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Chaos within Republican party & White House threaten world stabilty

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Still think that all's well with the current administration in the White House? Well, read this, and then re-visit that thought.

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GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
10.03.2006

Bush and the Perception of Weakness
By George Friedman

There is good news for the Republican Party: Things can't get much worse. About five weeks from the midterm elections, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) asserting that the situation in Iraq will deteriorate in 2007 is leaked. On top of that, Bob Woodward's book is released to massive fanfare, chronicling major disagreements within the White House over prosecution of the Iraq war and warnings to U.S. President George W. Bush in the summer of 2003 that a dangerous insurgency was under way and that the president's strategy of removing Baathists from the government and abolishing the Iraqi army was a mistake. These events are bad enough, but when U.S. Rep. Mark Foley (R-Fla.) -- the head of a congressional committee charged with shutting down child molesters using the Internet -- is caught sending e-mails to 16-year-old male pages, the news doesn't get much worse.

All of this is tied up with the elections of course. The NIE document leak was undoubtedly meant to embarrass the president. The problem is that it did, as it revealed the rift between the intelligence community and the White House's view of the world. The Woodward book was clearly intended to be published more than a month before the elections, and it was expected to have embarrassing revelations in it. The problem is that not a whole lot of people quoted in the book are denying that they said or did what was described. When former White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card is quoted as trying to get U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld out of office and the assertion is made that first lady Laura Bush tried as well, and denials are not flying, you know two things: Woodward intended to embarrass Bush just before the election, and he succeeded. For all we know, the leak about Foley asking about a 16-year-old's boxer shorts may have been timed as well. The problem is that the allegations were true, and Foley admitted what he did and resigned.

These problems might be politically timed, but none of them appears to be based on a lie. The fact is that this confluence of events has created the perception that the Bush White House is disintegrating. Bush long ago lost control of leakers in the intelligence community; he has now started to lose control over former longtime staffers who, having resigned, have turned on him via the Woodward book. Bush appears to be locked into a small circle of advisers (particularly Vice President Dick Cheney and Rumsfeld) and locked into his Iraq strategy, and he generally appears to have suspended decision-making in favor of continuing with decisions already made.

Now, this may not be a fair perception. We are not in the White House and do not know what is going on there. But this is now the perception, and that fact must be entered into the equation. True or not, and fair or not, the president appears to be denying what the intelligence communities are saying and what some of his closest advisers have argued, and it appears that this has been going on for a long time. With the election weeks away, and the Foley scandal adding to the administration's difficulties, there is a reasonable probability that the Republicans will get hammered in the elections, potentially losing both houses of Congress if the current trend continues.

One theory is that Bush doesn't care. He believes in the things he is doing and, whatever happens in the 2006 elections, he will continue to be president for the next two years, with the power of the presidency in his hand. That may be the case, although a hostile Congress with control over the purse strings can force policies on presidents (consider Congress suspending military aid to South Vietnam under Gerald Ford). Congress has substantial power when it chooses to exercise it.

But leaving the question of internal politics aside, the perception that Bush's administration is imploding can have a significant impact on his ability to execute his foreign policy because of how foreign nations will behave. The perception of disarray generates a perception of weakness. The perception of weakness encourages foreign states to take advantage of the situation. Bush has argued that changing his Iraq policy might send the Islamic world a signal of weakness. That might be true, but the perception that Bush is losing control of his administration or of Congress can also signal weakness. If Bush's intent is the reasonable goal of not appearing weak, he obviously must examine the current situation's effects on his ability to reach that goal.

Consider a matter not involving the Islamic world. This week, a crisis blew up in the former Soviet republic of Georgia, which is now closely aligned with the United States. Georgia arrested four Russian military officers, charging them with espionage. The Russians demanded their release and halted the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia -- a withdrawal Moscow had promised before the arrests gave it the opportunity to create a fundamental crisis in Russo-Georgian relations.

Normally a crisis of this magnitude involving a U.S. ally like Georgia would rise to the top of the pile of national security issues at the White House, with suitable threats made and action plans drawn up. Furthermore, the Russians would normally have been quite careful about handling such a crisis. There was little evidence of Russian caution; the Russians refrained from turning the situation into a military conflict, but they certainly turned up the heat on Georgia as the crisis evolved on its own. The Kremlin press service said Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin talked about Georgia in a telephone conversation Oct. 2, and that Putin told Bush third parties should be careful about encouraging Georgia.

