55 replies
Given the amount of travel I do I thought it made sense to make the first post a schedule of where I will be. If you are interested in meeting with me while I am in one of these places, send me a message and I'll see what we can do. I'll try to keep this schedule up to date as it changes.
- August 21-26 ? TechEd Asia in Singapore
- August 27-31 ? TechEd New Zealand
- August 31-September 6 ? TechEd Australia
- September 22-25 ? TechEd China in Beijing
- September 26-30 ? TechEd Taiwan in Taipei
- October 1-7 ? TechEd Hong Kong
- October 10-12 ? Customer meetings in London
- October 13 ? German academic conference in Darmstadt
- October 14 ? Serbian security event in Belgrade
- October 21-27 ? tentative TechEd South Africa, Sun City
- November 3-4 Customer meetings in Minneapolis
- November 14-18 ? IT Forum in Barcelona
- November 28 ? December 2 ? Swedish security summit and customer meetings, Stockholm
- December 5 ? 31 ? Vacation
- December 13-14 ? Security Summit East in Washington DC
It's funny how some things seem so obvious to many of us who work at the mothership that we don't seem to realize they are not obvious to others. A couple of days ago we received a report that password policies were not being honored when a domain member is not connected to the domain. Specifically, the "Maximum password age" setting was configured on the domain and the password had expired, but the user received no notification when logging on. The user was using a domain account that was cached on the client using the cached credentials ("Number of previous logons to cache" setting) feature.
Well, this was well known, at least to some, and it makes a lot of sense really. If the password has expired, you must create a new one. However, you cannot create a new one unless you are connected to a domain controller. Therefore, since you cannot create a new one, you do not get notified that the password has expired until you actually connect back to the domain. In other words, the "Maximum password age" setting is only honored when you are connected to the domain. If you log on to a disconnected client and subsequently reconnect, you will only get a prompt when you either log off and back on, or when you lock and unlock the system. If you run a network and find this unacceptable, you may want to consider using a script on your VPN server that prompts the user to change their password. This can be done using a post-connect script, for instance.
The same behavior happens with account lockout settings. Of course, IMNSHO, you should never set yourself up for a trivial denial of service by using account lockout anyway. Use good passwords instead, and you won't need to worry about account lockout.
I'm at yet another event, and this time I decided to go see a few of the other sessions instead of just trying to find as much free food as possible between my own presentations. This experience brought to mind an old concept: "Death by PowerPoint." It is almost embarrassing how some people use PowerPoint. Steve Riley frequently refers to e-mail as "the place where knowledge goes to die." Well Steve, you have it wrong. Nothing kills knowledge as fast as putting it in PowerPoint.
Some of the most egregious ways to use PowerPoint I have seen include:
- PowerPoint is NOT a word processor! The point of a PowerPoint slide is not to cram as much information into a single slide as possible. The idea of a slide is to have memory joggers that trigger thinking in the audience. That means you do not need to even have complete sentences (although it is a bonus if the words are spelled correctly). Simple statements work just fine
- Most of your audience probably knows how to read ? A corollary to the thinking that PowerPoint is a word processor is that far too many presenters stand on stage reading the slides. It turns out that most of the audience members probably are literate and can read the slides for themselves. The purpose of a presentation is not to do so for them. If you want to read to people, go to the reading hour at the local library. A presentation is about explaining things to people that go above and beyond what they get in the slides. If it weren't they may as well just get your slides and read them in the comfort of their own office, home, boat, or bathroom.
- A picture is worth a thousand words, possibly more ? Just because PowerPoint has bullets is no reason to use them. There is no way you can convey as much information in a slide full of bullets as you can in a slide with a single picture on it. Try this next time, put a picture in instead of the bullets and then talk about the picture. People will find it much more interesting and much more informative. As a bonus, it makes it more worthwhile to come to the presentation as opposed to just downloading the slides ? making you a more important person to have at the event.
- It's a good idea to know your presentation ? statements like "oops, what is that slide doing here" or "I don't really know what this point is trying to say" are never a good thing in a presentation. Generally speaking, an audience that went through the time and effort to attend your presentation expects you to have spent at least that much time preparing for it. Taking someone else's presentation and just standing up and reading the slides as they show up is typically not going to work out too well.
- Bullets are bad, stories are good ? There is no law that says everything you say has to fit in a bullet. In fact, teaching by bullet points was never one of the more interesting in school was it? Think back to the classes that you enjoyed ? most of the time they were the ones were the teacher related the material to real life, by telling a story that illustrated the points. Which would you rather hear? An sound-bite explanation of the four pieces that need to be proven in a lawsuit over negligence, or a story about how someone was negligent and got sued over it?
- The actual content of your presentation is much more important than the slide show template you used! ? I do about 80 conference presentations a year. For some reason, every single event feels that they must have a unique PowerPoint template for their slides. It takes anywhere from 15 minutes to two hours to reapply a template, depending on the presentation and what you have done in it. That is two hours that could be profitably spent doing other things, like say putting in content that the audience would care about as opposed to setting it in a template they don't care about. That is two weeks of my time a year that I can't create information and transfer knowledge, but instead spend trying to figure out why somebody decided that a red font on a blue background was a good idea.
- The purpose of the three-pane view is not so you can see which the next slide is ? PowerPoint's three-pane view is great ? for building presentations. It is not there as a substitute for rehearsals so you can tell which the next slide is. Hit F5 and use PowerPoint the way it was designed. If you're already in three-pane view by the time you read this, hit shift-F5 and it will start the slideshow from the current slide.
- Don't put your audience in pain. ? OK, so the general idea is to transfer knowledge. If you make the audience's collective eyes bleed by putting up white slides with a black font, something which is just horribly painful to look at in a dark room, you are much less likely to actually convey any points since they will be trying to look away from the screen the whole time.
- Be conscious people with disabilities ? Most disabilities do not interfere with a presentation. However, some do. For instance, red text on a blue background is impossible to see for people who are color blind since it won't stop moving. Red text on black has the same effect, and red text on green simply disappears unless they are completely red and completely green, in which case the red text just jumps around a lot instead.
- It is not a requirement to have at least one slide in each presentation that nobody can read ? You do not have to have a slide that nobody can read, contrary to popular opinion. That is what handouts are for. If people can't read it, why put it on the screen? Why waste the audience's time with it?
- 12-point font is not appropriate ? 12-point font can't be read unless you are right in front of the slide, in which case you need to move your head far too much. 14 points is bare minimum. Ideally, don't go below 18.
- There is no contest as to who can use the most fonts ? You won't get dinged if you don't use 12 different fonts in a single slide. One or two is perfectly fine and actually makes the slide readable instead, an extra bonus.
Do you have a favorite story about "Death by PowerPoint?" Let me know! Post a comment or send me an e-mail if you don't want it posted.
by rayjeff
I need to show this to the faculty in my division. I think it will help
them when they start to use PowerPoint presentations during their
lectures. And it will be especially helpful because they are
computer-illterate. WIll make my job easier.
by keithn
Try telling attornies why they shouldn't fill every slide up with multiple levels of bullets!! Then they want each bullet to appear a different way!
A few weeks ago I took a 20-slide presentation one of the attorneys prepared and whittled it down to 9 slides. I also removed all of the animations except for page transitions.
I had the attorney sit in the back of our Events Center, where I presented his original slide show, followed by the revised presentation. He chose to go with the revised show.
Keith Nelson - Boston MA
by cbell
by panzrwagn
No discussion of the problems and limitations of Powerpoint is incomplete without mentioning Edward Tufte's monograph on "the Cognitive Style of Powerpoint":
"...slideware often reduces the analytical quality of presentations. In particular, the popular PowerPoint templates (ready-made designs) usually weaken verbal and spatial reasoning, and almost always corrupt statistical analysis."
But hey, he's only the world expert on visual presentation of data.
Good comments folks! I particularly like the part about Ed Tufte. I have not yet seen him, but I have friends that have. They say he is amazing! I really want to see this. Even though I never saw him, he actually influenced my style already. I have a lot more pictures and a lot less bullets now.
On the animations, that would be another "don't" wouldn't it? I can't stand it when people over-animate slides. In kindergarten (and sophmore year in college) they always covered the bullets on the overhead transparencies that had not yet been discussed. I think the idea was that people were not considered mature enough to read at their own pace and still pay attention. I'd like to think that most audiences today are mature enough to handle that, especially if the slide is well designed.
So I got a new wireless router for my house today and was absolutely appalled at the way they have treated security in the thing. Now, this is not unique at all. I have tried most of the other common home routers as well, and they all sin in about the same ways. Frankly, I have yet to find a wireless product that does security as well as the venerable Microsoft MN-500 802.11b router. Of course, the MS device only does WEP, which is pretty much equivalent to no security at all these days, but when it came out, that was all there was, and it was on by default, and ordinary mortals could actually set it up. Not so with the recent crop of products. Here are some particularly egregious issues:
- This is an excerpt from the manual
Administrator Password
The Router ships with NO password entered. If you wish to add a password for more security, you can set a password here. Keep your password in a safe place, as you will need this password if you need to log into the router in the future. It is also recommended that you set a password if you plan to use the Remote management feature of this Router.
Let me get this straight; if I wish to have security, I may optionally configure it? Why is security optional? What kinds of passwords might this thing support? There is no mention of it in the manual. However, since it is web-based, I presume it can?t have special characters in it since those get to be URL encoded. Oh, and the walkthrough configuration wizard thingie, that ensures you get a wireless network that is shared with every neighbor that can find it (which is a large number with a MIMO router like this one) does not allow you to set a password.
Hmm, even stranger. When I try to set the password and at the same time told it not to use NAT it actually does not take the password. Weird. It restarts the router, but I can still log in with the default blank password.
- The wireless network is on by default, with no security, and that handy blank password on the router. 'Nuf said. From what I saw in my testing anyone could connect to it and manage it as long as they were on the internal side of the network, but of course, all that takes is a pringles can and a convenient spot to park within about five miles of the router. I have said many times that one of these days I am just going to turn off my wireless network and use one of my neighbors. On any given day I can see at least 6 of them from my home office. I just think there is a company policy against that sort of thing.
- The use terms like ?computer hackers use what is known as ?pinging? to find potential victims on the Internet.? A hacker is not a criminal! Why is it that we keep using the term "hacker" when we really should be using "attacker" or "criminal"? Hacker is a proud term that was originally used in the computer world to refer to those who really loved computers and everything about them. Then some misguided journalist decided to equate it to criminal and it went downhill from there. Why can't we just refer to them as the criminals they are? If someone goes in and robs a bank branch there would be no question about which labels to put on him, but because the crime involved stealing someone's bank account details and electronically transfer all the money to some place you've never heard of they are somehow different than traditional robbers? I've even seen cases where prosecution was called off for fear of destroying the criminal's "career and chances of getting into the university of his choice." This is just appalling. Maybe if we used more descriptive terms to refer to these people we'd start actually putting them where they belong.
- Oh, but the fact that criminals use ping as a way to discover your system is not sufficient reason to block ICMP echo by default. You have to actually turn that blocking on. I wonder if the router blocks portscanning? They use that too. I suppose I need to find out.
- ?Your Router is equipped with a firewall that will protect your network from a wide array of common hacker attacks including Ping of Death (PoD)?
Wow!!! It protects me against a really scary sounding attack!!! I guess I don?t need that patch Microsoft issued 8 YEARS AGO to fix that problem. BTW, exactly how many people are still running NT 4.0 on their home wireless network so they would be vulnerable to this? I guess the original release of Windows 95 was vulnerable too, but putting a firewall in front of those is not likely to help much. - IP Address Lease Time: Forever. Yeah, that makes sense, because we will never ever change computers!
