Curiously those defective versions ought to ensure that the help desk staff are more closely aligned to the the rest of the IT group (on the basis that they ALL have a common view of system users).

What actually happens is that the help desk staff are STILL despised by the rest of the IT group because the help desk is (always will be) stuck with the role of referring 'difficult cases' on to the remainder of the IT group. What a happy place those help desks are, despised by the customers and despised by their colleagues.

Fixing up the relationship with the customer is just a matter of 'doing what help desks ought to be doing' and running some advocacy on behalf of the customers (which makes the relationship with your colleagues worse). Fixing up the relationship with your colleagues requires something much more substantial - basically you need to be in a position to offer your colleagues something positive to counteract the effects of the 'awkward jobs' that will still be coming through. My suggestion is that is Client Knowledge and Client Tools, things that visibly make THEIR jobs easier.

by rosearch

Gday Local.  I'm mindful that when I talk about 'defective' models I'm not talking about defective people.  The thing about IT is that most people in it have a little bit of passion (else why would many of stay here) and whether it's a passion for helpding people, or for doing 'technical things', it's not something that you'd criticise lightly.  So telling these folks they are doing the 'wrong thing' is generally not a good way to get them to consider 'other ways' of doing things.  What I like to do is stimulate thinking on how much more enjoyable/productive/satisfying things would be 'IF' things were different (most people can fill in the blanks).  Our fault (mine as well) is that too often we get to the point where (through exhaustion, or through being 'boxed in' too long) we just give up and tell ourselves 'well that's the way it is'.   Life is too short to spend all of the working part of it frustrated, angry or tuned out (the things that happen to passion when it has no positive outlet).

Sometimes the answer is to get out (one of my colleagues became a commercial airline pilot, others have become artists, police officers and builders).  Other times the answer lies in just a little shift in the ways things are done.  When your talking about 'difficult' relationships between people and groups it always comes down to 'who will make the first move'.  IT traditionally has 'dug itself in' on that point - working on the basis that we are the custodians of the 'new' technology and the 'more rational' approach - and taken the view that others will have to change to meet 'our' requirements, but we will not change to meet theirs.   But if we believe the difference between IT and the consumers of IT services is that IT is 'cleverer' then surely we have more capacity to shift and adjust our approach, and a greater responsibility to TRAIN and EDUCATE the IT consumers.  Folk (and I know that you are not one of them) who despise IT consumers lack of 'proficiency' are really just telling me that they (those folk) are dud performers or part of a dud IT team that doesn't know how to do its job properly.

To come back to your example, if people don't have the technical expertise, or the confidence to call the IT section to book a help desk job it tells me that there's something wrong with the organisation (not the people) that can be fixed. We might say that these people shouldn't be working in the organisation at all - well that's a viewpoint, but if folk believe that what are they doing to change the organisation's recruitment or performance management policies and get rid of these people?   It might be in some cases the RIGHT response, or it might be WRONG response, but I'm absolutely sure that to  have a view that something is defective and do nothing at all about it is the DUMB response.

by gunnar klevedal

Rosearch said:

"Eight years ago the first reports of printers being 'hacked' into came to light.  This was a result of a change in 'capability' in printers, now being network enabled.  Obviously large multifunction printer/copiers/faxes in offices have introduced another 'capability'.  This capability opens up the interesting possibility of programming the machine to fax everything that is printed or copied to an external location"

Gunnar Klevedal says:

This is interesting news for me. I have always thought about network printers as common  local printers, that can be used by several people 'almost' simultaneously. In other buildings than mine, they have actually installed some 'intelligent' printers-copiers, and i believe one of them has FAX capabilities. I've been invited to come and have a look at it. but not taken the time. Think I should go and have a look.

What you said about End user certification was also inerresting. We have it too. Our first level is Building access control. Then a smart card and a PIN-code is needed to log into a workstation. The users certificate lasts for one year.  There is nothing of value stored on the PC, All information is on the server..

 

by rosearch

If setting up firewalls, and undertaking hugely expensive and complicated processes for managing security in an organisation are considered acceptable and inevitable parts of operating in the world today, to what degree should organisations consider simply making themselves invisible? Of...

This post originally appeared on an external website

by rosearch

Good point Local, I was thinking about the degree to which a manager's direct staff were involved in educating him or her to be a 'better manager', but I missed the degree to which people outside the managers direct group worked with him or her. IT support staff (and I was one before AND after I was on IT Executive) have unique access to just about everyone in an organisation. In fact the only people who don't have respect for a really good IT support person would be the propeller heads in the IT specialist areas.