The Russians frankly do not see the United States as capable of taking meaningful action at this point. That means Moscow can take risks, exert pressure and shift dynamics in ways it might have avoided a year ago out of fear of U.S. reprisals. The Russians know Bush does not have the political base at home, or even the administrative ability, to manage a crisis. Both National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice are obsessed with Iraq and the Washington firestorm. As for Rumsfeld, Woodward quoted the head of U.S. Central Command, Gen. John Abizaid, as saying Rumsfeld lacks credibility. That statement has not been denied. It is bad when a four-star general says that about a secretary of defense. Since the perception of U.S. crisis management is that no one is minding the shop, the Russians tested their strength.

There is, of course, a much more serious matter: Iran. Iran cut its teeth on American domestic politics. After the Iranians seized U.S. Embassy personnel as hostages, they locked the Carter administration into an impossible position, in which its only option was a catastrophic rescue attempt. The Iranians had an enormous impact on the 1980 election, helping to defeat Carter and not releasing the hostages until Ronald Reagan was sworn in as president. They crippled a president once and might like to try it again.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was involved in the hostage-taking and got a close-up view of how to manipulate the United States. Iran already undermined Bush's plans for a stable government in Iraq when it mobilized Shiite forces against the Baghdad government over the summer. Between that and the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, Iran saw itself in a strong position. Iran then conducted a diplomatic offensive, as a former Iranian president and the current Iranian president both traveled to the United States and tried to make the case that they are more moderate than the Bush administration painted them.

With five weeks until the U.S. congressional midterm elections, the Iranians would love to be able to claim that Bush, having rejected their overtures, was brought down -- or at least crippled -- by Iran. There are rumors swirling about pending major attacks in Iraq by pro-Iranian forces. There are always rumors swirling in Iraq about attacks, but in this particular case, logic would give them credibility. The Iranians might be calculating that if Iranian-sponsored groups could inflict massive casualties on U.S. troops, it would affect the U.S. election enough to get a Democratic Congress in place -- which could cripple Bush's ability to wage war and further weaken the United States' position in the Middle East. This, of course, would increase Iran's standing in the region.

The Iranian perception is that the United States does not have the resources to launch either an invasion or massive airstrikes against Iran. The Bush administration's credibility on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is too low for that to be regarded as a plausible excuse, and even if strikes were launched to take out WMD, that rationale would not justify an extended, multi-month bombing campaign. Since the Iranians believe the United States lacks the will and ability to try regime change from the air, Tehran is in a position to strike without putting itself at risk.

If the Iranians were to strike hard at the United States in Iraq, and the United States did not respond effectively, then the perception in key countries like Saudi Arabia -- a religious and geopolitical rival of Iran's -- would be that aligning with the United States is a dangerous move because the U.S. ability to protect them is not there, and therefore they need to make other arrangements. Since getting the Saudis' cooperation against al Qaeda was a major achievement for the Bush administration, this would be a major reversal. But if Riyadh perceived the United States as inherently weak, Riyadh would have no choice but to recalculate and relaunch its foreign policy.

Iran and others are feeling encouraged to take risks before the upcoming U.S. election -- either because they see this as a period of maximum American weakness or because they hope to influence the election and further weaken Bush. If they succeed, many U.S. allies will, like the Saudis, have to recalculate their positions relative to the United States and move away. The willingness of people in Iraq and Afghanistan to align with the United States will decline. If the United States is seen as a loser, it will become a loser. Furthermore, the NIE and the Woodward book create the perception that Bush has become isolated in his views and unable to control his own people. He needs to reverse this perception.

It is easy to write that. It is much harder to imagine how he will accomplish it, particularly if there is a major attack in Iraq or elsewhere. Bush's solution has been to refuse to bend. That worked for a while, but that strategy is no longer credible because it is not clear that Bush still has the option of not bending. The disarray in his administration and the real possibility of losing Congress means that merely remaining resolved is not enough. Bush needs to bring perceived order to the perceived chaos in the administration. Between the bad luck of degenerate congressmen and the intentions of the Iranians, he does not have many tools at his disposal. The things he might have done a year ago, like replacing Rumsfeld, are not an option now. It would smell of panic, and he cannot afford to be seen as panicky. Perhaps Bush's only option at this point is to remain self-assured and indifferent to the storm around him.

Whatever the perception in the United States, Bush's enemies overseas are not impressed by his self-assurance, and his allies are getting very worried that, like Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, his political weakness will not allow him to control the U.S. course.