- The driver for the network cards that go along with the router is not signed. Not to worry, the manual explains it:
You might see a screen shot similar to this one <screenshot of unsigned driver approval screen here>. This DOES NOT mean there is a problem. Our drivers have been fully tested and are compatible with this operating system.
Good idea!!! Let?s train people to click ?yes I want to install the malicious software? (or the equivalent) in every dialog that pops up and asks them to do so. Why is it so hard to understand that driver signing is about trust in the source of the driver, not about whether it has been tested to work or not. I don't think anyone expects a vendor to release a driver they have tested only insofar as to make sure it compiles.
People complain about Microsoft security, but frankly, the state of security in the rest of the industry scares me sometimes.
Or just want to know how to shoot yourself in the foot? 
SMB Message Signing is one of Microsoft's top support call generators, and for good reason. It mitigates valid security threats, but is very complicated to use and can have far-reaching implications on the stability and functionality of your network. To help people figure out how to use it properly I made it the topic of the September Security Management column: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/community/columns/secmgmt/sm0905.mspx.
I titled the column "How To Shoot Yourself in the Foot With Security, part 1." I have no idea how many parts there will be but as anyone who has been in the field for a while knows, there are many ways to shoot yourself in the foot with security! If you have a favorite story in particular or something you'd like me to discuss, let me know, or start comment thread here.
Enjoy!
I'm working on an FAQ for passwords right now. Look for it in the Security Newsletter next month (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/secnews/newsletter.htm). However, one thing that has come up more than a few times in the recent past is what to do with the built-in Administrator account. I'm not sure that it fits in the framework of passwords per se, but it may actually merit a blog post, so here are some do's and don'ts. Keep in mind, I am specifically referring only to BUILTIN\Administrator, also known as NT AUTHORITY\Administrator; the account with relative identifier 500.
Do's
- Disable it. The built-in Administrator is basically a setup and disaster recovery account. We use it during setup and to join the machine to the domain. After we are done with that we should never use it again and it can be disabled. It should never be used during normal operations. For that, each person who administers the system needs his or her own administrative account in addition to the ordinary user account they use to read e-mail, surf the web, play Age Of Empires III, etc. If you allow people to use the built-in Administrator account you lose all ability to audit what anyone is doing. There is no accountability. Not too worried about that? Well, try this: close your eyes and lean back. Now, imagine standing up in a packed court room. You are under cross-investigation by the defense attorney as a hostile witness. The question being asked is how sure you were that it was the defendant who shipped all the company secrets off to your competitor. Your best answer is "well, one of these ten people because it appears that the person logged on as 'Administrator' when he did it." OK. Open your eyes again, and open them real wide this time. Wide enough so that you can see through ease of use to see the CYA benefits of not using the built-in Administrator account.
- Set a unique password. If the account is disabled, what does it matter what the password is? Well, here is the problem, what if it is not disabled on all systems? Now, be honest with yourself. How many unique passwords are used on the built-in administrator accounts across all systems in your environment? If the answer is less than the number of systems in your environment you have a problem. If only one of those systems gets compromised the bad guy can dump out the password hashes and he now has all that he needs to authenticate to all the other systems using the Administrator account (note that it does not matter how strong the password is here. If the bad guy has hashes, password strength is irrelevant). To avoid this you need to ensure that every system has a unique local Administrator password. How do you do that? There are a couple of options. You can use a tool like User Manager Pro (http://www.liebsoft.com/index.cfm/products/ump), which I am told does this. (I have not used it myself. If you have, please let me know how it works.) You can also use a command line tool that can set the password. Should you wish to actually ever use the account, you need to be able to recover the password. That means either writing it down, or using a tool that can recover it for you. One such tool is passgen, which comes with Protect Your Windows Network (http://www.awprofessional.com/title/0321336437). Passgen is designed to set a pseudo-random password on regular accounts and service accounts, across the network. The password can either be fully random, or based on two pieces of known input: a unique identifier for the system or account, and a common pass phrase. The common pass phrase is the global secret, but it is not stored on any of the systems protected by the secret. Hence, it is much easier to protect than the administrator password on thousands of machines.
- Set a very long password, or none at all. Obviously a really long password is a good idea, but a blank one may be even better. In an environment where you can guarantee physical security, and you do not need to use the account across the network, leave the administrator account password blank. That way it can not be used across the network, and nobody needs to know what it is. Of course, if you have more than one administrator, it leaves you open to abuse and accountability issues, so you need to carefully consider this approach. If you need to be concerned with those problems, set a very long password; 127 characters or so. That way the account is as good as disabled.
Don'ts
- Use it. Seriously. You should never use the built-in administrator account. Use your own administrative account instead. If things get so bad that you need the built-in administrator account, flatten the system and rebuild it. It's generally quicker and less painful. If you need to get data off of it first stick the hard drive in another system and get it off that way, or use that carefully tought out disaster recovery plan that's gathering dust on someone's shelf!
- Share it. As I mentioned above, sharing the built-in Administrator account is a really bad idea. You may think you never need to be worried about accountability, to which I have one thing to say: neither did any of the colleagues who ended up in court being unable to explain why they had failed to provide accountability for user action.
Yesterday during a discussion I was having with some customers in Taiwan another chat I had with an MVP a month or so ago came back to mind. The question asked was about Independent Software Vendor (ISV, i.e. "not Microsoft") support of Microsoft patches for the OS. Specifically, how long is it reasonable to take an ISV to fully support their product on an OS patched with a particular patch, or rather, update, or a particular service pack?
My response (not the official Microsoft response mind you, but I do not know that there is one) was that as for service packs, the reasonable time frame is "immediately." The fact is that service packs undergo massive beta programs. Every ISV is invited to participate in those beta programs. They can therefore test their products on the service pack at the same time we test the service pack; report bugs to us, and hopefully have a chance to get those bugs fixed before the service pack releases. In other words, I believe there is absolutely no excuse for ISVs to claim that their product is not tested on a particular service pack.
Software updates are different. For updates there is no beta program. ISVs do not get a chance to test the update before it is released. It is reasonable to give them some time to test them before supporting them. The exact time frame should be dependent on the severity of the update, the nature of the systems that should be running the software, and the type of data the ISV processes. For a critical update for a server that needs to process critically important data, such as PII, financial data, etc, 24 hours to 5 days is probably reasonable, depending on the complexity of the update and the ISVs software. For lower severity updates it may take longer.
The discussion got started when the customer found an ISV that specifically would not support any updates since MS04-012, which was released in April 2004. If you want a system updated in the past 18 months apparently you would either have to run an unsupported configuration, or get rid of this software and buy from another vendor.
This is critically important. You have to protect your information assets. You, therefore, have to decide how important they are. If a vendor will not meet your risk management goals, you need to consider a different vendor. It is unfortunate, but that is the only way to protect your network and your information.
Do you agree? Let me know if you have a different way to think of this.
A friend just pointed me to an interesting blog post. The premise is that logon dialogs should not be asking for a username. Mostly the blog post points to why the username provides no value, not really expanding the argument that it is superfluous. Nevertheless, you have to love an article that recommends the use of pass phrases (in spite of the fact that they don't link to any of my articles on the topic)! The basic idea here is that passwords should be unique, and therefore the password is enough to identify you to the system.
I really like the fact that people are doing some creative thinking about authentication. We are taking far too much of what is being said about authentication at face value without nearly enough questioning and creative thought about what really works in the real world. Nevertheless, I do not think this idea will fly.
The first reason removing usernames is not going to work is simply because the authors fail to make a compelling case for why to remove them. They argue fairly succesfully that they provide no value. But, simply not providing value does not support the argument for removing them. For a proper dialectic argument, you need to argue FOR your position, not simply why something else is not worthwhile. There is statement as to a benefit to be had by removing usernames from the logon dialog. One of the arguments is that the username provides no security. That is correct, it does not. If people realized that maybe we could get rid of silly requirements like removing the last logged on username from the logon dialog. Is that enough to remove usernames from the logon process entirely though? I do not think so.
Further, the author argues that no two users should use the same password? Why not? What is wrong with this? In fact, there is a real serious reason why you should allow this, and that is the second reason this idea will not work. Think about it this way: let's say your logon dialog has only a password field in it. Now you go change your password and the system responds with "sorry, that password is already in use." OK, fair enough. Log off, type the password you tried to set, and you are now logged on as whichever user used that password. Instant attack, and the system even told you how to do it! Is it likely that users will use the same password as someone else? Yes, it is. I once cracked 23,311 passwords from a single system to learn more about them, how long it takes to crack them and what they were like (the results are presented in Protect Your Windows Network). In that set, I found that there were only 22,706 unique passwords. The remaining 2.6% were duplicates of some other password. In all, 3.9% of passwords were not unique. 8 passwords occurred more than 10 times, and one occurred 61 times! The risk of collisions is actually quite high. The chance of picking the same password as someone else is about one in 40. If you do a system-wide password reset, for instance, and have 1,000 users change their passwords all at the same time, it is a virtual certainty that at least one person would pick a password that is already in use. You only need 88 users to have a chance less than 10% that all the passwords would be unique. This alone should be enough to dismiss the entire argument.
Like I said, the fact that people think creatively about passwords and authentication is encouraging, and we need to keep doing so as an industry because the solutions we have today leave some things to be desired. People are very bad at passwords, although I do hope they can get better. Smart cards are expensive and do not work everywhere. Biometrics have their own set of problems with expensive hardware and lack of replaceability of the tokens. We need creative solutions that are simple to implement and use and do not cost a mint. Keep up the thinking!
I have received more and more queries about whether to worry about password cracking, and what to do to avoid it. It seems it may be time to document this a bit better. It is all, of course, already in Protect Your Windows Network, but in the October TechNet Security Newsletter I have a column on Frequently Asked Questions on passwords, which addresses this, along with several other issues. I thought it might be interesting to have a little debate or take comments about the newsletter piece in this forum. Here is an excerpt that deals with password cracking:
Should I be concerned about password cracking?
The answer is a qualified no. Cracking against captured hashes is not an interesting attack. The hash is the only secret used in challenge-response protocols today both on Windows and on other operating systems. An attacker with the hash has all that is required to authenticate as the user and cracking is simply a waste of time. Tools that implement this type of attack, known as a pass-the-hash attack, are available on the Internet already. Although the tools are still relatively unstable and unreliable, we should expect their quality to improve significantly as passwords get better. In addition, in order to capture the hashes the attacker must break into the authentication server, which is typically the domain controller on a Windows-based network. If this has occurred, the network has been fully compromised already and cracking passwords is only useful to attack other networks where the same users used the same password (a practice that should be strongly discouraged). Windows will never pass the hashes across the network in an unencrypted channel. Thus, capturing the hashes in a network transfer is pretty unlikely.
Since January 2005, cracking against the stored password verifier (the cached credential) has received renewed interest due to the publication of the first commonly available tool to extract those verifiers from a compromised computer. Cracking the password verifier is reasonably efficient, taking roughly three times longer than cracking against the NT hashes. This, however, is really not an interesting attack either. First, the verifier is a hash of a hash, making it at least twice as resilient as the original hash. Second, since the password verifier is salted with the username it is unique even for two users using the same password. While a pre-computed hash attack can still be used to speed up the first computation, it is useless against the second hash. Finally, the password verifier serves a very important purpose. Without it users would have to use local credentials when logging on to a computer while disconnected from the domain but use domain credentials when connected. Clearly this process would create a nuisance for users. More important, however, is the effect it would have on the captured hashes. Most security researchers would agree that a vast majority of users would use the same password for both accounts. If an attacker compromises a computer that has local credentials and those credentials match credentials on a domain, the attacker would now have all the information needed to authenticate as the user to the domain and would not have to crack a single password. The OWF representation stored locally for the local account is identical to the one stored for the user?s domain account if the two have the same password. Clearly the dynamics of the human-computer interaction mean that the password verifier probably increases security instead of decreasing it. Therefore attacks against the password verifier are probably also not interesting.
