The point of the newsletter I belong to by them is that they believe too much information is made secret. Their political agenda seems more to the release of information then anything else.
They release information on various white papers the pentagon does, cia risk assessment, things like that. To be truthful, I get a newsletter from them a couple times a week. This really wasn't anything different. It was a paper that they got their hands on, that a normal citizen doesn't.. And they posted it... If you want, I can paste like 4 of their latest newsletter links they provide to try and show you what I mean. It's very diverse in the links they post. But the common theme is that it is information that is not readibly avaible, which they are making so.
Dan
This is what was in 02/22/2007 newsletter for links of released papers:
Some other notable CRS products obtained by Secrecy News that are not
readily available in the public domain include these:
"Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications
for U.S. Interests," updated February 1, 2007:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30679.pdf
"Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Overview of U.S.
Implementation and International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Interpretation of Consular Notification Requirements," May 17, 2004:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32390.pdf
"Pipeline Safety and Security: Federal Programs," updated January 25,
2007:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33347.pdf
"Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S.
Interests," updated January 18, 2007:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33407.pdf
"Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy
Issues," updated January 22, 2007:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33123.pdf
And the previous newsletter:
ULING IN AIPAC CASE INTERPRETS ESPIONAGE ACT NARROWLY
In the unprecedented prosecution of two former officials of the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a federal court
last year upheld the government's controversial claim that the
Espionage Act could be used to prosecute the unauthorized receipt
and transmittal of classified information by private citizens who
are not engaged in espionage.
But as the case proceeds, the court continues to interpret the
Espionage Act in a restrictive manner that places an increasing
burden of proof on the prosecution, and that could even make the
case a source of embarrassment for the government by exposing
sensitive "back channel" diplomatic practices.
In a decision last week, Judge T.S. Ellis, III, denied a defense
motion asking the court to compel testimony from Israeli
government officials.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/rosen021407.pdf
But along the way, the court also elaborated its demanding view of
the requirements that the prosecution must meet to win a conviction
under the Espionage Act, and indicated what sorts of facts might
tend to exculpate the defendants.
"To prove the alleged conspiracy to disclose [national defense
information, or NDI] to one not authorized to receive it, the
government must prove all of the following," wrote Judge Ellis, at
the beginning of a list of prosecutorial hurdles (at page 8) that
reiterates and expands upon the requirements first spelled out in
his August 2006 order denying a motion to dismiss the case.
Among other things, the government must prove that "defendants
possessed all the culpable mental states that would be necessary
for conviction under [the Espionage Act]," which include four
distinct states of knowledge or belief (at page 9).
Briefly, prosecutors must show that the defendants knew the
information involved was closely held and could harm the United
States; that it could be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of a foreign nation; that the recipients of the
information were not authorized to receive it; and that the
defendants acted with knowledge that the disclosures were illegal
and could harm national security.
But if the defense can show that U.S. government officials
frequently disclosed confidential information to AIPAC for
transmittal to the Israeli government, the court observed, that
would mean the defendants could have plausibly believed such
behavior was authorized.
If "the governments of the United States and Israel routinely used
AIPAC as a diplomatic 'back channel' [to convey sensitive
information]" that would be "potentially exculpatory" since it
could "affect defendants' perception of the propriety of any
disclosures made by or to them."
The nature of the relationship between the governments of the U.S.
and Israel may also have a bearing on the defendants' state of
mind, the Judge wrote, in language that may foreshadow close
scrutiny of U.S.-Israel relations at trial:
"The more specific the details of the alleged cooperation between
the two governments, the more probative [i.e., legally
significant] such cooperation becomes," Judge Ellis wrote. (p. 14)
In another important observation, the judge wrote that "testimony
that disclosures of alleged NDI were viewed by defendants, or their
contacts in the diplomatic establishment, as beneficial to the
United States' interests is exculpatory." (p. 13)
Similar reasoning would imply that if a news organization published
classified information in the belief that doing so was beneficial
to the United States, that would take it beyond the scope of the
Espionage Act's prohibitions on unauthorized disclosure of national
defense information.
The trial of defendants Steven J. Rosen and Keith Weissman is
scheduled to begin on or around June 4 in the Eastern District of
Virginia.
A separate ruling from Judge Ellis last week denied a defense
request to suppress statements made by defendants to FBI agents on
grounds that the agents used trickery or deception to elicit the
statements.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/rosen021407b.pdf
The two rulings were first reported in the New York Sun on February
16.
NEW IC DIRECTIVE ON INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Intelligence analysis "must be objective and independent of
political considerations," according to a new "capstone" directive
issued by the Director of National Intelligence.
The directive establishes the policy framework for intelligence
analysis and defines a set of methodological standards and
expectations, with an emphasis on inter-agency collaboration and
outreach.
"The IC will seldom have the requisite depth and breadth of
expertise to provide all of the insights and detailed answers
demanded by our customers. To satisfy their needs, the IC must tap
outside expertise and build and expand relationships with
non-intelligence government agencies, academic, business,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and think tank communities,
both domestically and internationally, while addressing the
counterintelligence and security obligations that are inherent to
such initiatives."
See "Management, Integration, and Oversight of Intelligence
Community Analysis," Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 200,
January 8, 2007:
http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-200.pdf
Also new is "Intelligence Community Update to DCID 6/11, 'Controlled
Access Program Oversight Committee'," Intelligence Community Policy
Memorandum (ICPM) 2006-700-10, January 12, 2007:
http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icpm/2006-700-10.pdf
SELECTED CRS REPORTS
Some recently updated reports of the Congressional Research Service
that are not readily available in the public domain include the
following.
"U.S. Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients,"
updated January 3, 2007:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31362.pdf
"NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitment," updated January 24, 2007:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21659.pdf
"Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview," updated January 5,
2007:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22120.pdf
"Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background," updated January
23, 2007:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf
"The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya," updated January
17, 2007:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21695.pdf
Though the general public is not permitted access to the
congressional database of CRS reports online, these same reports
can be purchased from a private vendor for about $4000 per year,
the Washington Post noted yesterday.
"How I get them is my trade secret . . . but I get them all," said
Walt Seager, who digs up the reports for Gallery Watch, a
legislative tracking service.
See "Information, Please" by Elizabeth Williamson, Washington Post,
February 19:
http://tinyurl.com/2hjayn
In fact, however, Gallery Watch only gets those reports that are for
common use by all Congressional offices. It does not provide the
significant fraction of reports that are performed for the use of
an individual Member. For the same reason, the claim by Gallery
Watch that its reports provide some kind of advance insight into
the Congressional agenda is exaggerated. Most of the reports it
offers are updates of existing publications, along with others that
are mostly undertaken at the initiative of CRS itself, not Members
of Congress.
What is true is that current congressional policy on CRS reports
promotes a kind of checkbook democracy, in which corporations,
other large institutions and wealthy individuals have exclusive or
preferred access to CRS products, while the general public is left
to fend for itself.
So, when I look at this newsletter... I consider it pretty a political with their primary concern being the openness of more information.