65 replies
by rosearch
To be sceptical about the capacity of computer technology to meet the needs of individuals and communities, and to be sceptical about the capability of individuals and communities to take up the benefits (and responsibilities) of technology kinda takes the...
by rosearch
Overview.What is It Component security certification is an approach that works to ensure a comprehensive security coverage of an organisation, by identifying all of the components of an organisation, and ensuring that the security implications of each component are...
by rosearch
There is a case to argue that the practical implementation of Systems Security in organisations has been too strongly focussed on specific threats and requirements around specific components, at the expense of an overall balanced approach.1 It can be argued...
by rosearch
I have spent quite a few years looking after computer and telecoms systems in a patch covering 2.5 million sqare kilometres (mostly desert) and all of that work was done remotely.It was possible to observe that there were factors that...
by rosearch
While it is true to say that ?Service Desk Systems don?t solve problem, people do? the quality of the systems have a considerable bearing on the quality of service, and the quality of the experience for both support staff and...
by rosearch
Information Technology Service Desks (indeed IS Departments) that do no more than resolve problems and requests for assistance in a timely manner are guaranteed a future doing the same thing ad infinitum.A purely reactive Service Desk, is a Service...
by rosearch
The mistake that Organisations frequently make, when looking at the effectiveness of their technology Service Desks, is to focus on how effective the Service Desk is at dealing with the Client, and not at how effective the Organisation is at...
by rosearch
Computer systems include capabilities that enable detailed monitoring of performance and activity within the systems. The requirement to manage the systems and maintain a very high degree of security over them will require that technology staff utilise those capabilities. Systems...
by rosearch
A concern arises as a result of the degree to which activity (essentially staff work performance) can be monitored in our technology systems.Technology staff managing the technology systems have the capacity to observe staff member's work and 'non work' activity...
by rosearch
I was moved to comment yesterday by a programmer who sadly observed that nobody (much) these days cared about building in quality and robustness. I think some programmers should sit down and have a few drinks with architects and get...
by rosearch
Five years isn't a bad life cycle for an organisation these days, particularly one built around a technology capability. An organisation that commences with a reputation for being 'innovative' and 'imaginative' often ends up being seen as 'resistant' and 'unresponsive',...
by rosearch
A Client Knowledge Base is essentially a discipline that involves capturing and building information about the client organisation, and then employing that knowledge to more effectively react to, and anticipate, the client organisation?s technology issues and needs. The focus is...
by rosearch
The traditional 'do something wrong and you will be punished' approach to achieving security compliance means that we alienate a large group within the organisation who should - in fact - be willing allies of the technology security manager. Staff...
by rosearch
The preamble makes the claim that 'faith' underlies much of what we regard as scientific fact. I'll suggest how that is the case, but in doing so point out the difference between a 'faith approach' and a scientific approach'. And...
by rosearch
This post started life as a comment I originally posted on the 'Never Work Alone' Blog, a meritorious site built by group who had the idea of helping folk who have management or organisation problems. My comment relates to the...
by badams
When you print stuff like the following: "This difficult is compounded by the face . . ." it makes me less than motivated to continue reading the article. You need a proofreader. :)
by rosearch
It's an interesting debate though. Some would say that you might be 'too pernicky', but I tend to agree with you that something that aspires to being 'quality' should aim for a pretty high standard on all fronts
Regards, John McCann
by rosearch
I have to admit that if I was someone else applying my own skeptical standards to these posts I'd have to ask 'interesting analysis, but what's this based on and why don't I find these views expressed elsewhere? Well I...
by rosearch
Technology Call Centre managers bemoan the high turnover rate of staff, and yet have very few effective strategies for reducing that rate. Mostly they talk about methods of managing the impact of that rate of turnover - as if it...
by rosearch
I was just over at Chris Lawers blog and picked up a discussion (started by Richard Anderson) about the use of the term 'user' to describe people 'on the receiving end of technology services'. There was some suggestion that 'customer'...
by rosearch
I have tried (and failed) over the last 5 years to sell the concept of the Client Knowledge Base (CKB) to both commercial and government organisations (in both cases 'from the inside'). Obviously part of the failure is down to...
by rosearch
I am wrestling with an interesting concept. To what extent does the 'effective' technology security in an organisation depend upon the degree of motivation and morale of the workforce. A traditional view would have it that Security has an independent...
by rosearch
While we talk about the possibility of 'insiders' being involved in security breaches (well in fact the 'probability' if you believe the surveys), what are the consequences for a outsourced service provider (who is providing security) if a member of...