So what does a good IT support person 'do' with this access. Obviously you're there to help solve problems. But the access, the respect that you have allows you to 'influence' things here and there, connect people together, make a suggestion, give an opinion. All done very carefully, the more precise or 'strong' you are in your views the more likely that you'll bump into resistance (and be wrong!). And being 'wrong' means you lose the respect and the ability to influence.

Let's use an example, say a system that the staff are having a lot of trouble using (because it was badly designed). The manager is blissfully unaware of course (none of his own staff will tell him bad news), and the senior ranks of IT know but won't admit they've got a 'dog' on their hands (and after all, the support guys will 'fix it up') and if anyone has the guts to tell the Executive they won't want to know that they've just wasted a large sum of money. So who can tell the manager - well obviously the IT support guy. How? Well you could say, next time the Manager needs some support,"I can't come down now because I'm busy fixing the problems with that XXX system". Ok, but this is better: "I'll come down straight away, I have a heap of work to do with problems with that XXX system and this will be a chance to deal with them all at once.."

A cat - as they say - may look at a King. And tell him a tale or two about 'what's really going on'. And the manager (and this was the point of the post originally) might learn that it's possible to manage a section and have no idea of what's going on until he/she's told by a 'most unlikely source'. Cheers, JMc

by local support

Guess you type wit 10 fingers. I write slowly with one finger, because of nerve disease.

Like your comment.

 

timeout   , place closes

have a good weekend

 

/Local support

by rosearch

Gday Local, I resisted learning to touch-type for many years
- it was mostly just a prejudice against taking one more step down the 'slave
to the machine' path (I was an IT manager with Luddite tendencies..). When I
eventually decided to take the plunge I came across the issue of QWERTY's in-built inefficiency
all my usual dark suspicions were confirmed. I might add that not even the
QWERTY fans argue that the keyboard is optimised for efficiency - what they do
argue is whether any of the alternate keyboard styles is faster/easier to
learn/use. So I spent two or three weeks plugging away trying to learn on a Dvorak
layout using a typing tutor program but gave it away when the tutor kept
'bleeping' at me every time I made a mistake. I came back to it a year or so
later, without the tutor this time, and was touch typing on a Dvorak layout
within a week (badly). Two years later I'm still not a hugely fast typist, but
my fingers do less work for the same output (as QWERTY) and I get the some evil
satisfaction of watching other folk who sit down at my PC floundering when they
discover that pressing F results in U (I remap the keys in the PC config, but
don't bother using a special physical keyboard anymore). Frankly though, I'm
still waiting for a decent (cheap) speech to text technology.

But regarding length of posts, It's the quality of the thought, not the
quantity of words that matters.

by gunnar klevedal

40 years ago I learnt touch-typing on a real typewriter. I could type the whole alphabet without looking at the keys. Today's keybords for The PC are different,  Nowadays i cannot do that.

I agree with local support that all users are end users, one way or the other.

I myself is not the administrator on any PC at work. Tis is good, because i have the same limitations, as the people i try to help. The helpdesk is remote, in another city. With the use of netmeting they can become an administrator on the local machine, and fix errors.

On my home PC I've created four accounts and my own account is  'restricted user'.

Have a nice Day.

by rosearch

Thanks Gunnar, I am having a very good couple of days.  A bit of dialog makes blogging worthwhile.  You really raise another good point, and that is that there is incredible diversity in most organisations - or I should say 'in the people' in most organisations.  A manager who gets 'out and about' and has a chance to engage people in conversations can learn a lot from listening to their stories.  When I first started work 25 or so years ago I was working with a lot of guys who'd been through the war and had stories to tell about quality of human endeavour and fortitude. Now 25 years later a new generation of 'old guys' tell stories about mainframes and the sense of excitement at harnessing technology to deliver a better world.  It makes me wonder what stories this generation of IT folk will be telling in 25 years from now about their 'good old days'. But the point is, get out and talk, and listen - and call it time well spent.  Cheers, Tban/Rosearch

by gunnar klevedal

Hi Tban

You are quite right about talking to people. What is also important is that you must try to adjust your language , when talking to different people. Commmunication should be two-way with a common vocabulary. I live in Sweden, and at work we speak Swedish. But we use the English version of Win2k and MS Office. I sometimes find myself speaking a mixture of Swedish and English. but mostly I explain computer questions, trying to se the situation from my coworkers standpoint.