Cracking against captured challenge-response pairs is, however, still an interesting attack. However, using the LM Compatibility Level switch it can be effectively invalidated by not transmitting the LanMan challenge-response pairs. This is a valid approach in almost all environments. Some (quite possibly not all) problems with LMCompatibilityLevel were listed above. If you are not subject to any of those issues, we recommend that you configure LMCompatibilityLevel to 5.
After one of my recent articles I ended up in a discussion with someone over blocking easy attacks by unsophisticated attackers. For example, I said you should not worry about Rainbow Crack. What is important is protecting the password hash database because the hashes are plain-text equivalent. If passwords get too difficult to crack, the bad guys will just build better tools that can use hashes directly in the authentication sequence. Of course, you should also ensure that the passwords are resilient against guessing and cracking the authentication sequence, but those are much easier to deal with. This means though that 14+ character passwords are not really all that important. 8-9 characters are fine for most purposes.
The argument against my claim is that unsophisticated attackers, say malicious internal users, can still simply go download Cain and, since it has a cracker built in, take over your network. If we ignore the issue that these users would already be administrators, this argument still hits the nail on a particular onerous head: easy access to rudimentary tools that create criminals of opportunity. My approach to dealing with the issue is a bit different though. I tend to focus on two things.
- First, run the systems in such a way that you do not expose sensitive info, such as high privilege credentials on low privilege systems, and then protect the sensitive systems appropriately. That makes the crimes much more difficult to perpetrate. It also makes the systems harder to run, which is why we find so few environments doing it.
- Second, focus on defeating the most skilled attackers the environment is likely to face. While it may be a bit more difficult to do so it will also defeat the attacks by the less skilled criminals of opportunity.
If we take the case of Rainbow Crack, there are two ways to defeat it. The first is to use very strong passwords (or pass phrases) which are unlikely (but not guaranteed) to be in the tables. The second is to stop the bad guys from getting your password hashes. No hashes, no cracking.
This is why I think we need a change in tactics in security. This field has spent the past 20 years responding to attacks by raising the security bar to just above where the attackers are at the time we raised the bar. This approach means we are always playing catch up to the newest attack. We raise the bar, the attackers jump over it. We raise it again, they jump over. I feel like I am in an old Basic program:
10 gosub detectNewAttack
20 gosub raiseSecurityBar
30 goto 10
How do we get out of this cycle?
Take an example: if you are paranoid, like me, you would agree that it is only a matter of time until Cain and friends, in "the interest of security," will include pass the hash functionality. After all, since everyone will use 15 character passwords soon (and if you believe that I have some land I want to show you
) their current technique will no longer work. That means that if we primarily focused on mitigation number one above we will now once again playing catch up, and we will have made all our users mad in the progress by forcing them to use horribly long passwords without much help on how. On the other hand, if we thought differently about the problem and worked on fundamental design and secure operations instead we would stop not just the current attacks, but the new ones. Stopping current attacks is nowhere near as interesting as stopping future ones.
Don't misunderstand me here. Strong passwords are still extremely important, and I an one of the loudest advocates of pass phrases. However, I also think that as security professionals we need to stop playing catch up. We need to stop reacting to every new move the bad guys come up with and start anticipating and get ahead. The information security discipline is heading for a crisis unless we start working on strategic security, not just tactical response. We need fresh thinking, new thought, and partnerships with those who use our systems. The bad guys know how we operate and they keep using that against us. To get out of this situation we need to stop just raising the bar and instead move it to a new playing field; one where we get to write the rules.
These are of course my opinions, and you are free to disagree, but it explains why I think the way I do.
So I was actually in the United States for a couple of days last week and decided to get the long overdue ISA server running at home. After all, how hard could this be? In ISA 2004, with the new "firewall configuration by cartoon" interface, you just pick the cartoon that looks most like your network. Heck, since I have SBS, it actually clicks the right cartoon for you.
And what was the reason for this excursion you might ask? Why not spend the time with kids, or whisky, or maybe both, instead? Well, part of my just wants to learn more about ISA. Part of me is mostly interested in blocking my 7-year olds administrative account from surfing the web. You see, he needs to have an administrative account because of all the bad software out there that won't run as a regular user. To manage that I gave him two accounts, one that is a local administrator and one that is not. Then I am now trying to block the one that is a local admin from surfing the web.
Theoretically, all this should be simply. You install SBS, then install ISA, and the installer will create the "SBS Internet Users Group" and you just remove him from that group. If only things were so easy. Once you start restricting things like this SecureNAT clients (clients without the ISA client, or clients with the ISA client that can't authenticate to the domain) can no longer connect anywhere. This happens because the SBS Internet Users Group needs to replace All Users in the outbound web rule. Once it does that, you must authenticate to connect out. Otherwise you are anonymous and it does not work. This causes a major problem with my work laptop since it cannot be a domain member and hence cannot authenticate out.
To solve that Chad Gross suggested setting up DHCP reservations for the laptop and setting up an ISA rule and allow those addresses to connect out. (Susan Bradley suggested ditching ISA, but what would be the fun in that?) Kind of cumbersome, but it works. Thanks Chad!
The next thing I notice is that my FrontPage webs do not work. I host a few of them and now I could not get to any of them. This caused a huge problem for my wife because she hosts all the pictures on her blog on one of them and of course it was a critical business requirement to be able to upload new ones immediately. The oddest part was that they work from my work laptop when I am VPNd into work. Checking the ISA logs I see requests for http://<IP address>/_vti_bin/_vti_aut/author.dll which are blocked. That's odd, but explains why they are blocked, or do not work. If they do not have the right host headers the IIS server won't find them. I fire up netmon, however, and don't see them at all. Even stranger.
To figure out what was going on I set up a temporary rule to allow one of my internal machines to send http to anyone, all networks. Now it works and of course ISA shows that it is the new rule that is letting the traffic through. Going to netmon I don?t see anything on the external interface. Going to the internal interface, however, I see a very standard request from my internal client to the local machine, using the proper host header. The only thing I can think of is that ISA gets paranoid. Basically, there is a request here to the external address, but it is coming from the inside. That can?t be good, let?s block it. But why? The key was in the logs really. The request was anonymous. I had the firewall client turned off on that machine. I also had that rule that blocked certain users from getting to the Internet (no local admins are allowed to surf the web). Since the firewall client was disabled, the user was anonymous and ISA blocked it. Turn on the firewall client and now it can get there.
It looks like the magic combination was the override rule for the corp laptop that Chad suggested, and ensure the firewall client is on. Then things started working, sort of. My corp laptop now needs an override rule in my block users rule to allow all traffic from it to override the block, otherwise it will get blocked since it can?t authn to the firewall. I also have to add ?All Users? to the SBS Internet Access Rule? for the same reason. Once I do that, everything seems to work, but there appears to be a lot of magic rules that need to be there.
ISA is doing exactly the right thing here. The problem exists, as usual, between the chair and keyboard (PEBCAK). The trick is to use a judicious combination of Network Monitor and ISAs log, pay particular attention to who is making the requests, and really analyze the impact of all the rules. Keep in mind that if any of the rules apply to anything other than "all users" you must have a firewall client or an override rule to get through.
Now if I can only figure out why extending one of my web sites with FrontPage Server Extensions 2002 does not work unless I first extend and then unextend it with Windows SharePoint Services I would be really happy. Maybe there is some sacrifice on the altar of SharePoint that I missed?
So I was actually in the United States for a couple of days last week and decided to get the long overdue ISA server running at home. After all, how hard could this be? In ISA 2004, with the new "firewall configuration by cartoon" interface, you just pick the cartoon that looks most like your network. Heck, since I have SBS, it actually clicks the right cartoon for you.
And what was the reason for this excursion you might ask? Why not spend the time with kids, or whisky, or maybe both, instead? Well, part of me just wants to learn more about ISA. Part of me is mostly interested in blocking my 7-year olds administrative account from surfing the web. You see, he needs to have an administrative account because of all the bad software out there that won't run as a regular user. To manage that I gave him two accounts, one that is a local administrator and one that is not. Then I am now trying to block the one that is a local admin from surfing the web. I actually think this is a very useful thing to do. One of the major ways malware gets installed is when well-meaning people who surf the web with too high privileges accidentally or intentionally click the wrong button. If we can keep them from surfing the web using privileged accounts we can stop much of the malware right there. ISA server has the ability to do this because it has the ability to identify users. This is one of those very useful things that not many firewalls allow you to do. However, it turned out to be a little trickier than I thought, so I figured it would make sense to tell people about some of the problems I encountered and how I solved it.
Theoretically, all this should be simple. You install SBS, then install ISA from the SBS Premium Technologies disk. The installer will create the "SBS Internet Users Group" and you just remove the users you want to block from the web from that group. If only things were so easy. Once you start restricting things like this SecureNAT clients (clients without the ISA client, or clients with the ISA client that can't authenticate to the domain) can no longer connect anywhere. This happens because the SBS Internet Users Group needs to replace All Users in the outbound web rule. Once it does that, you must authenticate to connect out. Otherwise you are anonymous and it does not work. SecureNAT clients do not authenticate. This causes a major problem with my work laptop since it cannot be a domain member (it is already a domain member elswhere) and hence cannot authenticate out.
To solve that Chad Gross suggested setting up DHCP reservations for the laptop and setting up an ISA rule and allow those addresses to connect out. (Susan Bradley suggested ditching ISA, but what would be the fun in that?) Kind of cumbersome, but it works. Thanks Chad!
The next thing I notice is that my FrontPage webs do not work. I host a few of them and now I could not get to any of them via FrontPage. This caused a huge problem for my wife because she hosts all the pictures on her blog on one of them and of course it was a critical business requirement to be able to upload new ones immediately. The oddest part was that they work from my work laptop when I am VPNd into work. Checking the ISA logs I see requests for http://<IP address>/_vti_bin/_vti_aut/author.dll which are blocked. That's odd, but explains why they are blocked, or do not work. If they do not have the right host headers the IIS server won't find them. I fire up netmon, however, and don't see them at all. Even stranger.
To figure out what was going on I set up a temporary rule to allow one of my internal machines to send http to anyone, all networks. Now it works and of course ISA shows that it is the new rule that is letting the traffic through. Going to netmon I don?t see anything on the external interface. Going to the internal interface, however, I see a very standard request from my internal client to the local machine, using the proper host header. The only thing I can think of is that ISA gets paranoid. Basically, there is a request here to the external address, but it is coming from the inside. That can?t be good, let?s block it. But why? The key was in the logs really. The request was anonymous. I had the firewall client turned off on that machine. I also had that rule that blocked certain users from getting to the Internet (no local admins are allowed to surf the web). Since the firewall client was disabled, the user was anonymous and ISA blocked it. Turn on the firewall client and now it can get there.
It looks like the magic combination was the override rule for the corp laptop that Chad suggested, and ensure the firewall client is on. If you also have a need to allow non-domain members out you need exception rules for those. I also have to add ?All Users? to the SBS Internet Access Rule? for the same reason. Once I do that, everything seems to work, but there are a lot of magic rules that need to be there.
ISA is doing exactly the right thing here. The problem exists, as usual, between the chair and keyboard (PEBCAK). The trick is to use a judicious combination of Network Monitor and ISAs log, pay particular attention to who is making the requests, and really analyze the impact of all the rules. Keep in mind that if any of the rules apply to anything other than "all users" you must have a firewall client or an override rule to get through.
I've been meaning for a while to put together a list of my taped presentations and web casts. More and more of them are turning up in various places, and it is kind of fun to watch actually. Here is a list. If you know of more, send me an e-mail and let me know and I will update this post.