We believe that, in the end, reality governs perception. But we are not convinced that, in this case, the perception and the reality are not one and the same; and we are not convinced that, in the coming weeks, the perception is not in fact more important than the reality. And if the Republicans lose the upcoming elections, the perception that Bush lacks the plans and political power needed for decisive action will become the reality.

For Bush to be able to execute the foreign policy he wants, his party must win the midterm elections. For that to happen, Bush must get control of the political situation quickly. To do that, he must change the perception that his own administration is out of control.

Easy to write. Harder to do.

Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.

102 replies

by dawgit

That pretty much sums it up. And, the Iranians 'feel' threatened, that's 'their' prerspective, and that can't be changed by any-one but them. To them, the threat is real. That is indeed a dangerous situation. (When one has a dangerous animal cornered, one really has a problem)

edited to ask; Where have you been hidding? geeze, I was missing all the argue'n around you. ;\ (tongue in cheekie)

by tony hopkinson

The iranians are 'right' to feel threatened.

First of all no one likes them

Second, in america's position they would do what they think US will do

Third right after awe and destruction a few well publicised hawks were attributed with "who's f'ing next" comment and Iran was on the list along with Syria.

Fourth and most important even if Iran was a reasonable player, by invading Iraq we set a precedent and gave ourselves a convenient beachhead for further agression in the area.

In threat assessment terms only capability matters.

As for GWB's credibility domestically I'll have to leave that for domestic comment, the view from across the pond is very negative but we don't get a vote.

by deepsand

It does'nt seem to have much effect when I use it; perhaps you'll have better luck with it.

by deepsand

At the moment, I've a little time to get back to the business of draining the swamp. Of course, I'm sure that the nasty critters will not remain at bay forever. Such is my lot.

by delbertpgh

GWB (and the U.S., since he's driving our bus) has gotten himself into a box. Iraq looks like it can never be won by the kind of force we're applying, only get worse; there are no Iraqi political players who can step up and take charge; and we have to ignore more serious threats because we're tied down by this war.

The parallels to our entry into the Viet Nam war are so striking, it's amazing that GWB and team decided they could follow exactly the same path and come to a different outcome. Of course, the conservative view has been that irresponsible cowards broke our will and encouraged the enemy, and if we had all just stuck the course and turned up the pressure, a badly chosen war would have worked out okay.

The biggest difference between Viet Nam and Iraq is that we were able to walk out of Viet Nam, and nothing bad happened there (unless you were a Cambodian or an ARVN officer.) If we sail hastily out of Iraq, we leave the place in a civil war, to become a failed state and a base for terrorists, and maybe the start of a regional war between the Saudis, Syrians, Iranians, and Turks.

Of course, if GWB was at the height of his strength, what would he be doing with it? Invading Iran, probably; the one Middle Eastern mistake he could pull that was dumber than invading Iraq. That, and declaring a National Defense Anti-Terrorist USA Patriot Tax Cut, to make sure we couldn't pay for it.

by deepsand

His father recognized that Iraq was a country not yet predisposed to self-governance, one that remained stable only by virtue of the presence of a strong dictator, and that the removal of such would yield catastrophic results.

The younger Bush believed that he knew more about geo-politics than did his father; a mistaken belief for which the world now pays the price.

by maxwell edison

Q. What is (your) main point?

A. The United States is winning the war that began on September 11, 2001. At this point, Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremists are on the ropes.

Q. How can you say that when warnings of terror are everywhere and the situation in Iraq looks so grim?

A. We have to remember the goal of Al Qaeda is to create an uprising in the Islamic world and overthrow what they consider to be corrupt, secular Islamic governments. Not a single Islamic government has fallen or sided with Al Qaeda. In fact, almost all are actively cooperating with the United States in fighting Al Qaeda.

Q. But the situation is still so dangerous.

A. I am not saying that the war is won. I am saying that the United States is winning. Al Qaeda doesn't intend to lose. It intends to reverse the trend. So, the situation is extremely dangerous. But the trajectory favors the United States.

Q. How has the United States done this?

A. By creating a situation in which it has proven too dangerous for Islamic governments to work with Al Qaeda or remain neutral. A range of actions has forced these governments to confront Al Qaeda. The result has been increased instability in many countries, such as Saudi Arabia-the more pressure there is, the more instability.

Q. Doesn't this risk resentment among the Islamic masses?

A. The resentment against the United States is enormous. Nothing can be done about anti-American feeling in the Islamic world beyond shifting the burden of containment to local governments.