Have a nice day    ,Gunnar

by rosearch

While we're here I may as well canvas some other 'angles of influence'.  You could categorise the story of the IT support guy talking to the Chief Executive under the heading 'Access'.  Of course getting yourself demoted so that you can wander round the building and talk freely to anyone at all has it's downside.  We'll firstly there's the cut in pay, but then there's also the cut in 'status' - and status has a lot to do with your ability to influence.  What you might do is use someone who is already in that role (rather than stepping into it yourself) and form an 'alliance to influence'.  Mind you, if that seems complicated, another fellow I knew seemed to run a fairly good angle by inviting his targets out on his boat.  Even the offer sounded rather grand, and if accepted it created an interesting power play 'on board'.  Obviously the captain is the guy at the wheel...

Other angles, well the old powerpoint presentation might win hearts and minds, but nothing beats raising some issue close to your heart while addressing your companies customers (preferably in the presence of your Executive).  Or even better, writing a speech for your Executive to read when addressing those customers.  While the latter method is prone to editorial interference by the Exec's, it's less likely to be prejudicial to you career.  But heck, if the company doesn't care for the ideas that are 'close to your heart' what are you doing working there anyway?

Other angles involve sending key players off on 'mind altering' training courses, seminars, or experiences.  How does this work on your Boss or the Executive?  One method is to apply to them (with all of the brochures etc) for authorisation to go (and write a justification that says 'although more suited to higher management I would dearly like to spend a week on the beach in Bora Bora')  Result: one sun-tanned Executive primed to do whatever the trip primed him or her to do (there was some 'how to be a better Executive course attached to the holiday wasn't there?).  On the other hand if you have a vacilating Executive, pray for a near-death experience for him/her just prior to the next 'normally unproductive meeting'.  There's nothing like the whizz of the grim reaper's scythe to put things in perspective for the chronic procrastinator.   Leaving brochures and publications around helps as well.

In fact bringing astronomy magazines in to work (one of my interests) launched one of my colleagues on a entirely different career path.  Which leads me to a nice concluding point.  If you want to talk about influence you need to decide before hand what you are trying to influence folk to do (or believe, or whatever).   If you're fuzzy about that you'll get fuzzy results.  And then you have to understand why they (and they'll all have different reasons) won't think it's a good idea.  And then work on persuading them how good it will be for them (individually). Very seldom - and you knew this already - is it about the 'merit' of the idea or the product.  It's all about engineering a 'coincidence of interests' - mine and yours.

by rosearch

Soapbox Graphic

Think NORAD, missile silos. The guy with the launch key, and the other guy with the other key. Insert and turn simultaneously to launch missiles. Don't we live in a dull world nowadays.

I'm wondering if anyone else has ever wondered if you can actually stop your most senior IT superuser, your most trusted systems administrator, from being able to operate 'without restriction' in your network. Is the answer to split the passwords for the highest level access into two, and give half to the systems administrator, and the other half to the senior internal auditor? So that neither could access the highest level account without the involvement of the other.

Why would you want to restrict your systems administrator at all? Because they have children, wives, and a hundred other ways of being 'turned' by someone who wants to do that badly enough. But wouldn't the audit trails reveal any wrong doing by the system administrator? Not if they had sufficient access to manipulate the audit files. So all we have to do is prevent the systems administrator from being able to touch the audit files? Yes. How do you do that if they have full access? Don't give them full access - create an account that does everything they need EXCEPT the ability to touch the audit files, and give them that. Call it the Systems Administrator Operations account. Then take the true Systems Administrator access and split the password between the Administrator and the Auditor. The Auditor won't be using that for their day to day work (they'll have an Audit account), so in fact the Administrator and the Auditor shouldn't need to do the two key trick very often at all.

Would this work, has anyone tried it? Are there ten thousand system administrators out there who would take this as an attack on their integrity? Should we nevertheless rise above our stung pride and start thinking seriously about accountability?

Want to see who's next On the Soapbox? Find out in the Blog
Roundup newsletter. Use this link to automatically subscribe and have it
delivered directly to your Inbox every Wednesday.

by apotheon

It would be prohibitively difficult to implement, and even more difficult to maintain. Your sysadmin would be hamstrung and your auditor would be spending all his time looking over the sysadmin's shoulder. It just wouldn't work that well.