- This one is just great. I'm at the end
- IT Forum 2004 Preconference. It was called "Practicing Better than Best" and was by Steve Riley and myself
- What Nobody Told You About Protecting SQL Server 2000 from IT Forum 2004
- How To Get Your Network Hacked in 10 Easy Steps (Anatomy of a Hack) from TechEd Australia 2005. This is a very recent version of this presentation. If you want to see how this session has evolved over the year I have been delivering it, this is the latest version.
- Security Myths from TechEd Australia 2005. This is probably my favorite session of all time, or at least one of my top three (the hacking session and my current "Is That Application Safe?" would be the other two). This one has Steve and I delivering it together, which is even more fun.
- This is a really ancient one that I did while I was still at Boston University. I think you have to pay for it too, but to make the list complete, it belongs here.
- A talk on Mobile Computing Security I gave at Black Hat Windows 2002. It is in Real Media though. [:(]
- A webcast copy of the Security Configuration Wizard presentation I gave at TechEd US 2005
- I had forgotten that I did an Ask The Expert webcast on how to prevent hacking in 2004
- An old webcast on Security Risk Management from 2004
- Steve and I did a TechNet webcast on security myths in June 2005
- An audio-only interview on Defense in Depth I did with Tech Republic
- A really old webcast I did for SANS together with a bunch of others on a very old problem in IIS
- I spoke at the Management Information Systems Research Center on Network Threat Modeling as well as Security Myths. The two are combined, and they were supposed to be password protected. I guess they missed the "security" part of those presentations? :-)
That was what I found when doing a quick search. There are a few more old web casts which I will see if I can find at some opportune moment. If you find anything not listed here, please let me know.
My latest TechNet article, "How to Shoot Yourself in the Foot with Security, Part 2: To ACL or Not To ACL" was just published in the TechNet Newsletter. It turns out that ACLs is one of the major ways people destroy their systems, and of course it is also one of the major ways to protect the system. As Steve pointed out in his blog, people setting unsupported ACLs on operating system binaries was what made MS05-051 blow up. Microsoft does not test on custom ACLs on the OS. We made that clear in KB 885409 over a year ago. That makes ACLs critically important, but also quite tricky. The article was written with the hope that it dispels some of the myth around ACLs and points out what to do and not to do with them. Most of the items in there are not absolutes - there are exceptions - but generally, they are good advice and they will keep you from having to call for technical support on an unsupported OS configuration. ACLs is actually one of the major support call generators. Hopefully, this will do some small part to solve that problem.
By the way, it deserves to mention that with lead times on articles being what they are, this article was written in September, before MS05-051 came out. Take note of the first way to shoot yourself in the foot with ACLs in the article. It would have prevented the problems with the patch in MS05-051 had people followed it.
If you have comments on the article or ACLs in general, feel free to follow up to this blog post.
After a delay that was WAY too long we finally got the Protect Your Windows Network site up and running. Mostly it is just about the book for now, and it really highlights how bad I am at UI design. Eventually I thought I would start putting some personal things up there, like downloadable presentations, some tools, and so on. If I can ever find a piece of blogging software I am comfortable with from a security perspective I'll put that there too.
Being a security guy I see the world in black and white. People are either good or bad. Technical security means are either secure or not. We are either underpaid, or we are in marketing.
No, seriously, nothing is that black and white. Take SMB Message Signing for instance. Obviously it provides some serious security value, if you are subject to man in the middle attacks on your SMB network, have potentially hostile people luring you to go to malicious SMB servers (and haven't patched your systems for a while). Requiring SMB message signing on your clients is an absolute must if you have not installed XP SP2 yet, and you can't block outbound SMB from your network. At the same time, SMB message signing may sink performance into the toilet. When you turn on SMB message signing transfers get serialized. Packet 1 must arrive and be acknowledged before packet 2 gets sent, and so on.
By default, SMB Message Signing is done only between clients and DCs by default. That is fine in most situations. DCs are not very big file servers. Sure, they serve group policy files, but those are tiny in the scheme of things. There are exceptions though, and one the Small Business Server crowd is intimately familar with. SBS servers are DCs, and file servers, and print servers, and application servers, and web servers, and they probably make toast, change your oil, and book complicated airline tickets for you too. If you use an SBS server as a massive file server, you may want to consider turning off SMB message signing. In playing with this tonight I found transfer times on a large (5.5GB) file transfer go from 54 minutes with SMB message signing turned on to 22 minutes without. There are absolutely situations where it is worth turning it off. The SBS community has known this for a while: http://www.smallbizserver.net/Default.aspx?tabid=139.
What is the risk in doing so? Well, you would open yourself up to man-in-the-middle attacks, replayed SMB messages, and a host of other evil - many of which may be as likely in a small business as finding front office personnel that claim they are actually computer experts! Don't get me wrong. SMB message signing is general security goodness. However, if you have to use your DC as a file server, and you have a very low likelihood of having people inside your network use man in the middle tricks, then the mitigation may be worse than the risk. This is just one more situation where one size security does not fit all.
That is the measure of when you should turn off the security - when the mitigation is more painful than the risk you are trying to mitigate.
For about a year I have been telling a story to highlight how users running as administrators are much more likely to get malware installed on their systems than users who run as normal users. The story is actually in Protect Your Windows Network if you wanted to see it. The conclusion was that if you let your users run as admins, prepare to spend a lot of time removing malware from their systems.
Recently eWeek did some empirical testing on that type of claim. Their results are presented at http://www.thechannelinsider.com/print_article2/0,1217,a=166172,00.asp. Basically, they verified the same thing we already know: no persistent malware showed up on the system where the user was not an administrator (note that I consider Power User privileges to be functionally equivalent to Administrators but eWeek separated the two).
It is really interesting reading. Take a look at it.
When we wrote Protect Your Windows Network we put some tools on the CD. The tools are now posted on the website: http://www.protectyourwindowsnetwork.com. There is even a new version of the passgen tool available there. The new version supports setting passwords up to 256 characters, which will make it impossible to log on with the account.
We also posted the errata for the book as well as updated our next few speaking engagements.
If you have any feedback on the tools, or anything else for that matter, let me know.
At some point about six weeks ago I once again was hit with arguments that pointed to people considering security as black and white; you are either secure or you are not. Security is not now, nor has it ever been, a binary decision. There are a lot of factors we need to consider, all of which should be rooted in what you need to accomplish with the systems, the threats they are subject to, and whether the mitigation is less palatable than the risk itself. Having the incredible luxury to do so, I wrote a column on it. The column is entitled Microsoft Small Business Server and Security: It's All About Risk Management! and just came out in the Microsoft Security Newsletter today. While I use Small Business Server as the example, as the title says, it is all about risk management!
Enjoy!
Apart from the obvious issues with biometric authentication (like the fact that revoking them is quite onerous and the fact that they are actually detachable) I have never really been much of a fan of them for other reasons, like the issue that they always seem to be fooled by low-tech means. A recent scientific study seems to validate that. Of course, I think the Chaos Computer Club video is much more fun (it is in German, but you'll get the gist of it even if you do not understand German).
Being that I am on vacation, I just had to take a break from all the relaxing and get my new K-JAM/QTek 9100 to connect to OMA on my SBS server. These devices have not been out very long and run the latest version of Windows Mobile (nee, Windows CE), version 5.0. Nick, one of the SBS MVPs, has been doing some great work getting Exchange Active Sync (EAS) and Outlook Mobile Access (OMA) to work on his K-JAM so I thought I'd easily get mine to work. In case you do not know, EAS is that really cool thing that lets you sync your Windows SmartPhone or Phone Edition device with Exchange using Pocket Outlook. OMA (called OMA Browse) originally, is a web site that allows any WAP device to browse e-mail in a text-based interface more than a little reminiscent of Gopher.
To start with I was having problems connecting to OMA altogether. which lead me to rerun CEICW, which deleted the publishing cert, which broke ISA, which broke all the web sites, which I fixed by re-running CEICW again, which now allowed the default web site to work, which allowed me to fix OMA by adding the host name to the host header on the site, which then allowed me to get the rest of the sites up and running.
Let's take that slowly. Oddly enough, Nick's experiences are slightly different than mine. First, I can't use EAS since Windows Mobile still can sync only with one Exchange server and I already need it to sync with the Microsoft corporate Exchange server. OMA I can use off my own Exchange server though. I was even able to get it to work, eventually.
The core problem was that I am too cheap (or maybe not highly paid enough) to go buy a cert, so I let Small Business Server generate one. Now, according to Nick, that is not supposed to work. And, it didn't, at first. The Windows Mobile team made the devices only trust the built in certs, and then made it devilishly difficult to add new trusted root certs to the devices. Turns out there are a number of things you need to do to get the device to accept the self-signed certs.
1. Configure the OMA hosting web site with a host header that holds the hostname of the system hosting it
2. Re-run the Configure E-mail and Internet Connection Wizard (CEICW) to publish OMA
3. Re-add the rule in ISA that allowed all the other sites to be published. When I ran CEICW, it decided I really did not want to publish any of the non-SBS sites that were hosted on this server
4. Open MMC and add the Certificate Manager snapin for this computer (the SBS computer)
5. Export the public keys for the two certs used by SBS (one is called "publishing.<hostname>" and the other is the name of your external web server). Save them as .cer files.
6. Download those certs to the Windows Mobile device. Put them somewhere you can find them, like on a storage card
7. Run File Explorer and run the cer files. The Windows Mobile team post talks about having to use the certinst.exe tool (located in the Windows directory on the device, but on my K-JAM .cer files are already linked to that executable.
At this point we have OMA working on the device, with one exception. It will not work if it is on the internal network inside the SBS Server. The reason is that SBS Premium sets up ISA as a proxy server on port 8080, even for SSL. The device will try to connect to OMA over 443, which will generate a RST (TCP Reset) as soon as you connect and the device sends the first request. If you use http instead of https, it will work. Basically, to fix this you have to set up a proxy server on the device. My preferred option is to use GPRS to access OMA. It was painful enough to set this up to start with. However, if you want to use the proxy approach you need to go to the Settings option, Connections tab, Connections icon, then Add a proxy server. Keep in mind, you will need to go back in there as soon as you leave the home network you will need to turn off the proxy.
This morning when I tried to use FrontPage (don't even start) to edit one of my web sites, I was faced with this error:
Error Code: 500 Internal Server Error. Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) network is unreachable. For more information about this event, see ISA Server Help. (10051)
10051 means "System Call Interrupted." That was not all that helpful though. What system call? And, what does ICMP have to do with it?
To understand the problem, we need to consider the network design. I have an ISA 2004 server, sitting on the same system (running Windows Small Business Server 2003 Premium) as the web sites. Therein lay the rub. The ISA dashboard kind of gave it away actually. There were several alerts there saying that ISA could not bind to port 80 on 192.168.0.1, in other words, the inside network interface. Now, IIS should already be bound there, so that makes some amount of sense, although given the choice of IIS and ISA, I think I would prefer if ISA got to bind to the interfaces first. The more I use ISA the more I like the logging and alerting infrastructure.
The problem turned out to be the ISA Web Proxy Auto Discovery (WPAD) information. Somehow, and I swear it had nothing to do with me, ISA was set up to serve WPAD from port 80, instead of the default of 8080. Of course, IIS was already bound there, so hence the error. That seemed to bring down the whole proxy. and cause the connectivity problems.
I was able to find a number of people with the same problem, but not anyone who had figured out the solution, so I thought it made sense to post it. The solution was to change the port that ISA serves WPAD on back to 8080. Go to the ISA console, expand "Configuration", click on Networks, and double-click the "Internal" network. Go to the Auto Discovery tab and set it to 8080, which is where the firewall clients will look for it anyway unless you tell them otherwise.