by rosearch
How do you create a creative organisation out of a (primarilly) processing organisation? You can't, not by your own efforts alone. But you can (help) grow one. Are we talking about making 'everyone' creative? No, the bulk of your people...
by rosearch
The significance of the 'warning' message at an organisations logon screen extends beyond the 'immediate effect' that it is intended to achieve - which is to alert the system user that they are 'at' a private logon screen, that they...
by rosearch
Disaster Recovery Plans (DRP) are predicated on systems and procedures working successfully together. If you're fortunate enough to have a plan, how do you keep it alive - because they seem to 'die' from a range of causes. In fact...
by rosearch
This essay explores the motivators for excellence in Security Management. Specifically it looks at the factors that work against positive motivation, and the limitations of negative motivation when it is applied to Security Managers and Managers with security responsibilities. The...
by rosearch
This paper suggests that we generally underestimate the complexity of the call centre role within organisations.Superficially call centres are about people taking phone calls and answering questions.The simplicity of that activity, and our familiarity with it as one of the...
by rosearch
In a previous post I suggested that the key to understanding what went on in call centres was understanding the relationships between all of the various parties involved in the call centre. I explained that I was using the term...
All system users are individuals - different people. Some of our end users ask me to help them phone the help desk.
Help desk staff mostly speak our own language. but the end users do not understand anyway.
/Local support
by rosearch
What actually happens is that the help desk staff are STILL despised by the rest of the IT group because the help desk is (always will be) stuck with the role of referring 'difficult cases' on to the remainder of the IT group. What a happy place those help desks are, despised by the customers and despised by their colleagues.
Fixing up the relationship with the customer is just a matter of 'doing what help desks ought to be doing' and running some advocacy on behalf of the customers (which makes the relationship with your colleagues worse). Fixing up the relationship with your colleagues requires something much more substantial - basically you need to be in a position to offer your colleagues something positive to counteract the effects of the 'awkward jobs' that will still be coming through. My suggestion is that is Client Knowledge and Client Tools, things that visibly make THEIR jobs easier.
by rosearch
Sometimes the answer is to get out (one of my colleagues became a commercial airline pilot, others have become artists, police officers and builders). Other times the answer lies in just a little shift in the ways things are done. When your talking about 'difficult' relationships between people and groups it always comes down to 'who will make the first move'. IT traditionally has 'dug itself in' on that point - working on the basis that we are the custodians of the 'new' technology and the 'more rational' approach - and taken the view that others will have to change to meet 'our' requirements, but we will not change to meet theirs. But if we believe the difference between IT and the consumers of IT services is that IT is 'cleverer' then surely we have more capacity to shift and adjust our approach, and a greater responsibility to TRAIN and EDUCATE the IT consumers. Folk (and I know that you are not one of them) who despise IT consumers lack of 'proficiency' are really just telling me that they (those folk) are dud performers or part of a dud IT team that doesn't know how to do its job properly.
To come back to your example, if people don't have the technical expertise, or the confidence to call the IT section to book a help desk job it tells me that there's something wrong with the organisation (not the people) that can be fixed. We might say that these people shouldn't be working in the organisation at all - well that's a viewpoint, but if folk believe that what are they doing to change the organisation's recruitment or performance management policies and get rid of these people? It might be in some cases the RIGHT response, or it might be WRONG response, but I'm absolutely sure that to have a view that something is defective and do nothing at all about it is the DUMB response.
by rosearch
Whenever we control system users access by assigning (or holding back) permissions, we are effectively 'certifying' their IT security status. If we don't have a single document (literally a certificate) that describes the sum of all of a particular persons...
Rosearch said:
"Eight years ago the first reports of printers being 'hacked' into came to light. This was a result of a change in 'capability' in printers, now being network enabled. Obviously large multifunction printer/copiers/faxes in offices have introduced another 'capability'. This capability opens up the interesting possibility of programming the machine to fax everything that is printed or copied to an external location"
Gunnar Klevedal says:
This is interesting news for me. I have always thought about network printers as common local printers, that can be used by several people 'almost' simultaneously. In other buildings than mine, they have actually installed some 'intelligent' printers-copiers, and i believe one of them has FAX capabilities. I've been invited to come and have a look at it. but not taken the time. Think I should go and have a look.