There's an alternative, though: configure all systems on the network to send system and user log data to a given reserved IP address. Don't have a computer at that address: have one outside the network's address range that uses a utility such as snort to "listen" for traffic directed at that address and log it. This creates an "anonymous" logging server. You can give that server a root password (since it would best be implemented with a unixy OS, I'll not play silly buggers with euphemisms for "root") that is not in the sysadmin's possession, and let the auditor manage that system. Voila, you have accountability without destroying the effectiveness of your sysadmin.

by ru_trustified

There is a clear principle in security that you do not give any one
person all of the keys to the kingdom, unless he owns the
kingdom. This "separation of duties" and another important
principle, that of "least privilege" go along way to preventing
intrusions and abuse by "authorized" users in the system. In the
enterprise, the duties should be shared by the senior system admin, and
the chief security officer. No one person should be wearing both hats
for some of the reasons listed in the blog.

The norm, unfortunately, is that once you are "in" the network or
system there are nothing to stop any insider from accessing anything
that he wishes to, unless the organization is lucky enough to have a
security savvy administrator. However, since many IT people are run off
their feet, many do not have the time to implement all that they
could/should or or perhaps do not realize all of the risks, for the
simple reason that they are not "security" people.

Most security breaches are from insiders. Check out "The Insider" by
Dan Verton for a horrifying snapshot of supposedly secure enterprises.
The most costly breaches are from insiders. Everyone has a price. How
does one protect systems and data from a disgruntled DBA, (the
"accidental" deliberate data dump) or and employee who goes off the
beam?

Would logging prevent incidents from happening? Not if the
perpetrator planned to sabotage the system, or start a nuclear attack
and then do himself in? Would logging stop someone from selling a trade
secret and disappearing to another country with his booty? Probably
not. Security that is reactive, or after the fact, may not be much good
as a disincentive or a preventative measure.

The technology that is required in referred to as "mandatory access
controls", which is not well understood even by so called security
people unless they have a military background, and it is often mistaken
for "network" access controls such as user id, but again leaves us with
the situation where once the user is in, he has access to everything.
Mandatory access controls regulate user access to all files and
devices. Unfortunately this technology from the military paradigm has
always been too complex and costly for use by anyone except for
situations where the expense was justified.

At this point I offer the following disclaimer: I am part of a company
that now offers a technology that offers mandatory access controls and
tamper resistant audit trails. It regulates system calls, network
calls, file access requests and device usage for all system users,
including the super user. It is an advanced security sub-system for
Linux that can be dropped on a running Linux system. It will then
provide a layer of core security that protect system and
data from the o/s layer to the user layer. We now offer an
appliance that can be used as a front end for any platform server,
which now means a trusted computing environment can be offered from
appliances that are dropped into the existing IT infrastructure. Linux
skills are not required.It is not SELinux based. That is enough detail as it is not my intent
to "sell" but to contribute to this discussion.

A detailed paper on this kind of security can be found here, but the
link may be disrupted temporarily over the next few days due to web
site revisions.

http://www.googgun.com/TRUSTIFIER_UNDERSTANDING.pdf

Why should system administrators be worried about the enterprise protecting their assets? 99% of them may be honest but can anyone predict who can't be trusted? Can anyone guarantee that someone will not steal trade secrets? As long as they have the tools and access to do their job, what is the problem? Is it really wise to rely on cub scout promises, prayer and the hope that everyone will do the right thing when millions of dollars,the survival of the enterprise, or the security of the nation may be at stake, or does worrying about stepping on a few toes matter more?

by royhayward

Well for starters, the whole two key missle launch is not just a government policy, it is a military policy.  I have nothing but respect for the service man and women who protect our nation.  But for the buracracy that serves them, I have no desire to imulate.  This is a very bad idea.  And there is nothing to pervent the auditor and sysadmin from caluding together, so you still have not plugged the whole.

At some point you have to trust somebody.  Finding people that you can trust to work in you IT group is a business necessity, if you can't do that they you have failed as a manager/business owner.  Please let me know what your company is so that I can make sure I never do business with you.  But after you have found these trustworthy people, just go to them and ask how we can keep things secure, and how we can log all the activity, even theirs.  We all understand that security protects the sysadmin as much as the company and user.  We will build you a system that you can understand, and that will work with the buisiness that you are in.