Q. You must think that George W. Bush has done a good job.

A. The Bush Administration played a bad hand moderately well. But it still committed enormous errors, some of which are threatening the success of the war.

Q. What are some of these errors?

A. The failure to force the military and intelligence communities to go to wartime footing immediately after September 11th has left both organizations undermanned and in disarray. Not a single major reform of the military or intelligence structure has taken place since the war began. This has resulted in both military and intelligence failures that leave the U.S. open to major reversals. Bush and his team appear to have been paralyzed by events.

Q. Was the invasion of Iraq one of these errors?

A. Lying about why we were invading Iraq was a massive error. The invasion itself helped generate the forces that have Al Qaeda on the defensive now. Iraq is the most strategic country in the Middle East and following the invasion of Iraq, key countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran began to change their policies to support the U.S. against Al Qaeda. The invasion was a good idea and the administration had good reasons for doing it. But they had nothing to do with WMD or Al Qaeda.

Q. Why did we go into Iraq?

A. We went into Iraq to isolate and frighten the Saudi government into cracking down on the flow of money to Al Qaeda. Bush never answered the question for fear of the international consequences. Early in the war, the President said that the key was shutting down Al Qaeda's financing. Most of the financing came from Saudi Arabia, but the Saudi government was refusing to cooperate. After the invasion of Iraq, they completely changed their position. We did not invade Saudi Arabia directly because of fear that the fall of the Saudi government would disrupt oil supplies: a global disaster.

(Note: Maxwell Edison suggested that very thing on several occasions.)

Q. What is the situation in Iraq now?

A. The situation is manageable even though violence will continue for years. Like Northern Ireland, it will be a generation before it calms down. At the same time, it doesn't effect the strategic situation.

Q. What happens next?

A. Al Qaeda has got to try to get some points on the board. If it doesn't, its credibility in the Islamic world will dissipate. If it can, it will attack. The United States is now engaged in a global counter-offensive designed to block them. It's not clear what will happen. In addition, Al Qaeda will try to bring down Saudi Arabia.

Q. What will the United States do?

A. It will play defense against Al Qaeda in the United States and Saudi Arabia. It will threaten Iran with war if Iran aids Al Qaeda. Most important, the United States will have to invade northwestern Pakistan. There are plans for this already. In addition, if Pakistan collapses due to an invasion, the United States and India will have to jointly occupy Pakistan. The end game is in Pakistan.

Q. Why are we going into Pakistan?

A. Stratfor said in December 2003 that the campaign is being planned. In February 2004 a spokesman for the Pentagon said they were going in to Pakistan. Since then we have been carrying out small scale incursions for months. The war cannot end until the command cell of Al Qaeda is destroyed and that is located in Northwestern Pakistan, but it has been delayed by manpower shortages.

Q. Is victory for the United States guaranteed?

A. Not at all. Japan was winning World War II, until the United States fought back. Al Qaeda struck the first blow, and the United States has counter-attacked successfully. Al Qaeda will try to recover.

Q. Can it recover?

A. Yes, but in my view, Al Qaeda is far more likely to lose than to win.

Q. If the Bush adminstration mishandled things so badly, how can victory be possible?

A. The United States had a lot more room for error than Al Qaeda did. When you are big and powerful, you can afford mistakes.

-- George Friedman

by onbliss

..to George Friedman. But maybe if others want to answer, please do so.

Based on the following two questions and answers, does'nt it appear that Iraq was then just used as a pawn? Is it different from proxy wars?

So in order to scare a nation, another nation was invaded resulting in many civilian deaths and damage to property.

Yes, everything is fair in love and war. So how do we explain or rationalize the entire affair to the common Iraqi who is seeing his/her country in difficult times? Would it be fair to answer him/her saying he had a bad ruler?

How would you feel, if you were punished by someone who actually wanted to punish your friend, but instead punished you to instill fear in the friend?

[i]
Q. Was the invasion of Iraq one of these errors?

A. Lying about why we were invading Iraq was a massive error. The invasion itself helped generate the forces that have Al Qaeda on the defensive now. Iraq is the most strategic country in the Middle East and following the invasion of Iraq, key countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran began to change their policies to support the U.S. against Al Qaeda. The invasion was a good idea and the administration had good reasons for doing it. But they had nothing to do with WMD or Al Qaeda.