What you said about End user certification was also inerresting. We have it too. Our first level is Building access control. Then a smart card and a PIN-code is needed to log into a workstation. The users certificate lasts for one year. There is nothing of value stored on the PC, All information is on the server..
by rosearch
If setting up firewalls, and undertaking hugely expensive and complicated processes for managing security in an organisation are considered acceptable and inevitable parts of operating in the world today, to what degree should organisations consider simply making themselves invisible? Of...
by rosearch
Otherwise known as 'your people', or 'your team', or sometimes simply as 'our team' depending upon how heirarchical your approach is. Setting aside the issue of how technology teams and heirarchies arrange themselves (another post another day) the thing that...
some managers are end users too . We try to help all staff.
/Local Support
by rosearch
So what does a good IT support person 'do' with this access. Obviously you're there to help solve problems. But the access, the respect that you have allows you to 'influence' things here and there, connect people together, make a suggestion, give an opinion. All done very carefully, the more precise or 'strong' you are in your views the more likely that you'll bump into resistance (and be wrong!). And being 'wrong' means you lose the respect and the ability to influence.
Let's use an example, say a system that the staff are having a lot of trouble using (because it was badly designed). The manager is blissfully unaware of course (none of his own staff will tell him bad news), and the senior ranks of IT know but won't admit they've got a 'dog' on their hands (and after all, the support guys will 'fix it up') and if anyone has the guts to tell the Executive they won't want to know that they've just wasted a large sum of money. So who can tell the manager - well obviously the IT support guy. How? Well you could say, next time the Manager needs some support,"I can't come down now because I'm busy fixing the problems with that XXX system". Ok, but this is better: "I'll come down straight away, I have a heap of work to do with problems with that XXX system and this will be a chance to deal with them all at once.."
A cat - as they say - may look at a King. And tell him a tale or two about 'what's really going on'. And the manager (and this was the point of the post originally) might learn that it's possible to manage a section and have no idea of what's going on until he/she's told by a 'most unlikely source'. Cheers, JMc
Guess you type wit 10 fingers. I write slowly with one finger, because of nerve disease.
Like your comment.
timeout , place closes
have a good weekend
/Local support
by rosearch
Gday Local, I resisted learning to touch-type for many years
- it was mostly just a prejudice against taking one more step down the 'slave
to the machine' path (I was an IT manager with Luddite tendencies..). When I
eventually decided to take the plunge I came across the issue of QWERTY's in-built inefficiency
all my usual dark suspicions were confirmed. I might add that not even the
QWERTY fans argue that the keyboard is optimised for efficiency - what they do
argue is whether any of the alternate keyboard styles is faster/easier to
learn/use. So I spent two or three weeks plugging away trying to learn on a Dvorak
layout using a typing tutor program but gave it away when the tutor kept
'bleeping' at me every time I made a mistake. I came back to it a year or so
later, without the tutor this time, and was touch typing on a Dvorak layout
within a week (badly). Two years later I'm still not a hugely fast typist, but
my fingers do less work for the same output (as QWERTY) and I get the some evil
satisfaction of watching other folk who sit down at my PC floundering when they
discover that pressing F results in U (I remap the keys in the PC config, but
don't bother using a special physical keyboard anymore). Frankly though, I'm
still waiting for a decent (cheap) speech to text technology.
But regarding length of posts, It's the quality of the thought, not the
quantity of words that matters.
40 years ago I learnt touch-typing on a real typewriter. I could type the whole alphabet without looking at the keys. Today's keybords for The PC are different, Nowadays i cannot do that.
I agree with local support that all users are end users, one way or the other.
I myself is not the administrator on any PC at work. Tis is good, because i have the same limitations, as the people i try to help. The helpdesk is remote, in another city. With the use of netmeting they can become an administrator on the local machine, and fix errors.
On my home PC I've created four accounts and my own account is 'restricted user'.
Have a nice Day.
by rosearch
Hi Tban
You are quite right about talking to people. What is also important is that you must try to adjust your language , when talking to different people. Commmunication should be two-way with a common vocabulary. I live in Sweden, and at work we speak Swedish. But we use the English version of Win2k and MS Office. I sometimes find myself speaking a mixture of Swedish and English. but mostly I explain computer questions, trying to se the situation from my coworkers standpoint.
Have a nice day ,Gunnar
by rosearch
I was over on the Tech Republic website where 'Local Support' made a good point - it's not just the subordinate staff in a Manager's section that have a chance to educate him or her 'from below'. The IT support...
by rosearch
Other angles, well the old powerpoint presentation might win hearts and minds, but nothing beats raising some issue close to your heart while addressing your companies customers (preferably in the presence of your Executive). Or even better, writing a speech for your Executive to read when addressing those customers. While the latter method is prone to editorial interference by the Exec's, it's less likely to be prejudicial to you career. But heck, if the company doesn't care for the ideas that are 'close to your heart' what are you doing working there anyway?