Now for the scary part.  For those of us that deal with security, there is, at some level, in every system, a hole in any systems security.  Given enough time on a system, and I can get around its security.  Why, am I sitting in my office thinking of ways to beat my own security?  Well I'm not, I am having managers and developers and DBAs come in and and say, "How can we do this?"  where the answer is "We can't" but the need is real, so now I have to figure out how to make the system do something it wasn't designed for, and  after a few of these sessions, I have found the hole in the fence.

Do I then jump up and fix them.  No time for that, and it would just make me find more holes.  "How can you keep finding holes?  Why not just make the system 'totaly secure' from the beginning?"  Well because we actually have to use the system for our work.  Having a system that doesn't let anything happen will be suecure, and devastating to business.

The answer is to balance the trust of you employees with the needs of the business.  And don't do it in a black box, let the sysadmin know that he is part of the team that keeps company in business.  (I bet he/she already knows this, but it is you who have forgotten.)

by ru_trustified

"At some point you have to trust somebody."

That may be true Roy, but if one can not guarantee 100% that you can trust
everyone in your organization, then you must PROTECT, and the need to
do that escalates with the value of the data that must be protected.

Many people are not aware that the most serious and costly cyber
breaches are from the inside job. A Price Waterhouse Coopers report in
the last quarter of last year stated that the average cost per inside
breach for the enterprise was
 @ $1.7M and that 59% of enterprises had
been hit. (Probably understated)

Why not just make the system 'totaly secure' from the beginning?"

The IT architectures that are the basis for today's OS's were designed
by academics for academics, for the purpose of sharing information.
Security was not a consideration. When they are used in ways not
originally intended, holes develop.
When status quo security technologies are applied as band-aid fixes
then we are left with interoperability problems and things that break
applications. Only status quo approaches to IT security impede business
functionality.

You are right when you say that the system has to work or the end result can be devastating to the business.

Many people do not understand the difference between a hardened, and a
trusted system. A simple definition of a trusted system is that not
even the system administrator can tamper with the data.  There is
a big difference between " having a system that doesn't let anything
happen will be suecure" and having a system that only disallows 
"unauthorized"  system or network calls, or file access attempts.
Monitoring can not actually prevent abuses from happening, although it
may be enough as an disincentive in many cases.  It is still
"reactive". If your trade secret is already gone to another country
though, the damage is done, even if you do happen to figure out who did
what and when.

by rosearch

I have picked up some interesting views, here and off-line. It seems that there's a couple of issues at the 'heart of the issue'. Firstly though, while the two key (two person) approach would suggest the possibility of collusion/conspiracy between the two key-holders, the odds against that are exponentially higher than that of a single system administrator working alone unobserved. Furthermore, when the key-holders come from different backgrounds (IT and Audit) there is less liklihood that they would have any other relationship (ie proximate working relationship) on which to develop a conspiracy.

That said, two 'new directions' emerge from the discussions so far. Firstly, no matter what technical arrangements you put in place (all the way up to a two-key system), what should you do to ensure (as an organisation) that the IT Systems Administrator that you recruit, and continue to employ, is a 'person of integrity'. Do you run police checks, and do you run checks across national as well as local jurisdictions? Do you check every academic qualification claimed, and check with previous employers (and not just a single person that the applicant has nominated from the most recent - or more worryingly from some not so recent - employer)? This checking helps, but doesn't predict the most likely reason for someone on the inside 'going bad' AFTER you employ them, which is a gambling habit that gets out of control, or a drug habit (either the employee's or that of someone in their family) that has led to debts. I'll leave it to subtler minds to suggest what might alert you to these issues. People are generally very good at keeping these things 'hidden', but you might start by keeping tabs on their leave records, and watching for signs of work conflict - basically looking for anomalous behaviours. If this sounds a bit 'too heavy' remember that we have generally agreed so far that in many cases (for reasons of cost) you 'just have to trust' while noting that the System Administrator has 'total access' to your fundametal business systems. If you value those systems 'blind trust' might just be a little 'too blind'.