While I was at it, I set up the split DNS and direct access to the web sites from the internal network as well, in accordance with Tom Shinder's advice. I really think this solution is rather inelegant, and a lot of extra work for something that should be automatic. I also worry that external connectivity problems will go overlooked this way, but still. We'll see. I reconfigure this thing whenever I have time, so I'll use it this way for a while.
For some reason I decided that today was a good day to figure out how to block certain file extensions from being accessible over the web. This could be very useful, for instance, if you are trying to prevent a particular exploit that utilizes a particular file extension for its payload.
To do this go to the rule that allows inbound web traffic and double-click it.
Click the "Protocols" tab
Click "Filtering"
Click "Configure HTTP"
Click the "Extensions" tab
Here is where you have to make the choice of what to block. If you have some time, it would be really good to enumerate good things here and block everything else. What might be good? The following probably are:
- HTM
- HTML
- JPG
- JPEG
- JFIF
- GIF
- PNG
- ASP
- ASPX
- TXT
- EXE (we probably want to be able to download these)
- OCX (arguably ActiveX is good)
- SWF (I personally do not like Shockwave, but some people do)
- CFM (Cold Fusion)
- PHP
- ZIP
- There are probably a lot more and quite frankly, in an emergency, you would not want to build this list. Do this later, when you can do some real analysis on it
So obviously, if we are worried about a particular attack, we'll select "Block specified extensions (allow all others)" in the drop-down list
Click Add
In the "Extension" box type the name of the extension, such as "WMF" (without the quotes)
Click "OK" twice and then click Apply.
If you want to verify whether the filter works go to http://www.protectyourwindowsnetwork.com/test-wmf.htm. If the picture on that page is blocked your filter probably worked.
This past week there have been a lot of questions about the WMF vulnerability, what Microsoft is doing, and what the community should do to protect against it. For many reasons, Microsoft's response to the problem is best left to those who do this for a living. However, there is a lot of interest in the community for ways to protect against the problem until an official patch is available. Obviously, a patch is the best protection there is, but until there is one, and until we can get it applied, do we just watch our systems melt around us? I cannot speak for Microsoft and this blog post is a purely personal opinion piece, not a Microsoft statement. However, I think this is just another risk management problem.
Let's look for just a minute at the vulnerability itself. It exploits a little-known function in Windows Meta Files (WMF). Those files are used for, well, I don't know really. I think they are mostly used for clipart in Office. In any case, the exploit involves a file with special commands in it, which would be rendered by shimgvw.dll acting on behalf of the user. The exploit requires user interaction, such as surfing to a web site hosting an image that exploits the problem, viewing an e-mail with an embedded such image in an e-mail program that shows those images (Outlook 2003 does not do so automatically), or opening an image as a file attachment.
There are many different exploits of this by now. They are currently in active use to install spyware, according to SANS.
Protecting Yourself
A number of protective measures do exist. They include the usual measures as well as a few unique ones.
Surf in an unprivileged context
Simply surfing the web as a non-administrator will go a long way toward protecting yourself. The obvious way to do this is to make your user account something other than an administrator. You really should do that anyway. However, even if you cannot be a regular user (all of us can, strictly speaking, but it is inconvenient), use the Restricted Tokens functionality in Windows XP Service Pack 2 to surf unprivileged. A really simple way to do that is to use the Run As functionality. Right-click the icon you use to launch Internet Explorer (or whatever browser you use) and select Run As. When you do you get this dialog.

If you select the "Protect my computer and data from unauthorized program activity" checkbox you will get a restricted security token and the browser will basically be a regular user. The damage it can cause is therefore that of a regular user. Of course, this is nowhere near as good as running as an regular user, but at least it goes some way toward surfing with protection.
Obviously, your users will never do this on their own. You can do it for them though. Right-click the icons they use to launch their browser, and select the Advanced button on the Shortcut page. Click the "Run with different credentials" box and click OK twice. Now distribute this icon and make sure it is the easy way for them to launch the browser. They will naturally, as users tend to do, click "OK" on the first dialog pops up, which will automatically give them a restricted token. Here is how that looks:

If you want to verify that this works, use Aaron Margosis most excellent PrivBar toolbar for IE. I find it a handy measure to ensure that I am browsing in the right context. There are some things that do not work properly in this context, like the MSN toolbar, but I find that a small price to pay. Another annoyance is that none of your settings for IE work when you run restricted. Finally, it does not seem to work at all on a domain-joined system that is not connected to the domain.
How and where does this help? Using a restricted account is good security practice no matter what. It will contain the exploit to only information that the restricted user has access to and makes it a lot harder escalate the exploit to other systems. In addition, it means that it is very difficult for the attacker to rootkit the system through this type of exploit since the user does not have access to install anything. However, surfing restricted will not stop the exploit. It just makes it somewhat less bad. If the user has access to sensitive information, so do the criminals. That means that while all my users are running restricted, as do I most of the time, I do more than that to protect them.
Block the Exploit At The Gateway
The next possible preventive measure is to attempt to block the exploit. I showed last week how to block file extensions in ISA server and Susan showed how to do it on the mail server if you have SBS. If you do not have SBS, the process is a bit more complicated, but you can still do it.
Blocking the files at the gateway is a great idea. It stops the exploit somewhere where the exploit has no control. If you try to stop the exploit at the user level, the user has the ability to override the protection as long as there is a compelling enough reason to do so. As we all know, promises of huge sums of money, chocolate, or naked dancing pigs, is far more important than security to most users. Given the tradeoff between the two, security stands no chance. With extension blocking the user has no control over the protection and therefore cannot override it very easily.
Of course, there is a downside. According to Security Focus, there is now a handy exploit kit that produces exploits that do not use the WMF file extension. That means that blocking only WMF files does not stop all exploits. It only stops those we know about right now that use WMF extensions. This works because the system is written to be smart about file contents. If the file extension says it is a JPG file, but the content says it is WMF, then clearly someone must have made a mistake and they really wanted the file parsed as WMF so it will go ahead and do so. Unfortunately, we live in a file extension oriented world, but the components are written assuming that file-extensions are unreliable. Protective measures are still file extension oriented though. Therefore, blocking files based on extensions is useful, but not complete protection. To be fully protected you would need to block all the file types that can be used, which may include EMF, GIF, JPG (and friends), Paint, PJPG, PNG, TIF, WMF, and possibly others as well. Of course, you can block all of those as well, but now we are really making web browsing painful. A better option would be to have a smart file parser at the gateway which can determine based on the contents of the file what it is. If you have a Network-Based Intrusion Detection System, this would be a really good time to get the manual out and figure out how to block WMF files based on content.
The question then is, should you use file blocking? Personally, I have blocked WMF and EMF files. I have not gone so far as to block JPG and the others yet. I probably will not do so as I believe (hope) that the sites my users go to will not be hosting the exploit. They are typically only surfing a few different sites and that limits exposure. Had my exposure been different, the value of the information I protect been higher, my legal requirements to provide protection been firmer, or my risk tolerance been lower, I probably would have blocked all of them. It really comes down to risk management, and there is no right answer here. You have to judge your risk, your requirements, and your tolerance for risk. The cure here is to block all these file extensions. The cost of actually doing so is low, but the side-effects are large. The potential risk is variable depending on the environments. You end up with a risk management formula that looks something like this:
RiskOfAttack*CostOfAttack - CostOfCure - CostOfSideEffects*RiskOfSideEffects = RiskCoefficient
Obviously, this is entirely abstract, but if the calculated risk coefficient is positive, and greater than your risk tolerance, then you would implement the protection. In my case, the risk coefficient is negative for this particular preventive measure meaning that the cost of the side effects of the cure are greater than the risk itself. In your case, that may not be the case.
De-Register the DLLinvoked
The official Microsoft work-around is to de-register the shimgvw.dll file so that it does not get invoked at all. This does stop the attack since the vulnerable component is no longer used. However, the cost of implementing the prevention is high since it requires the action to be taken on every single machine. If you have an Enterprise Management System (EMS) that would not be too difficult, but still takes some work. If you do not you have to either run to every system and run the regsvr32 /u %windir%\system32\shimgvw.dll command. Then when the crisis is over you have to run back to every system and do basically the same thing. Each operation takes a reboot.
There is one other problem with this protection. In order to unregister the DLL you have to be an administrator. I can see a lot of people that would put a logon script together that would unregister the DLL. Then I see a web page that says "in order to see the naked dancing pigs on this page you must first run this component. Please click here first..." and a link to a cmd file with regsvr32 shimgvw.dll. You see, users can undo any protective measure you put in place as the user.
The potential value of de-registering the DLL is high if the user is not an administrator. If the user is an administrator, it is negligible. The side-effect is moderate. It only stops the Windows Picture and Fax Viewer, which breaks the filmstrip mode in Windows Explorer and viewing any file type that is registered to that component, which is all of the ones listed above. You can, however, still surf the web and see pictures there. This highlights an important point, there are usually more than one way to skin any particular cat. Any component that explicitly loads shimgvw.dll is not protected. I do not know of any such components, but since the DLL is still there it is foolish to think that there is not something that loads it. Couple that with a high cost of implementation and you find that either your risk of attack or your cost of attack, or both, has to be extremely high to go this far. It is a valuable protective measure in some environments, but certainly not in all. Personally, I have used this measure on one machine where I have to be an administrator.
Up to date Anti-Malware
The old standby of keeping your anti-malware (anti-virus, anti-spyware, anti-rootkit, anti-whateverthecurrentfadistoday) up to date is of course also recommended. Doing so will block known exploits, but not unknown ones. The anti-malware crowd are working overtime on this one to keep their signatures up to date, but eventually, signatures will fail. I think of anti-malware as antibiotics. Sure, I like them, and sure, they prevent infection, but eventually the pathogens become resistant, and at that point there is no cure. It is a case of leapfrogging. We leapfrog the criminals, then the criminals leapfrog us. Then we leapfrog the criminals, and they leapfrog us. We have been doing so for 20 years or more, and we are still fighting the same battles.
Note that I am not saying not to use anti-malware. You definitely should use it. It is a nice safety net. Just do not become overly reliant on it. The time will come when an exploit is not stopped by anti-malware. Do not fall into the trap of thinking that just because you have anti-malware you can stop being vigilant.
Unofficial Patch
Finally, there is an unofficial patch. Patch really is the right terminology for this. It patches (using basic rootkit technology) a system DLL to ignore calls to the vulnerable function. The patch comes with an MSI file, so you can distribute it via Intellimirror. According to SANS, it does stop the current exploits. Personally, I have not tested it, and I have no intention of using an unofficial patch at this time.
Again, it is risk management. If you have extremely high security requirements, you may want to go so far as using something as drastic as an unofficial patch. However, in that situation you are probably not willing to trust a third-party packaged patch anyway. The unknown risk of issues with an unofficial patch is pretty high. The cost of implementation ranges from low in a domain environment, to very high in an unmanaged environment. If your risk and the cost of the attack is very high then you may want to consider the unofficial patch, but I cannot in the best conscience recommend it right now.
Conclusion
Hopefully this will help you consider the options. There is no right solution, there is no one-size fits all approach to preventing this problem. Even in a single network there is no a single approach that always works. Some exposed machines deserve more protection than others, as do some users. My point in this post is not to solve the problem for you, but to point out some things you may not have considered yet. If you have, congratulations, you are probably ahead of the game. This, after all, is just another risk management problem.
by pnolan
Well balanced and informative post Jesper. Thanks for putting it together.
Regards,
Pat
by espoo2
"I am a Senior Security Strategist in the Security Technology Unit at Microsoft. My job is to explain to our customers how to run Microsoft products securely, and to the extent that it is needed, help the product groups figure out how to make it possible to do so."
quoted from http://blogs.technet.com/jesper_johansson/archive/2006/01/02/416762.aspx
The open source movement is starting to subsume, absorb, and digest MS. The first step is providing fixes much faster than MS can:
http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?rss&storyid=996
Now _that's_ something that *will* convince the masses to trust open source and switch to Linux etc.