Other angles involve sending key players off on 'mind altering' training courses, seminars, or experiences. How does this work on your Boss or the Executive? One method is to apply to them (with all of the brochures etc) for authorisation to go (and write a justification that says 'although more suited to higher management I would dearly like to spend a week on the beach in Bora Bora') Result: one sun-tanned Executive primed to do whatever the trip primed him or her to do (there was some 'how to be a better Executive course attached to the holiday wasn't there?). On the other hand if you have a vacilating Executive, pray for a near-death experience for him/her just prior to the next 'normally unproductive meeting'. There's nothing like the whizz of the grim reaper's scythe to put things in perspective for the chronic procrastinator. Leaving brochures and publications around helps as well.
In fact bringing astronomy magazines in to work (one of my interests) launched one of my colleagues on a entirely different career path. Which leads me to a nice concluding point. If you want to talk about influence you need to decide before hand what you are trying to influence folk to do (or believe, or whatever). If you're fuzzy about that you'll get fuzzy results. And then you have to understand why they (and they'll all have different reasons) won't think it's a good idea. And then work on persuading them how good it will be for them (individually). Very seldom - and you knew this already - is it about the 'merit' of the idea or the product. It's all about engineering a 'coincidence of interests' - mine and yours.
by rosearch

Think NORAD, missile silos. The guy with the launch key, and the other guy with the other key. Insert and turn simultaneously to launch missiles. Don't we live in a dull world nowadays.
I'm wondering if anyone else has ever wondered if you can actually stop your most senior IT superuser, your most trusted systems administrator, from being able to operate 'without restriction' in your network. Is the answer to split the passwords for the highest level access into two, and give half to the systems administrator, and the other half to the senior internal auditor? So that neither could access the highest level account without the involvement of the other.
Why would you want to restrict your systems administrator at all? Because they have children, wives, and a hundred other ways of being 'turned' by someone who wants to do that badly enough. But wouldn't the audit trails reveal any wrong doing by the system administrator? Not if they had sufficient access to manipulate the audit files. So all we have to do is prevent the systems administrator from being able to touch the audit files? Yes. How do you do that if they have full access? Don't give them full access - create an account that does everything they need EXCEPT the ability to touch the audit files, and give them that. Call it the Systems Administrator Operations account. Then take the true Systems Administrator access and split the password between the Administrator and the Auditor. The Auditor won't be using that for their day to day work (they'll have an Audit account), so in fact the Administrator and the Auditor shouldn't need to do the two key trick very often at all.
Would this work, has anyone tried it? Are there ten thousand system administrators out there who would take this as an attack on their integrity? Should we nevertheless rise above our stung pride and start thinking seriously about accountability?
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by apotheon
It would be prohibitively difficult to implement, and even more difficult to maintain. Your sysadmin would be hamstrung and your auditor would be spending all his time looking over the sysadmin's shoulder. It just wouldn't work that well.
There's an alternative, though: configure all systems on the network to send system and user log data to a given reserved IP address. Don't have a computer at that address: have one outside the network's address range that uses a utility such as snort to "listen" for traffic directed at that address and log it. This creates an "anonymous" logging server. You can give that server a root password (since it would best be implemented with a unixy OS, I'll not play silly buggers with euphemisms for "root") that is not in the sysadmin's possession, and let the auditor manage that system. Voila, you have accountability without destroying the effectiveness of your sysadmin.
There is a clear principle in security that you do not give any one
person all of the keys to the kingdom, unless he owns the
kingdom. This "separation of duties" and another important
principle, that of "least privilege" go along way to preventing
intrusions and abuse by "authorized" users in the system. In the
enterprise, the duties should be shared by the senior system admin, and
the chief security officer. No one person should be wearing both hats
for some of the reasons listed in the blog.
The norm, unfortunately, is that once you are "in" the network or
system there are nothing to stop any insider from accessing anything
that he wishes to, unless the organization is lucky enough to have a
security savvy administrator. However, since many IT people are run off
their feet, many do not have the time to implement all that they
could/should or or perhaps do not realize all of the risks, for the
simple reason that they are not "security" people.
Most security breaches are from insiders. Check out "The Insider" by
Dan Verton for a horrifying snapshot of supposedly secure enterprises.
The most costly breaches are from insiders. Everyone has a price. How
does one protect systems and data from a disgruntled DBA, (the
"accidental" deliberate data dump) or and employee who goes off the
beam?