The second direction that emerges from discussion is 'how difficult' is it to 'limit' the Security Administrator while giving them 'free reign' to deal with and fix any problem that might arise in the system at short notice. I note some suggestions for 'total solutions' and don't discount them, but I imagine they don't come cheap. Again it's a question of putting a value on your business continuity. I have suggested a very limited approach, locking the System Administrator out of the Audit operations, and the ability to create Audit accounts. The practicality of that in all of the systems we are looking at is yet to be proved, but even 'conceptually' it's a challenging prospect. The reality is that even if we do come up with a feasible technical solution, a System's Administrator is the best-placed person in the world to find a way of 'breaking' the solution. McCann's Law says that 'Every security response will eventually be overcome'. But should the anticipation of eventual failure of an approach mean that it is not worth taking up? In business terms it is a simple equation - does it 'buy me time', does it in combination with other approaches offer a reasonable prospect of success, and does it make it clear to your customers and regulators that you are 'doing your best'. In a world where 'intention' and 'endeavour' have a very high significance in litigation, it might just be worth reconsidering how much effort you are putting into systems security, and reconsidering your definition of 'too difficult'. Cheers, Rosearch/Tban

by justin james

Awesome post! I've frequently been the sole sys admin at a company, and I sometimes wonder if my employer realises just how much they need to stay on my good side. The Bastard Operator From Hell is no joke, I've seen things like that happen where the loss or angering of a sys admin crippled a company. I've always been a nice guy, and played by the "what if I get hit by a bus?" principle, where the network and process is documented to the point where if I were to unexpectedly die or be terminated, they could function without me long enough to get a replacement, as well as lock me out. That's the trust system I establish with employers. But at the end of the day, it is way too easy for an admin to leave themselves a backdoor somewhere, even if it is just a "system account" that happens to have administrative rights & allow remote access. Just remember the words of Bruce Banner: "Don't make me mad. You wouldn't like me when I'm mad."

J.Ja

by rosearch

I must apologise for my inadvertently sexist obsevation about 'wives'.  Of course I meant 'spouses'.  ,, Rosearch/Tban

by rosearch

I must apologise for my inadvertently sexist obsevation about 'wives'.  Of course I meant 'spouses'.  ,, Rosearch/Tban

by vaspersthegrate

I agree totally with the blog. I worked, sad to say, briefly as a management trainee at Steak n Shake hamburger restaurant. A policy was that the store manager had to take someone with her when she took vault deposits of cash to the bank. Did they not trust their own managers? No, not that. It was: they simply did not trust Human Nature, and they wanted a policy to protect both managers from accusations of theft and the company from theft.

One day, the manager went to the bank without me. Then she left on vacation. The next day, a large amount of money was missing. The assistant managers said, "Someone must have left the vault open slightly, in a hurry, and some customer must have somehow got into the office, saw the vault open, and took the cash."

Yeah, right. I'm now dealing with gettting fired by a manager, and the company experienced "massive inventory losses" this past year. I know what really has been going on, and I'm typing a letter to the president today.

This is an illustration of the principle of "two keys" as the blog proclaims.

by bfilmfan

The solution to this issue is to have the logs created on a second system that the admins do not have full access.

Your 2 key concept doesn't prevent collusion.

The military uses the RBAC model with logs being copied to several systems to prevent collusion.

by pat.shediack

Not only do these concerns apply to Sys Admins, but also to those who control electronic records and can delete or transfer records. 

by kg70

Great idea genius.  What would prevent the audit person from being malicious and tampering with the file in order to get the System Admin fired?  Not to mention anyone else from accessing the audit file to manipulate it.  Placing weight on the audit files for purposes of employment is a rocky road.

If you don't trust your employees don't hire them.

 

by royhayward

Internal breaches of security have been and always will be the biggest risk to all businesses.  As in the example of the resturant manager above, IT and sys admins are not the only places where employees breaking the trust of their employer causes damage.  I think the background checks are the best idea.  If I want a job as a sys admin, I should expect a back ground check.  And if that status changes, ie I am arrested or something that would have made me fail the check, I expect that my position will be in jepardy.  Not fair, but it is life and security is a serious thing.

Any time you ever have this illusion of total security then you are fooling yourself.  Let me ilistrate the flaw in the two key aproach.

1.  As a regular task sys admins must be able to unlock and reset passwords for users that have forgotten them.

2.  It is possible to decrypt the passwords if you have access to the system.  That failing, we can make a backup of the password file to keep the old password.

3.  Using the above ability there is nothing to keep the disgruntled sys admin from loging in as the auditor, and erasing their tracks and then replacing the auditors password so that they wont notice.

4.  At this point all your two key system has done is add the illusion of security where there is no added benifit.  (Unless this illusion is a benefit somehow)

One of the risks of business and life is people who break your trust.  I put locks on my doors, but I don't have a barbed wire fence.  Would the locks and the wire really keep out a determined tresspasser?  No, and so I have to rely on the deterance of the laws and their consequences.  Otherwise I will spend all my energy on making my house and my company into a fortress that will deny access to even my friends and customers.