Q. Why did we go into Iraq?

A. We went into Iraq to isolate and frighten the Saudi government into cracking down on the flow of money to Al Qaeda. Bush never answered the question for fear of the international consequences. Early in the war, the President said that the key was shutting down Al Qaeda's financing. Most of the financing came from Saudi Arabia, but the Saudi government was refusing to cooperate. After the invasion of Iraq, they completely changed their position. We did not invade Saudi Arabia directly because of fear that the fall of the Saudi government would disrupt oil supplies: a global disaster.

(Note: Maxwell Edison suggested that very thing on several occasions.)
[/i]

edited: grammar

by maxwell edison

...the one we see in the public, and the one going on behind closed diplomatic doors.

Disclaimer: Since I'm not a fly on the wall behind those closed diplomatic doors, and thereby not privy to what's said, the following is pure conjecture on my part (but based on an enormous amount of reading and research).

When the Saudis, for example, flatly refused to help the Bush Administration help cut-off terrorist funding that was flowing through their country as freely as their oil, especially considering the fact that several of the 9-11 hijackers were Saudis themselves, I can imagine the Bush gang having an absolute hissy-fit. Remember all the talk years ago about the Bush family and the Saudi Royal family being in bed together? Well, they did have a pretty cozy relationship, and with the Saudi's refusal to help, I would guess that "pissed off" wouldn't begin to describe Bush's reaction. And I'm not just talking about President Bush, but also Vice President Cheney, who was Secretary of Defense during Gulf War One, current Secretary of Defense Rumsfeild, former President Bush (41), James Baker (an inside advisor), et al. I can just imagine an ultimatum given to the Saudis -- you're gonna' do it or else......

If you ask me, the invasion of Iraq was actually a strategically brilliant move (see note below), since several objectives would be achieved. In the case of the Saudis, there would be the side-benefit having them surrounded by forces capable of launching an attack on their country at a moment's notice. The Saudis eventually gave-in, but not until there were several armored divisions parked on their northern border, supported by a huge naval fleet to their south, and air power that's unmatched anywhere in the world. In my opinion, the Saudis were put on notice, perhaps just short of a full declaration of war, and it was all done behind closed doors. And they surrendered without a shot being fired.

As I said, it's all pure conjecture on my part, but I'd bet I'm closer to being right than I am wrong. If we only knew what we don't know.....

Note: Strategically brilliant, but political suicide. Perhaps this could have been surmised, perhaps it was more of a surprise. Nonetheless, this all brings us to the other "two wars" being waged -- the real one, and the political one, which is another issue all in itself. It used to be said that domestic politics stops at our nation's shores. I suppose the Vietnam experience put an end to that. But regardless of when it ended, it's sure nonexistent now.

by maxwell edison

You asked, [i]"..to George Friedman. But maybe if others want to answer, please do so."[/i]

Of course, I won't presume to answer for Mr. Friedman, as he is much more savvy and informed than I (or anyone else who posts their "expert" opinions in these threads), so all of the following answers are mine, from my perspective, considering my desired outcome, and are not based on anything he might have written. Although much of my opinion is indeed derived from reading any number of real "expert opinions", one of whom is Mr. Friedman himself, by way of his book, [i] America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies[/i]. (Read the book yourself, and you'll probably find Mr. Friedman's specific answers to all these very questions.)

You asked, [i]"Based on the following two questions and answers....."[/i] (I won't bother to re-post them in this reply), [i]".....doesn't it appear that Iraq was then just used as a pawn?[/i]"

No, Iraq is not a pawn, it's more like a bishop. Of course, all the terrorist fighters who rushed into Iraq (or were there to begin with) to fight this war are all pawns, but the big prize -- which is some semblance of a stable democracy in Iraq AND the strategic implications of securing that area -- has the importance of a bishop.

You asked, [i]"Is it different from proxy wars?"[/i]

Well, I suppose in some regards it certainly is a proxy war, since it's a war being fought against an opposing ideology on foreign soil. The only "proxy", however, is the battlefield, not the personnel, as we are doing most (but not all) of the fighting ourselves. Our presence in Afghanistan would also fit this description of a "proxy war".

You commented, [i]"So in order to scare a nation, another nation was invaded resulting in many civilian deaths and damage to property.[/i]"

I wouldn't put it as simply as that, as you make it sound as though Iraq under Saddam was simply an innocent bystander. That's not the case at all. The threat, as I see it (and as Mr. Friedman has stated it to be) comes from factions that reside in any number of locations within the entire middle-east. I suppose any country from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan could have been selected as the battlefield, so to speak, but Iraq was selected for a variety of reasons. Strategically, it gives the United States (and its allies) control of the area between Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, any one of which could be the next target (Saudi Arabia being the least likely military target). The primary reason, however, may have been because Saddam was in violation of existing UN resolutions, which provided the all-important legal authority for the invasion, regardless of how many people cried about it.