Would logging prevent incidents from happening? Not if the
perpetrator planned to sabotage the system, or start a nuclear attack
and then do himself in? Would logging stop someone from selling a trade
secret and disappearing to another country with his booty? Probably
not. Security that is reactive, or after the fact, may not be much good
as a disincentive or a preventative measure.
The technology that is required in referred to as "mandatory access
controls", which is not well understood even by so called security
people unless they have a military background, and it is often mistaken
for "network" access controls such as user id, but again leaves us with
the situation where once the user is in, he has access to everything.
Mandatory access controls regulate user access to all files and
devices. Unfortunately this technology from the military paradigm has
always been too complex and costly for use by anyone except for
situations where the expense was justified.
At this point I offer the following disclaimer: I am part of a company
that now offers a technology that offers mandatory access controls and
tamper resistant audit trails. It regulates system calls, network
calls, file access requests and device usage for all system users,
including the super user. It is an advanced security sub-system for
Linux that can be dropped on a running Linux system. It will then
provide a layer of core security that protect system and
data from the o/s layer to the user layer. We now offer an
appliance that can be used as a front end for any platform server,
which now means a trusted computing environment can be offered from
appliances that are dropped into the existing IT infrastructure. Linux
skills are not required.It is not SELinux based. That is enough detail as it is not my intent
to "sell" but to contribute to this discussion.
A detailed paper on this kind of security can be found here, but the
link may be disrupted temporarily over the next few days due to web
site revisions.
http://www.googgun.com/TRUSTIFIER_UNDERSTANDING.pdf
Why should system administrators be worried about the enterprise protecting their assets? 99% of them may be honest but can anyone predict who can't be trusted? Can anyone guarantee that someone will not steal trade secrets? As long as they have the tools and access to do their job, what is the problem? Is it really wise to rely on cub scout promises, prayer and the hope that everyone will do the right thing when millions of dollars,the survival of the enterprise, or the security of the nation may be at stake, or does worrying about stepping on a few toes matter more?
by isanabria_jr
by royhayward
Well for starters, the whole two key missle launch is not just a government policy, it is a military policy. I have nothing but respect for the service man and women who protect our nation. But for the buracracy that serves them, I have no desire to imulate. This is a very bad idea. And there is nothing to pervent the auditor and sysadmin from caluding together, so you still have not plugged the whole.
At some point you have to trust somebody. Finding people that you can trust to work in you IT group is a business necessity, if you can't do that they you have failed as a manager/business owner. Please let me know what your company is so that I can make sure I never do business with you. But after you have found these trustworthy people, just go to them and ask how we can keep things secure, and how we can log all the activity, even theirs. We all understand that security protects the sysadmin as much as the company and user. We will build you a system that you can understand, and that will work with the buisiness that you are in.
Now for the scary part. For those of us that deal with security, there is, at some level, in every system, a hole in any systems security. Given enough time on a system, and I can get around its security. Why, am I sitting in my office thinking of ways to beat my own security? Well I'm not, I am having managers and developers and DBAs come in and and say, "How can we do this?" where the answer is "We can't" but the need is real, so now I have to figure out how to make the system do something it wasn't designed for, and after a few of these sessions, I have found the hole in the fence.
Do I then jump up and fix them. No time for that, and it would just make me find more holes. "How can you keep finding holes? Why not just make the system 'totaly secure' from the beginning?" Well because we actually have to use the system for our work. Having a system that doesn't let anything happen will be suecure, and devastating to business.
The answer is to balance the trust of you employees with the needs of the business. And don't do it in a black box, let the sysadmin know that he is part of the team that keeps company in business. (I bet he/she already knows this, but it is you who have forgotten.)
"At some point you have to trust somebody."
That may be true Roy, but if one can not guarantee 100% that you can trust
everyone in your organization, then you must PROTECT, and the need to
do that escalates with the value of the data that must be protected.
Many people are not aware that the most serious and costly cyber
breaches are from the inside job. A Price Waterhouse Coopers report in
the last quarter of last year stated that the average cost per inside
breach for the enterprise was
@ $1.7M and that 59% of enterprises had
been hit. (Probably understated)
Why not just make the system 'totaly secure' from the beginning?"
The IT architectures that are the basis for today's OS's were designed
by academics for academics, for the purpose of sharing information.
Security was not a consideration. When they are used in ways not
originally intended, holes develop.
When status quo security technologies are applied as band-aid fixes
then we are left with interoperability problems and things that break
applications. Only status quo approaches to IT security impede business
functionality.
You are right when you say that the system has to work or the end result can be devastating to the business.