Jesper and his lot look quite pitiful in their rejection of the truly professional solution that was provided by an outsider. If MS were not such a behemoth that suffocates and chains all the talent of its employees, it would have found (some employee maybe did) *and provided* a solution faster than Ilfak Guilfanov. And if MS were a responsible, law-abiding company interested in protecting its customers instead of a monopoly that (thinks it still) doesn't need to worry about competition, MS would have advised its customers to apply Ilfak's patch http://www.hexblog.com/2006/01/silent_wmf_hotfix_installer.html#more until they come up with a permanent solution.
MS should have and could have provided a patch within a few hours; instead, they and their employees play Don Quixote about all major mainstream media recommending the unofficial patch. Jesper's lame comment "best left to those who do this for a living" (does he consider himself more of a professional than Ilfak and the SANS crowd?!) and link to the "semi"-offical MS statement at http://blogs.technet.com/msrc/default.aspx (i.e. by a colleague!) are in the best traditions of disinformation in Soviet and other dictatorships: The linked blog is older(!) than Jesper's blog entry, it's placatory instead of informative (even clueless newbies notice that Kevin, whoever that his - his link is empty - knows much more than he's telling), and it's even partly erroneous.
It's only a question of time before Microsoft's monopoly collapses. The Soviets ran out of money, and then their citizens started literally running away; Redmond is going to run out of customers and then out of money, as is already being demonstrated by Firefox.
by espoo2
by valdis9
<p>Very thorough analysis.? Having a Windows program whose main output are analytic network maps as EMF files I got worried about the current buzz[hysteria?] and needed a cool-headed overview.? Thanks!</p>function (match)
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}><p>As a small business I keep our 2 Windows machines OFF of the internet.? Only the office Macintoshes connect to the internet.? We sometimes email the EMF files from the Macs as attachments... can they be intercepted and infected along the way?? My guess is small chance...</p> function (match)
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OK, you have probably seen it, but the official update for the WMF vulnerability was just posted! The bulletin is titled MS06-001. The updates are on Windows Update, as well as on the download center. Links to the Download Center updates are in the bulletin.
Go patch your stuff!
Jim Harrison has created a very cool script to do much better blocking of the WMF exploit in ISA server. The script is nice because it sets up a policy that actually parses the request body and blocks WMF files that are renamed to something else by using ISA's ability to look really deep into the payload. It also is helpful in that it can uninstall itself.
This script, while being much better than simply looking for extensions, is not foolproof. It will obviously not work with an HTTPS tunnel, unless the ISA server is proxying the HTTPS connection and terminating it at the ISA server. Nor would it work on an e-mail borne attack, such as where the offending file is attached to an e-mail. Those latter ones you need to block by blocking attachments in e-mail. Still, it does assist in blocking certain types of attacks and as I said before, all these things have to be accounted for in your risk management strategy.
Recently I was on yet another flight, trying to get some e-mail
done. This time, however, I was answering e-mail offline on my
SmartPhone. Of course, the phone was in flight mode so the radio was
off. I wouldn't want to "interfere with the aircrafts navigation and
communication systems." Needless to say, this was not nearly sufficient
for the flight attendant, who proceeded to lecture me on how important
it is that all cell phones be turned off lest they "interfere with the
aircrafts navigation and communication systems," and presumably cause
the plane to crash, sending all of us to a premature, fiery, and
particularly violent death.
Curiously, however, a few minutes afterward, while I was listening
to music on my WMA player I suddenly heard the tell-tale interference
from a GSM cell phone. Turns out the guy next to me had forgotten to
turn off his Palm Treo! HORROR! We must surely be heading into a death
spiral any second now!
As you may be able to tell from the fact that I am actually alive to
write this though, there were no terrorists yacking on their cell
phone, thereby causing the plane to crash, on this particular flight.
In fact, the mere notion that a device carried by 98% of the people on
the flight could cause a plane to crash is ludicrous in the extreme,
particularly considering that about 93% of those people are probably
incapable of properly turning the device off. Talk about another case
of security theater. Even the Transportation Security Administration -
national enforcer of security theater - apparently does not consider
cell phones a threat since they still allow us to bring them on board
aircraft. Maybe this will all stop as soon as someone figures out a way
to crack the battery case and use it as a deadly weapon?
At any rate, I decided to check how much trouble this particular
flight was really in. I turned on my wireless network and bluetooth on
my laptop. I am such a rebel! The funny thing was that the really
bright blue light shone the same flight attendant that was worried
about cell phones in the face about 6 times and she never seemed to see
much of a problem with it. I then proceeded to scan the ether a few
times to see who was communicating. I found three different wireless
networks, and two bluetoth devices advertising themselves. The
bluetooth devices were even advertising their owners names. Maybe I
should report Stacey and Tom to the TSA? They must clearly be
terrorists, using small, cheap, radio transmitters in a blatant attempt
to bring down a commercial airliner!
Cell phones typically operate on frequencies like 800 MHz, 850 MHz,
900 MHz, 1.8 GHz, and 1.9 GHz. Both bluetooth and 802.11b (my laptop is
old and does not have 802.11a or g) operate on 2.4 GHz. I'm not a radio
engineer, and maybe there is something special about the cell phone
frequencies that allows them to crash aircraft while the 2.4 GHz
hobbyist band does not; but I doubt it. I think the fact that every
single flight in the world probably has at least one Stacey or Tom on
it, and probably several, recklessly leaving their bluetooth devices
turned on is proof positive that there is absolutely zero risk posed to
air travel safety by cell phones or any other small radio transmitter.
Heck, SAS and Lufthansa, and maybe others too, now offer ridiculously
expensive wireless networking on board.
Clearly, this is just another case of security theater, acted out by
people refusing to accept the obvious and question their fundamental
beliefs about the things they learned years ago, which are so clearly
untrue.
by timmorton
Although I must agree that there seems to be highly contradictory evidence, the arguments regarding simultaneous connection to multiple cells, the potential effects of lightning or the effects of stronger signals on certain equipment may run and run. Nevertheless, I support the ban on cell phones in aircraft despite the inconvenience I have occasionally 'suffered' when I wanted to play with my smart phone or endeavoured to work in a space less than a fifth of the size I would legally be entitled to in my office.
The reason for my support of the ban is quite simple: any lifting of the ban would, for egalitarian reasons, have to apply to everyone.
Consequently, air travel would be instantly plagued by that genre of cell-phone user who invade our consciousness every day with a seemingly constant and superfluous narrative regarding their location, the local weather conditions or alarmingly candid details of their state of health.
Apparently oblivious of the fundamental function of a cell-phone, the sensitivity of the modern microphone, or the sensibilities of their fellow humans, these cell-boors are commonly to be heard conducting their banal conversations at such a volume to negate the need for a phone at all; merely opening an adjacent window would probably suffice provided that the recipient caller was within the same state.
In the enforced confine of an aircraft cabin, there are surely quite enough tests of our tolerance of our fellow man/woman without adding another?
For the technorati, who might actually make legitimate and valuable use of a cell-phone service at 30,000 feet, perhaps in time your call will also be answered. For now, in a world where every minute seems precious, take heart: above the clouds might be one of the few remaining places that you can find any head-room.
?No HONEY? I?m on a PLANE!... AMAZING, Huh???
by jetzen
Spot on. My only query is that maybe a plane load of bluetooth, GSM, UMTS, etc. signals can be enough to do something? I am guessing, probably not - but I don't know much about radio frequencies!
by osumiller
I can't seem to find the link at the moment, but I once read an article
that was along the same lines as this one. No, cell phones do not
cause a problem with the radios on board an airplane, but due to the
increased radio propogation when you lift the antenna to 30,000 feet,
cell phone carriers screamed at the thought of the bandwidth that these
devices (if left on) would consume (or at least that is what this
article attested to). I belive it, since I have studied radio
communications a little bit. Think about it, flying over
the Four-Corners region, your cell phone could connect to every cell
network in a 4 or 5 state area. At that altitude, you would have
the ability to connect to far more networks than you normally can on
the ground, since the terrain on the earth blocks some or all of the
signal, depending on where you are at (cell phones are in a "line of
sight" frequency range, which means that if a mountain stands in your
way, you aren't talking).
Proof of the line of sight is that your radio stations (FM) will have
their broadcast beaming from a tall building or tower. If you
wanted to broadcast from the ground on an AM radio band, you would
actually have decent results in range, with relatively little power,
since these broadcasts "bounce" off the ionisphere and back to the
earth in huge waves. Now take that concept and think about your
line of sight from 30,000 feet. Quite a difference between there
and sea level.
Just a few things to think about.
by dc guy
If using a cell phone causes the loss of so many IQ points that people forget that they don't have to shout, that's prima facie evidence that their use while operating a motor vehicle should be outlawed.
Just as seriuosly, I'm in favor of a ban on ALL public transportation. Having the guy behind me screaming at his wife or co-worker on a bus or subway is just as annoying as it is on an airliner.
How did people ever get along without the accursed things? I still can't find any reason to own one and lots of reasons not to.
by gsg
It might not cause the plane to crash, but it will cause me to beat the cell phone user about the head until they lie unconscious on the floor. It's bad enough hearing people deliberately speaking loudly in the moments before the shut off announcement, I don't want to hear it the entire flight. No, I am not impressed by your seeming importance as you very loudly talk about your deal you just made for the multi-million dollar contract to produce widgets for XYZ fortune 100 company. Here, let me take that cell phone and shove it down your throat.
I welcome the shut down announcement. Planes are the one place I'm free. The bathroom isn't even free of the cell phones. I've been on conference calls where the person on the other end is "communing with nature" during the call. It's not fun.
by sdan
Soooo, what we are looking at is that these devices probably will cause zero interference, but if they do it could be
1) Tricky for the cockpit crew to be able to interpret the accuracy of instrument data,
2) Cause for errant alarms,
3) Cause of unpredictable device behavior.
Should this happen, nope. Shouldn't planes be shielded and filtered well enough to keep this from occurring, yep.
In the air, it is about lives. Prove it safe FIRST, then go for it.
In short, why take the risk for a negligible benefit?
by rosearch
Which might say something about how all of us react differently not only to the way a message is delivered, but also to 'who' is delivering it. You and I both know that the Flight Attendant is delivering the instruction by way of 'rote' (I've been told to say this but I have no understanding of what's behind it). Whereas we'd assume that a pilot has some engineering background that gives some 'depth' to his/her view.
I love the 'security theatre' concept. I come from a profoundly skeptical view of just about everything, and particularly information technology and the 'theatre' we create around it. So I'd ask (because skepticism is about asking what lies behind) "what have you done by way of research to understand the issue of electronic interference", or is this just intended to make (the perfectly valid) point about how we feel when we are told something by someone who doesn't have the (apparent) competence to have a view on that matter?
I'd recommend a quick look at what happened to flight 427 back in '94. Nobody prior to that accident 'believed' that the servo that controlled the flaps could malfunction, despite the discovery later that several 'incidents' had occured because of it (effectively reversing the intent of the pilot at the controls) and some pilots were 'suspicious'. At the moment pilots have suspicions about intereference from electronic devices, I'm prepared to go along with their point of view. And incidentally, 427 took 20 seconds (you can count them slowly) from the point that it rolled until it dived into the ground. You can read the transcript at http://www.airdisaster.com. As you count 20 seconds (slowly) again you might appreciate that perhaps, after all, the Flight Attendant has a 'vested interest' in minimising even the slightest risk to the aircraft. Cheers, Tban
by chitwndave
In actual fact, the FCC has prohibited the use of cell phones in the air, not the FAA. The FAA merely enforces the ban on inflight cell phone usage. The reason being that at altitude you "bring up" too many "cells' with your phone. At least that was what used to happen as I don't know if the present state of the art has built-in safeguards to prevent this from happening. You used to block a lot of bandwidth in the old days.