In the end you still have to trust someone.

 

by wmwphl

    I think being a Network Admin or a SytemAdmin that does not have the full trust of his uppermangement would be the worst case scenario. Personally speaking id been a admin for the company for 6 years & having the fullpledge trust in my company, in return i gave them what they ask me for  & also pulling out some new stuff's that would benifit the company's bussiness.I think company must trust his Admin's  just like CSO's or CFO's. Does anyone really check  this guys? No cause they are hired due too thier experince & thier reputation.Just like these guys we too develop our reputation in this industry.Id never thought hacking my system if a time comes that my company would kick me out. Id rather see the network  running smooth thru many years even if Im gone. Cause it would only prove them wrong & id done a great job. I can also use it to my befnifit when i apply to other company I would tell them how i succesfully manage the companies network & have left it running up to this moment even if im gone.

    Auditing is a good thing but we cannot dismiss that the auditor or admin could connide.There are  companies that offer hackers as IT auditors ( if you really want a seriuos it audit ) this would give you a better picture of what has been done & what needs to fix with your network or maybe with your admin. I know it's hard to trust somebody especially if you dont know what he is working on. Best is that you  have a open door with your admin. As long as something does not feel right with him talk to him or let him know.

    Lastly i would recomend to have your company to do a ISO 90001 certifiaction this would help your company document every process that runs in the company ( including IS related process, ex:in my process a backup password is kept with the Admin/Security & is laways tested every moth incase i die in missery or been pirated by other company ) this would make your company process dependent & not people dependent.
       

by rosearch

Gday Bfilm. I note your observation about having logs created on a second system. For those that don't do this, this is probably a good 'next step'. Additionally you'd set the second system to record the logs onto write-once media. The problem still remains however, in that the Sys Admin with control over the primary system has the (potential) ability to 'tailor' what leaves the primary system and heads over to the secondary. But we ARE talking about a significantly reduced risk now. As for collusion, see my earlier comment. I note your reference to RBAC, but I'd suggest that it doesn't have much to say about controlling superuser priveliges. (but I'll talk off-line with you about that if you like).

Gday Kg. You suggest that the audit person might be malicious and tamper with the audit logs. I agree. There is sometimes a fantasy that Auditors (like System Administrators!) are incorruptable. So it's a very good point to raise. What you'd do of course is not give the Auditors access in the system to do anything more than read the logs (no delete, no modify, no create). That'd apply to everyone else as well. It's easy to fall into the trap of thinking that because the System Administrator (in the scenario I propose) can't take 'total control' of the system without the Auditor, that the Auditor has power in the system equal to or greater than the System Administrator.

Gday Roy. Absolutely correct. Total security is an illusion - and a very dangerous one. Which is why I like to keep a copy of McCann's law (Every security response will eventually by overcome) pinned on the wall behind me. However that doesn't mean that you don't 'give it your best shot'. And as you say, there is some benefit in the 'illusion' Except that I'd substitute some phrase like 'best endeavour in a rapidly changing threat environment' where you use the word 'illusion'. Getting back to an earlier comment I inserted, it's not just about the 'effective' security, but also about being able to show the Executive, the stockholders and the regulators that you are doing the best possible job. And you need to work very hard not to create an illusion, but in fact to break down the illusion held by Executives particularly that there is any such thing as 'absolute security'.

I'm coming strongly round to the point of view that what we are talking about here is technically 'difficult' (but not impossible), whereas doing proper background (and ongoing) checks on Sys Admin staff is relatively cheap and easy and gives a good basis for that 'trust' we're talking about. The example you work through (how a sys admin could spoof the auditors password) is exactly what I was looking for when I decided to tickle the tiger with this blog-post. What I'd like to challenge you (in a friendly way!) is to now think of a way of PREVENTING the Sys Admin from following the path you just described. Seriously..

As for barbed wire and your house. I guess it comes back to risk and threat. If I lived in certain countries I would have barbed wire (I have colleagues who have lived in armed compounds). It's a scalar thing. The added thing with systems of course is that it's hard to tell if anything has been stolen, or even tampered with - which is why I put emphasis on AUDIT (knowing that everyone is working like billy-o to get boundary security right). Finally, yes you have to trust, but what we are talking about is having frameworks on which we can build that trust. In a corporate environment where staff 'come and go' and where you have systems that maintain (and have the capacity to cripple) your business you might like to have a very substantial framework (of checks and balances) on which to base that 'trust'.