Many people do not understand the difference between a hardened, and a
trusted system. A simple definition of a trusted system is that not
even the system administrator can tamper with the data. There is
a big difference between " having a system that doesn't let anything
happen will be suecure" and having a system that only disallows
"unauthorized" system or network calls, or file access attempts.
Monitoring can not actually prevent abuses from happening, although it
may be enough as an disincentive in many cases. It is still
"reactive". If your trade secret is already gone to another country
though, the damage is done, even if you do happen to figure out who did
what and when.
by rosearch
That said, two 'new directions' emerge from the discussions so far. Firstly, no matter what technical arrangements you put in place (all the way up to a two-key system), what should you do to ensure (as an organisation) that the IT Systems Administrator that you recruit, and continue to employ, is a 'person of integrity'. Do you run police checks, and do you run checks across national as well as local jurisdictions? Do you check every academic qualification claimed, and check with previous employers (and not just a single person that the applicant has nominated from the most recent - or more worryingly from some not so recent - employer)? This checking helps, but doesn't predict the most likely reason for someone on the inside 'going bad' AFTER you employ them, which is a gambling habit that gets out of control, or a drug habit (either the employee's or that of someone in their family) that has led to debts. I'll leave it to subtler minds to suggest what might alert you to these issues. People are generally very good at keeping these things 'hidden', but you might start by keeping tabs on their leave records, and watching for signs of work conflict - basically looking for anomalous behaviours. If this sounds a bit 'too heavy' remember that we have generally agreed so far that in many cases (for reasons of cost) you 'just have to trust' while noting that the System Administrator has 'total access' to your fundametal business systems. If you value those systems 'blind trust' might just be a little 'too blind'.
The second direction that emerges from discussion is 'how difficult' is it to 'limit' the Security Administrator while giving them 'free reign' to deal with and fix any problem that might arise in the system at short notice. I note some suggestions for 'total solutions' and don't discount them, but I imagine they don't come cheap. Again it's a question of putting a value on your business continuity. I have suggested a very limited approach, locking the System Administrator out of the Audit operations, and the ability to create Audit accounts. The practicality of that in all of the systems we are looking at is yet to be proved, but even 'conceptually' it's a challenging prospect. The reality is that even if we do come up with a feasible technical solution, a System's Administrator is the best-placed person in the world to find a way of 'breaking' the solution. McCann's Law says that 'Every security response will eventually be overcome'. But should the anticipation of eventual failure of an approach mean that it is not worth taking up? In business terms it is a simple equation - does it 'buy me time', does it in combination with other approaches offer a reasonable prospect of success, and does it make it clear to your customers and regulators that you are 'doing your best'. In a world where 'intention' and 'endeavour' have a very high significance in litigation, it might just be worth reconsidering how much effort you are putting into systems security, and reconsidering your definition of 'too difficult'. Cheers, Rosearch/Tban
by justin james
Awesome post! I've frequently been the sole sys admin at a company, and I sometimes wonder if my employer realises just how much they need to stay on my good side. The Bastard Operator From Hell is no joke, I've seen things like that happen where the loss or angering of a sys admin crippled a company. I've always been a nice guy, and played by the "what if I get hit by a bus?" principle, where the network and process is documented to the point where if I were to unexpectedly die or be terminated, they could function without me long enough to get a replacement, as well as lock me out. That's the trust system I establish with employers. But at the end of the day, it is way too easy for an admin to leave themselves a backdoor somewhere, even if it is just a "system account" that happens to have administrative rights & allow remote access. Just remember the words of Bruce Banner: "Don't make me mad. You wouldn't like me when I'm mad."
J.Ja
by rosearch
by rosearch
I agree totally with the blog. I worked, sad to say, briefly as a management trainee at Steak n Shake hamburger restaurant. A policy was that the store manager had to take someone with her when she took vault deposits of cash to the bank. Did they not trust their own managers? No, not that. It was: they simply did not trust Human Nature, and they wanted a policy to protect both managers from accusations of theft and the company from theft.
One day, the manager went to the bank without me. Then she left on vacation. The next day, a large amount of money was missing. The assistant managers said, "Someone must have left the vault open slightly, in a hurry, and some customer must have somehow got into the office, saw the vault open, and took the cash."
Yeah, right. I'm now dealing with gettting fired by a manager, and the company experienced "massive inventory losses" this past year. I know what really has been going on, and I'm typing a letter to the president today.
This is an illustration of the principle of "two keys" as the blog proclaims.
by bfilmfan
The solution to this issue is to have the logs created on a second system that the admins do not have full access.