The FAA prohibits the use of any device in flight that Could interfere with navigation, howver. Case in point an FM broadcast reciever that could generate a harmonic that could cause a pilot navigation error allowing a plane to impact mountains etc. (this has actually happened and killed quite a few people in a crash some 25 years ago).
But you are correct, the cell phone will not really cause any problems. The airlines, for simplicity, just lump cell phones in with everything else.
If you want to see real security theater, see what the TSA and the other alaphabet groupds have done to General Aviation. They prohibit us from flying many places but don't prohibit Truck rentals access to the same areas (trucks have been used in several terrorist attacks here in the US). So far NOT ONE General Aviation aircraft has been used in a terroist attack on the US (also it is doubtful that you could get sufficient payload in one of these planes to do any real damage).
by smorty71
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11064059/
It shows that hospitals would benefit from lifting the cellphone ban.
by dc guy
I just saw a poll in this morning's paper, saying the majority of BUSINESS travelers are in favor of retaining the airline cell phone ban. I must say that almost all of the people who annoy me in public with their unnecessarily loud special-cell-phone-voice (which I think is the same as their outdoor voice) are not talking about business.
by davemori
I am a pilot as well as a IT director, and I worked in aerospace for many years and I disagree.
Proximity to an EMI or RFI source can generate interference, regardless of the disparate frequencies. Literally everything that receives will also emit, and the aircraft's internal wire harness, skin and systems can act as one gigantic antenna to propagate interference. When you get close enough and your power output is sufficient enough, you can generate interference on equipment operating on completely different frequencies.
This is not helped by the fact that some component chipsets and processors achieve their rated performance by doing clocking off of slower external busses. A 2.4 GHz processor may be making that speed by doing 8X clocking off a 333 MHz memory bus, etc.
The degree to which intereference is likely is going to depend upon the vintage of the Nav and Comm and Avionic systems on board the aircraft. You would be surprised at the vintage of some of the avionics systems aboard some of the commercial flights. On a recent flight, I spotted old style inertial nav systems on board a commercial airliner. This is stuff that GPS generally superceded over a decade ago -- and GPS has been around since the 1980s. The bird is still flying in that configuration because the airline needs to stretch out its money and with the recent downturn in the airline industry, it can't afford to massively upgrade existing planes.
While I agree it is not likely to cause a crash, the fact remains that even small calculation errors (a few seconds) in an old inertial nav system can throw you significantly off course on a trans-pacific or trans-atlantic trip when the airliner is travelling at 400 to 600 knots. While it may not turn into a life-threatening situation like Amelia Earhart where you can't find land, it will certainly cost the airline money given that jets burn down fuel at tens of thousands of pounds per hour, and given that a delay in an arrival or departure window at an airport costs the airline money in the way of fines, staff time, extra fuel burned off while waiting, etc.
All this stuff comes back to the consumer in the way of higher ticket costs.
Remember also that the skies are not always friendly, despite what the United Airlines commercials say. In passed years, airliners straying off course have been shot down.
As for what Lufthansa and others are doing with wireless -- great. But remember that anything put into an airplane has to pass their version (international equivalents) of FAA testing to make sure that safety is not compromised and to quantify the impact to existing avionics. Remember that they are generally deploying this on newer or more recently upgraded aircraft.
Your sarcasm about the TSA is funny, but it clearly is only looking at a very small facet of the equation. When you are a commercial pilot with 200-400 lives depending upon you, believe it or not that is only one of the small headaches you have to worry about.
Obey the rule. Cut the airline and aircrew some slack and turn the doggone devices off and be slightly inconvenienced for the duration of the trip.
People are too addicted to blackberries, cell phones, etc. anyway, and not all devices are 100% prohibited. They do let you use laptops after takeoff -- you just have to put them away before landing. The airline and the aircrew do try to be reasonable, but they have to obey FAA regulations.
Safety may get quoted by the flight crew, but there is a lot more to it than just safety, and they are too doggone busy in a flight to give a lengthy explanation to a bunch of feisty passengers who don't even want to listen to instructions on fastening safety belts, etc..
by mwachtmann
A bunch of radio and microwave transmitters on many different frequencies inside a metal can (fuselage) can have strange additive effects. I also like the idea of peace and quiet, so I'm OK with the ban. I once received permission from a commercial pilot to operate my 2 meter ham radio while in flight. While somewhere over the Grand Canyon I brought up repeaters in several states at the same time with only 5 watts. Cell phones could reek the same kind of havoc.
MikeW
by mjd420nova
With the proliferation of wireless devices in the world today, it would be near impossible to predict, simulate,
stage or observe the huge amount of interactions that could happen when numerous wireless devices,
regardless of their respective frequecies, and create interference that could interfere, over-ride or
otherwise disable navigation, communication and control systems aboard todays commerical
aircraft. Can your cell phone cause a gasoline fire when you use it while pumping gas in your
car? The phone companies say NO but incidents still happen. Can these exact situations
be duplicated to investigate the cause? Not likely. But what's the sense of allowing the
operation of these devices in possible life threatening situations. If your eyes could see
the RF emitted from these devices( a labratory device does exist) you could not imagine
what you would see. The list a long and loaded with things you would never suspect
but can be some of the biggest contributers to the "pollution" washing over your body
right this moment in your home, or where ever you are. Air lines are attempting to
reach a middle ground by setting up and testing devices, however without unlimited
resources to test every know device available, must set some type of limits or
parameters that must be meet to allow you to use your toy in flight.
The other day an old issue came up again: how do we mitigate the threat of sensitive data in page files. Page files are basically an on-disk repository of data that was in memory but not needed right at this moment. The system will page the data to disk, into the pagefile, to allow apps to use more memory than what the system really has.
This obviously can cause a security problem if an app stores sensitive data in memory and that piece of memory gets spooled to disk. If so, a bad guy can read it from there. This threat is not new and affects all operating systems that use virtual memory. However, how big a threat is it really? The last time this came up while I was talking to IT admins, I painted the following scenario:
If you are really worried about bad guys
1. Stealing a laptop that some random employee failed to protect physically while in the ?security? line at the airport
2. Pulling the hard disk out of it
3. Mounting it in a different computer
4. Copying a 2GB pagefile off it
5. Opening that page file in a hex editor and scouring through it on the off-chance that some random, poorly written, third party application:
a. Uses sensitive information
b. Keeps it in memory for any length of time
c. Does not properly mark that memory as non-pageable
d. Does not encrypt it
e. And the system just happens to page that particular page of memory to disk
6. Finding this password
7. Somehow figuring out that
a. It?s a password
b. It?s valid on system foo
c. For the user bar
8. Managing to get access to the interface for system foo
9. Allowing the bad guy to log on to system foo using that stolen password
Then you most definitely should worry about this. If so, you should set the group policy to "Shutdown: clear virtual memory pagefile". However, unless you also disable hibernation (which also writes memory to disk) and ensure that users always shut their system down, it will not help. That latter part, always shutting the system down, is a bit of an issue. Wiping the page file adds an additional 15 minutes or so to the time it takes to shut down the system once you tell it to wipe the pagefile; all while listening to the flight attendant yelling ?sir, I told you 12 minutes ago to shut that thing down, we have passed an altitude where portable electronic devices may no longer be used, you are jeopardizing the safety of everyone on board and we will have you arrested as soon as we manage to land this thing, which, by the way, we cannot do until you shut your computer off!?
Frankly, in most cases, if you are sufficiently worried about potentially sensitive data in page files you probably should rethink mobile computing alltogether. Maybe having people carrying around laptops with sensitive data on them really is not for you at this point?
It really boils down to risk management. For most of us, the risk probably does not outweigh the disadvantages of turning this setting on. Of course, there are other options. One is to not use a page file. You can turn it off entirely in Windows XP. On a system with a lot of memory this seems to not cause a lot of problems. I have not had one on my laptop for quite some time since I have 2GB of RAM, but little spare room on the hard drive for the page file. This is not really a recommended configuration, but it works fine in some cases.
A better option is coming with Windows Vista. If you get a system with a TPM 1.2 chip you can enable the Bitlocker feature which encrypts the whole hard drive. At this point everything on the drive is encrypted, including any potential clear text passwords in the page file. This is going to be very handy and obviously deals with a whole slew of other situations as well.
http://www.microsoft.com/events/teched2006/registration.mspxThe schedule for Spring 2006 is in full swing. Just in case anyone is interested in meeting up with me somewhere in the world (or has some new gig they think I should go to) I thought it makes sense to post my schedule here.
- February 6 and 7 - Albuquerque, NM for a training course. Yes, I need training too
- February 13 and 14 - Delivering a tech talk at UT Austin
- February 27 - March 3 - London (and environs) for the CISO summit and a set of customer meetings
- March 2 - IT Pro Conference in Paris
- March 6 - 15 - Australian Security Summits - Yes, it is true! My favorite Microsoft Subsidiary is organizing a new set of security summits. Here is the detailed schedule
- March 7 - Sydney community event at the Microsoft Office, 1 Epping Road, North Ryde
- March 8 - Sydney summit at Sofitel Wentworth.
- March 9 - Community event in Canberra at the Rydges Eagle Hack Resort. What's the best thing about Canberra? The road to Sydney! Closely matched by the fact that the Aussies buried their legislators alive
- March 10 - Summit in Canberra at the National Museum of Australia
- March 11 and 12 - scuba diving in Perth, or somewhere around there, maybe interspersed with a visit to the Little Creatures Brewery in Fremantle
- March 13 - Community event in Perth at the Perth Town Hall
- March 14 - Security Summit in Perth at the Hyatt Regency
- March 16 - 18 - Not to be outdone by their neighbors on the West Island, the Kiwis are also doing a security summit, in Auckland, on the 17th.
- March 27 -30 - Reykjavik, Iceland for Rocked 2006
- April 25 - Security Summit in Dallas at the Convention Center
- May 9 - 11 - TechEd Israel (tentative). I should get this schedule finalized in a week or two.
- May 10 - 11 - Federal Security Summit West in Redmond, Washington. I may be at both of these events, but right now this schedule is not final.
- May 21 - 25 - AusCERT 2006 (tentative) in Gold Coast.
- June 12 - 16 - TechEd North America in Boston, MA (yes, I know it is just called "TechEd" but don't you agree that's a bit conceited since there are 21 other events locally?). This is the biggest event of the year for us, and it will probably sell out in April this year. Make sure you register early!
- June 26 - Security Summit in Detroit at the Rock Financial Showplace, the Diamond center
This week I went to Dr. Edward A. Tufte's course on presenting quantitative information. Being a professional (yes, I know some people argue about the professionalism part) presenter I found this to be a reasonable way to pick up a few nuggets that might help me improve. What I saw and heard was both interesting and disturbing though. The interesting stuff made it worthwhile, and if you work on presenting, or digesting, information it is probably worth it to at least get the books.
Dr. Tufte is Professor Emeritus from Yale. Typically, Emeritus means "retired because he's too old and decrepit to drag himself into a class room but he made a really significant impact on science while he was here" Here I think it was more an indication of the fact that he makes more money getting 1000 people into a room, paying $320 a pop, to hear him talk about presenting information instead. He is widely considered one of the leading authorities of our time on the topic, so that frankly makes a certain amount of sense.
The second half of the course was the more interesting part, and was where Tufte's real biases showed up. First he talked about web design, arguing that a good web site should have 200-400 links on the first page. People are good at scanning information, they are already at the site so they do not need to be enticed to go there, and they are there looking for information, not corporate logos, so give them information. I generally agree with this, but he fails to include in this reasoning some of the fundamental externalities about why we have web sites. Many (most?) web sites are fundamentally about selling something. Tufte disparages marketing imperaialism, and I am not a great fan of marketing either most of the time, but frankly, it pays my bills. When you go to Microsoft.com, you may be looking for information, and we give it to you, but in the end, the site would not be there if Microsoft did not think it helped sell copies of the products. You cannot ignore that fact when you design something. What is needed is a good mix. Only marketing is not good, and only content is not going to pay the bills.