Finally (really) on liability. One of my colleagues in IT was murdered (many years ago else I'd not talk about it) after working a late shift. By the security guard employed by our company. Who hadn't done sufficient background checks on the man, who had (as I understand it) a substantial record of mental instability. This wasn't a litigious country (or time), but I'd imagine that these days if I was a relative I'd be looking at a multi-million dollar damages claim against the company for (gross) negligence. Just a reminder that 'trust' comes with a price tag. If I - as an Executive - don't do everything (reasonable) to protect the assets of the company and there is a security breach I might be liable to the stockholders and the public, and the regulators. Something to consider when weighing up the difficulties and the costs. Regards, Rosearch/Tban


by jmgarvin

You fail to mention that by restricting your sys/network admin, you've
just created more problems. If this person cannot properly do
their job, then how do you expect to get total performance out of your
IT infrastructure?

There are better solutions:
1) Trust in your sys admin or fire that one and hire one you trust
2) Off load all your logs to a centralized server that is maintained by the auditer/CEO/whoever
3) Have TWO sys admins...
4) Create a "better" envrionment. If you think that your sys
admin is going to take a bribe, then you better start thinking about
your pay structure, your reward structure, or your corporate culture
(or all of it).

If you are so sure that everyone is corrupt from the word go, then why
hire them? If your sys admin is willing to lose their job over a
bribe, then you probably aren't paying them enough. What about
comp time? What about a reward structure that is monetary?
What about the entire culture? How is your IT staff
treated?

While I wear my share of tin foil, I also know that it is certain that
for every bad apple there are 10 good apples. Also, if you show DUE
DILIGENCE, you will be fine.  That means doing proper background
checks, asuring employment history is correct, and getting proper
documenation from the hire. 

If you show
your geeks loyalty, they'll return the favor.

by rosearch

Gday JM, I think you've raised a very good point, and that is organisations that show trust and loyalty towards their staff will be rewarded a hundred-fold.  Long timers in IT know that it isn't just about the salary.  I have to stress though, that doing thorough security checks on staff is not showing disloyalty towards staff, it's just a matter of 'doing the right thing'.  And frankly if the new guy in applications development has been fired from his last 6 jobs I'd like to know about it before I start working alongside him (actually I'd rather the Co. didn't employ him in the first place).  Due diligence, as you say.

What I'm talking about is NOT a certainty that every one is corrupt (I've met a few and can tell the difference), but every one is potentially CORRUPTIBLE.  Take a couple of examples, daughter's hooked on cocaine and being threatened by her dealer, spouse has been in a car accident and is hooked on pain killers, you've taken a knock on the head and lost your inhibitions against gambling with other people's money.  Thing's happen.  Sure, rarely, but the question comes back to 'what have you done (as an organisation) to protect the organisation (and the individual) from 'slipping over the edge' in the case of that rare event occuring to your sys admin.  I agree that a bribe is the LEAST LIKELY thing to influence someone who is already in a position of trust, and for that reason didn't suggest it as a possible cause.

As you'll see in my earlier posts I have raised the question of, "how difficult' is it to 'limit' the Security Administrator while
giving them 'free reign' to deal with and fix any problem that might
arise in the system at short notice".  To my mind that is 'the challenge'.  Surely in IT (of all industries) we aren't going to say "it's too difficult so we can't do it".  That seems to me to be a sure sign that we've lost the innovative edge that created IT in the first place.

by ru_trustified

"how difficult' is it to
'limit' the Security Administrator while
giving them 'free reign' to deal with and fix any problem that might
arise in the system at short notice".  To my mind that is 'the
challenge'.  Surely in IT (of all industries) we aren't going to say
"it's too difficult so we can't do it".

It is difficult but it has been done. Read the link.

Your IT staff can work on the network but not access classified files.
By ranking application or O/S code higher than your staff, they can not
sabotage your systems. Your systems can be protected against accidental
damage by "Joe Idiot" as well, reducing on-going maintenance times.

Trustifier is a commercial enterprise product but it is they who have
data that is worth protecting. Again, I am not trying to sell here, but
sharing for the sake of this discussion, Trustifier  does what you
are calling for, and the naysayers say can't be done.

This discussion is closed to new replies.