Your 2 key concept doesn't prevent collusion.
The military uses the RBAC model with logs being copied to several systems to prevent collusion.
by pat.shediack
Not only do these concerns apply to Sys Admins, but also to those who control electronic records and can delete or transfer records.
by kg70
Great idea genius. What would prevent the audit person from being malicious and tampering with the file in order to get the System Admin fired? Not to mention anyone else from accessing the audit file to manipulate it. Placing weight on the audit files for purposes of employment is a rocky road.
If you don't trust your employees don't hire them.
by royhayward
Internal breaches of security have been and always will be the biggest risk to all businesses. As in the example of the resturant manager above, IT and sys admins are not the only places where employees breaking the trust of their employer causes damage. I think the background checks are the best idea. If I want a job as a sys admin, I should expect a back ground check. And if that status changes, ie I am arrested or something that would have made me fail the check, I expect that my position will be in jepardy. Not fair, but it is life and security is a serious thing.
Any time you ever have this illusion of total security then you are fooling yourself. Let me ilistrate the flaw in the two key aproach.
1. As a regular task sys admins must be able to unlock and reset passwords for users that have forgotten them.
2. It is possible to decrypt the passwords if you have access to the system. That failing, we can make a backup of the password file to keep the old password.
3. Using the above ability there is nothing to keep the disgruntled sys admin from loging in as the auditor, and erasing their tracks and then replacing the auditors password so that they wont notice.
4. At this point all your two key system has done is add the illusion of security where there is no added benifit. (Unless this illusion is a benefit somehow)
One of the risks of business and life is people who break your trust. I put locks on my doors, but I don't have a barbed wire fence. Would the locks and the wire really keep out a determined tresspasser? No, and so I have to rely on the deterance of the laws and their consequences. Otherwise I will spend all my energy on making my house and my company into a fortress that will deny access to even my friends and customers.
In the end you still have to trust someone.
by wmwphl
Auditing is a good thing but we cannot dismiss that the auditor or admin could connide.There are companies that offer hackers as IT auditors ( if you really want a seriuos it audit ) this would give you a better picture of what has been done & what needs to fix with your network or maybe with your admin. I know it's hard to trust somebody especially if you dont know what he is working on. Best is that you have a open door with your admin. As long as something does not feel right with him talk to him or let him know.
Lastly i would recomend to have your company to do a ISO 90001 certifiaction this would help your company document every process that runs in the company ( including IS related process, ex:in my process a backup password is kept with the Admin/Security & is laways tested every moth incase i die in missery or been pirated by other company ) this would make your company process dependent & not people dependent.
by rosearch
Gday Kg. You suggest that the audit person might be malicious and tamper with the audit logs. I agree. There is sometimes a fantasy that Auditors (like System Administrators!) are incorruptable. So it's a very good point to raise. What you'd do of course is not give the Auditors access in the system to do anything more than read the logs (no delete, no modify, no create). That'd apply to everyone else as well. It's easy to fall into the trap of thinking that because the System Administrator (in the scenario I propose) can't take 'total control' of the system without the Auditor, that the Auditor has power in the system equal to or greater than the System Administrator.
Gday Roy. Absolutely correct. Total security is an illusion - and a very dangerous one. Which is why I like to keep a copy of McCann's law (Every security response will eventually by overcome) pinned on the wall behind me. However that doesn't mean that you don't 'give it your best shot'. And as you say, there is some benefit in the 'illusion' Except that I'd substitute some phrase like 'best endeavour in a rapidly changing threat environment' where you use the word 'illusion'. Getting back to an earlier comment I inserted, it's not just about the 'effective' security, but also about being able to show the Executive, the stockholders and the regulators that you are doing the best possible job. And you need to work very hard not to create an illusion, but in fact to break down the illusion held by Executives particularly that there is any such thing as 'absolute security'.
I'm coming strongly round to the point of view that what we are talking about here is technically 'difficult' (but not impossible), whereas doing proper background (and ongoing) checks on Sys Admin staff is relatively cheap and easy and gives a good basis for that 'trust' we're talking about. The example you work through (how a sys admin could spoof the auditors password) is exactly what I was looking for when I decided to tickle the tiger with this blog-post. What I'd like to challenge you (in a friendly way!) is to now think of a way of PREVENTING the Sys Admin from following the path you just described. Seriously..