The last part of the course is the one I really wanted to talk about though. Tufte spends the final two hours in a very long, disparaging rant about PowerPoint ? which I take to mean "PowerPoint the product." He even demonstrated this with a slideshow, shown using the built-in Macintosh slideware program Keynote. (He had two Macs on stage the whole time, the only reason for which I can see is to give free marketing to Apple, because he never actually used more than one). I find it ironic that he uses one presentation program to disparage another, particularly when what he was disparaging the other for was not the faults of the program itself but rather the ways people use it, and to a lesser extent, its success.
This part of the course was one long rant about the sins of PowerPoint, all rooted in his famous essay "The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint." Yet, throughout this presentation, he failed to make a few critical points.
- PowerPoint is a tool; it is what you make it. The fact that people use it to put their audiences in pain is not necessarily the fault of the tool. PowerPoint has great power. As Peter Parker learned to his dismay, with great power comes great responsibility and you have to learn to use it for good, not evil.
- What he was really disparaging were people who use the tool wrong. The tool does not force people to use it wrong. You can chose to use it right. At the risk of making it sound as if I am simply narcissistic (which I hope I am not) there are ways to use it which do not put your audience in pain. Here is part 1, and here is part 2.
- PowerPoint is exactly that, it is a tool to add power to your points. If you do not have any points, or you do not use it to add power to them, then it is either the wrong tool for you, you are using it incorrectly, or you have nothing to say and should sit back down and stop talking.
- Using a slideware program (PowerPoint or some other) to write a technical report is the wrong way to use the tool. I've said that before, and Tufte did actually say it too, but what he failed to say is that it is perfectly fine to use the tool to explain complicated relationships, show and discuss graphs, and so on, in the report. A slide show is not a substitute for the report, although people often us it as such, and it is not meant to show that you have graphs and diagrams unless you use them to illustrate a point. A slide show is used to add power to the important points in the report.
- In his essay "The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint: Pitching Out Corrupts Within" Tufte does acknowledge that for years people used transparencies, but never mentions how those were used to put people in pain. Misuse of slide shows did not start with PowerPoint, or any other computer-based presentation program. It did not even start with flip charts and overhead transparencies. Putting an audience in pain is a finely honed art that transcends computers and began long before desktop computing. I had a professor once that would photocopy the book onto transparencies, put them on an overhead projector, and read them to us. Professors have been putting their audiences in pain for hundreds of years, and were never hindered in this pursuit by the lack of slideware programs and desktop computers.
Overall, I think Tufte failed to recognized, or at least acknowledge, because I think he actually does recognize them, two things:
- Bad presenters are bad presenters. Using a tool will not make them good presenters.
- There is a difference between "presenting" and "delivering a speech"
The first point is really simple. Using a tool to organize and deliver a presentation will not make a bad presenter a good presenter. If you can find a place in the PowerPoint documentation where it says that it will let me know and I will personally go over and sit down with the Office group to have a chat with them about their docs.
When I first learned to give presentations, I learned to create an outline. An outline was a way to organize my thoughts; a way to keep me on track, jog my memory as to what I was going to say, and ensure that I covered what I wanted to cover. It also prevented the most common problem at the time, which was people standing up and reading a text, instead of giving a presentation. Slideware programs all have, as a basic functionality, the ability to create an outline. That does not mean that you must put the outline up on a 3 meter by 4 meter screen in front of your audience! Doing that is one of the core misuses of PowerPoint. The audience does not need to see your outline, you need to see it. The audience needs to have the points in that outline explained. Slideware programs are not there so you can project your outline, they are there to help you present visual aids. You may need them for a particular presentation, or you may not. Slideware programs are great for showing diagrams, a network of something, or a relationship between objects. However, paper can do that too. What slideware allows you to do is point to the important bits so people can follow appropriately. If you do not need to do that, then there is no point in showing the diagram, unless your sole point is that you have one, which you could demonstrate by using a 4,000 year old technology called "paper". Computers can also make things move. Yes, it is very easy to overuse that technology, but it can also be extremely valuable in showing something in four dimensions (where time is the fourth dimension). For example, in my "How To Get Your Network Hacked in 10 Easy Steps" presentation, I use it to show how the attack progresses through the network, allowing people to follow along. I could print out the presentation and give everyone a set of pictures and then say "now go to picture 3" but that would kill large numbers of trees and have little value since the audience does not need to keep the picture, they just need to see it while I speak to it.
Another, sometimes, legitimate use of slideware programs is to present lists. Yes, you should also present them on something more permanent than a silver screen because people will not remember them, and if they do not need to, you don't need to show the list. However, slideware makes great lists. That is why they have bullets. The bullets are not there so you can show the audience your outline. It is there so you can show them a list ? while you talk about that list! In many cases, it is better to not show the list, but to show them something that will make them remember the list. But, if you have already done that, you can show a list that summarizes the points you want people to understand. In many cases, however, it is not the content of the list that is important, it is the fact that a list exists. In that case, there is definitely value in showing the list on the screen because it saves threes. Then you can put a picture of something else up and explain why the presence of the list is important.
Finally, there is a significant difference between giving a speech and presenting. My seven-year old recently had to give a presentation at school. To help him organize his thoughts I asked him what points he wanted to convey to the audience. His answer was "that I did a good job." I think he is going to be a politician. That is pretty much exactly what they do. A speech is not about conveying information, helping people get better at anything. A speech is about reinforcing to the audience that the speaker is a trustworthy authority, or represents such an authority, and that the speaker is important. In politics, a speech is almost invariable designed to do one thing, and one thing only ? get the speaker (re-)elected. Yes, there may be a circuitous route to that, through some bill that some portion of the constituency finds important or by announcing some new program, or by simply making people feel better, but make no mistake, the objective is to get (re-)elected. Even with a president, who like the current US president cannot get re-elected, that is the objective. If the people, for even a minute, think that he is not re-electable, then he loses his power, which in the end is the ultimate objective for all politicians. All the president's speeches are designed to show why people should trust him, and why they should mentally re-elect him, even if they cannot rush to the ballot box to do so. Organizational politics is no different. Giving a speech, which is what almost all keynote addresses are about for instance, is simply about making the audience trust the presenter.
You may have noticed that politicians do not use slideware when they make speeches? That is because they have no points they are trying to explain. Their point is the fact that they are important enough to give a speech. Every now and then you see a politician use a visual aid to demonstrate this fact, typically through demonstrating some other fact. Possibly my favorite political cartoon is one from 1992 that makes fun of that fact. It has a caption that says "inspired by Ross Perot Bill Clinton turns to visual aids to explain his new tax plan." The drawing is of Clinton, pointing to a picture of a large screw. Now, regardless of whether you agree with the message or not, the point crystal clear. That is the only reason to use a visual aid in a speech; to reinforce the point, which is that you are worth being re-elected, sometimes by demonstrating why someone else is not. For instance, I really believe the republicans were aching to use visual aids to illustrate Clinton's crimes, but could not do it for various reasons.
Delivering a presentation is very different. It is not about electing anyone, it is about conveying information. It is about helping people understand something so they can use it better, make a better decision about it, or use it to analyze a problem. The correct tools for doing this vary depending on the information. As Tufte correctly points out, if the information is a business plan, then a set of bullet points or a chart on a slideware presentation is an awful way to do it. It does not aid decision making, it does not convey information any more efficiently than paper or just a discussion. However, used to present a large chart so that we can illustrate complicated points, it is very valuable. If it is used to present a number of options for an advertising campaign, it is not because it is inherently missing the depth dimension. A set of print-outs would be better for that. Used to list a set of new features in a software product it is typically just painful.
In conclusion, I think Tufte understands very well how people can misuse the tools, but he blames the tools, not the people. He clearly does not like Microsoft. He gave that away in the first few minutes of the presentation when he said "The best thing you can do to improve your information uptake on the computer, other than get a Macintosh, is to get a great big high-resolution screen." His bias is leading him to blame the tool, not the way people use it, losing the opportunity to convey something really important in the process. Yes, the auto-content wizard makes it look like putting an outline on a big screen is all presenting is about, and yes, I don't use it, and yes, I would not miss it if it went away. However, it is not there to help competent presenters. It is there to help the bottom 10%. The rest of us would do better by handing out a report, and then put up a few pictures to illustrate our points, if that is what the presentation is about.
Now I am off to give yet another presentation. This one has four slides: a title slide (because the organizers require it), a graph of the fundamental tradeoffs in security, which I could put on paper if I weren't worried about the trees, a really complicated time-series progression with annotations at various places, and a picture. The presentation is expected to last for an hour, during which I will spend 55 minutes discussing the middle two slides with the audience.
by bschaettle
One of the important rules I learned about being a presenter is to BE BRIEF. You took 21 paragraphs and 2558 words to say "I disagree with Professor Tufte because he thinks the misuse of PowerPoint contributed heavily to the second shuttle disaster." I happen to agree with your assessment of his seminar. Was it worth $320, lunch not included? Haven't made up my mind yet.
by dc guy
Why did he have two Macs even though he only used one? The same reason I take two bass guitars to a gig even though I expect to only play one: it might stop working. No matter how simple the problem, I'll be back on duty sooner if I plug in the other one than if I try to fix the one that's not working. The dancers don't want to sit there while I fiddle with a short or a broken string. I'm one of the biggest Macintosh fans on TR, but even I know they're not as reliable as my bass guitar. When you command the kind of speaker's fees Prof. Tufte does, you have an obligation not to allow your presentation to be interrupted for more than half a minute by anything that's not dire enough to show up in the next morning's paper.
As for the critics of PowerPoint, automated tools highlight the difference between efficiency and effectiveness. They allow you to do the wrong things faster. I used to use CorelDraw for my visual aids. I find that on the average I put up one slide every four minutes, so I only need fifteen for a one-hour presentation. An adept Corel user can put together fifteen slides the hard way pretty quickly, so I was in no hurry to find a better tool. Now that I work for a company that provides me with PowerPoint instead of Corel I use it, but I still only put together fifteen slides for a one-hour presentation. Any time I save by not having to do things the hard way is probably wasted in my incessant fuming that this is a graphics package for kindergartners; I could create better slides with WordPerfect if my company would at least let me have that.
Not your fault. Enough bashing of a product that clearly was never intended for users like me in the first place. My point is that now that a tool like PowerPoint is available, people can CREATE slides faster than they should be SHOWING them! I've seen people flash slides every thirty seconds. That is simply not good presenting. Since the invention of the printing press prompted the teaching of reading at a younger age, most humans can read much faster than they can interpret speech, so we're programmed to always allow visual stimuli to distract us from aural stimuli. That's why TV advertisers don't care about your mute buttton. If you flash enough slides, even if their information density is low, the audience will be constantly distracted and nobody will hear or remember a word you say.
And if their information density IS low, people will come away from your presentation remarking that you sure didn't have much to "say."
And that's the problem with communication technology. The invention of written language allowed people to record something that wasn't really good enough to even say once, and have more people suffer through reading it than could have heard the original utterance. The invention of printing allowed us to distribute that thing that shouldn't have been said even more widely.
In the same way, PowerPoint allows people to create bad presentations more quickly, so they can give more of them and make them longer. It's not fair to call that the tool's fault, but we do anyway.
by yannburden
I agree that Tufte over-emphasises the relevance of templates and auto-content wizards, and does smack of petty Microsoft bashing. That said, I believe that it is fair to criticise a product for it's poor "instruction manual" (virtual or otherwise).
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