As for barbed wire and your house. I guess it comes back to risk and threat. If I lived in certain countries I would have barbed wire (I have colleagues who have lived in armed compounds). It's a scalar thing. The added thing with systems of course is that it's hard to tell if anything has been stolen, or even tampered with - which is why I put emphasis on AUDIT (knowing that everyone is working like billy-o to get boundary security right). Finally, yes you have to trust, but what we are talking about is having frameworks on which we can build that trust. In a corporate environment where staff 'come and go' and where you have systems that maintain (and have the capacity to cripple) your business you might like to have a very substantial framework (of checks and balances) on which to base that 'trust'.
Finally (really) on liability. One of my colleagues in IT was murdered (many years ago else I'd not talk about it) after working a late shift. By the security guard employed by our company. Who hadn't done sufficient background checks on the man, who had (as I understand it) a substantial record of mental instability. This wasn't a litigious country (or time), but I'd imagine that these days if I was a relative I'd be looking at a multi-million dollar damages claim against the company for (gross) negligence. Just a reminder that 'trust' comes with a price tag. If I - as an Executive - don't do everything (reasonable) to protect the assets of the company and there is a security breach I might be liable to the stockholders and the public, and the regulators. Something to consider when weighing up the difficulties and the costs. Regards, Rosearch/Tban
by jmgarvin
You fail to mention that by restricting your sys/network admin, you've
just created more problems. If this person cannot properly do
their job, then how do you expect to get total performance out of your
IT infrastructure?
There are better solutions:
1) Trust in your sys admin or fire that one and hire one you trust
2) Off load all your logs to a centralized server that is maintained by the auditer/CEO/whoever
3) Have TWO sys admins...
4) Create a "better" envrionment. If you think that your sys
admin is going to take a bribe, then you better start thinking about
your pay structure, your reward structure, or your corporate culture
(or all of it).
If you are so sure that everyone is corrupt from the word go, then why
hire them? If your sys admin is willing to lose their job over a
bribe, then you probably aren't paying them enough. What about
comp time? What about a reward structure that is monetary?
What about the entire culture? How is your IT staff
treated?
While I wear my share of tin foil, I also know that it is certain that
for every bad apple there are 10 good apples. Also, if you show DUE
DILIGENCE, you will be fine. That means doing proper background
checks, asuring employment history is correct, and getting proper
documenation from the hire.
If you show
your geeks loyalty, they'll return the favor.
by rosearch
Gday JM, I think you've raised a very good point, and that is organisations that show trust and loyalty towards their staff will be rewarded a hundred-fold. Long timers in IT know that it isn't just about the salary. I have to stress though, that doing thorough security checks on staff is not showing disloyalty towards staff, it's just a matter of 'doing the right thing'. And frankly if the new guy in applications development has been fired from his last 6 jobs I'd like to know about it before I start working alongside him (actually I'd rather the Co. didn't employ him in the first place). Due diligence, as you say.
What I'm talking about is NOT a certainty that every one is corrupt (I've met a few and can tell the difference), but every one is potentially CORRUPTIBLE. Take a couple of examples, daughter's hooked on cocaine and being threatened by her dealer, spouse has been in a car accident and is hooked on pain killers, you've taken a knock on the head and lost your inhibitions against gambling with other people's money. Thing's happen. Sure, rarely, but the question comes back to 'what have you done (as an organisation) to protect the organisation (and the individual) from 'slipping over the edge' in the case of that rare event occuring to your sys admin. I agree that a bribe is the LEAST LIKELY thing to influence someone who is already in a position of trust, and for that reason didn't suggest it as a possible cause.
As you'll see in my earlier posts I have raised the question of, "how difficult' is it to 'limit' the Security Administrator while
giving them 'free reign' to deal with and fix any problem that might
arise in the system at short notice". To my mind that is 'the challenge'. Surely in IT (of all industries) we aren't going to say "it's too difficult so we can't do it". That seems to me to be a sure sign that we've lost the innovative edge that created IT in the first place.
"how difficult' is it to
'limit' the Security Administrator while
giving them 'free reign' to deal with and fix any problem that might
arise in the system at short notice". To my mind that is 'the
challenge'. Surely in IT (of all industries) we aren't going to say
"it's too difficult so we can't do it".
It is difficult but it has been done. Read the link.
Your IT staff can work on the network but not access classified files.
By ranking application or O/S code higher than your staff, they can not
sabotage your systems. Your systems can be protected against accidental
damage by "Joe Idiot" as well, reducing on-going maintenance times.
Trustifier is a commercial enterprise product but it is they who have
data that is worth protecting. Again, I am not trying to sell here, but
sharing for the sake of this discussion, Trustifier does what you
are calling for, and the naysayers say can't be done.
This discussion is closed to new replies.
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