(As a side-note: Iran has to be feeling squeezed as well, as it has opposing forces on both its western and eastern borders. And I might suspect that all the current saber rattling coming from Tehran is born more of fear than strength.)

As far as the "civilian deaths and damage to property", you answered your own question when you went on to say, "Yes, everything is fair in love and war". And although it may not be "fair" to these people, it is how it happened to fall into place. (Not unlike French civilians who suffered because of Nazi Germany.) However, the one thing that can bring the quickest end to their suffering is not a withdraw of U.S. forces, but for the terrorists, themselves, to lay down their arms and stop killing their own people and destroying their own property. The USA is not the bad guy in this fight, and it's time the REAL bad guy is the one who's both publicly scorned and held accountable.

You asked, [i]"So how do we explain or rationalize the entire affair to the common Iraqi who is seeing his/her country in difficult times? Would it be fair to answer him/her saying he had a bad ruler?[/i]

Included in all my previous answers.

You asked, [i]"How would you feel, if you were punished by someone who actually wanted to punish your friend, but instead punished you to instill fear in the friend?"[/i]

I disagree with the premise of your question, because I don't think my "friend" would ever kill me for simply wanting to live free and in peace. And I think I answered this as well in my previous answers.

All of my answers presuppose that the "big picture" we see is the same. If you or anyone else sees the "big picture" differently than I (or Mr. Friedman), then it goes without saying that most (or all) of my answers would be challenged by those who see a different "big picture".

If I missed answering any of your questions specifically and fully, please let me know.

by delbertpgh

George Friedman (a PhD who started his own consulting company ten years ago, STRATFOR, based in Austin TX) is no less immune from mistakes than George W. Bush. His biggest mistake seems to be the underlying assumption that if GWB is flailing around with an army or a diplomatic struggle someplace, it must be doing some kind of good. Also, I think he knows that he can't put down GWB too badly, because it would be bad for business. He lives by selling his expertise, and his paying audience is small.

Friedman, who stikes me as an earnest man who talks smart enough to confuse himself, can't separate cause from effect. He sees a secret cleverness to GWB's strategy. He talks about Al Qaeda as if it were a centrally controlled powerful agency.

In fact, Al Qaeda's effectiveness was pretty much wrecked when we threw them out of Afghanistan and started chasing their money transfers. There are lots of people calling themselves Al Qaeda these days, but they don't have much to do with the central organization. It's a brand name any group of boys can pick up to make themselves seem more influential.

Friedman's last statement from his interview, "The United States had a lot more room for error than Al Qaeda did. When you are big and powerful, you can afford mistakes," strikes me as irrelevant. No matter your strength, you can make a mistake more powerful than you are. There is no direct path to success in this Iraq war, and lots of ways to make the conflict hotter. Friedman confidently says that twenty years should show us real progress. Based on what? Our honest efforts? The Brits held Iraq between the two world wars, more than twenty years, and in that time they had to send their army in five times.

Friedman figures that the real point is a clever ploy to get the Saudis to pressure Al Qaeda. Well, the Saudis are political cowards who won't do anything that seems hard or risky, and that's why they haven't been our real allies. They didn't want to crack down on folks who funded terrorists, because the royal family has survived by making devil's bargains with religious crackpots in Arabia for a hundred years. What got the Saudis to actually fight Al Qaeda and get tough with their sympathisers was when they started setting off bombs in Riyadh. Only when the risk was right in their laps shooting guns and blowing people up did they get serious.

by deepsand

To judge one by a single, brief work alone is fraught with risk of being in error.

If one follows George's regular periodic reports, along with those of his colleagues, you will find that:

1) With respect to GWB, Mr. Friedman is neither a detractor nor an apologist. In fact, he is exceedingly careful in his efforts to remain objective in all matters.

2) He knows full well that there there is no single entity which acts as the puppet master for "terrorists." In fact, StratFor has published a number of reports chronicling the evolution of the various groups and persons here involved.

3) He makes no claim to being infallible; when his predictions have failed to come to pass, he has publicly so stated when and where appropriate.

Taken as a whole, the body of StratFor reports serve well as a source of broad and objective knowledge and understanding of geo-politics.

by maxwell edison

[i]"Chaos within Republican party & White House threaten world stabilty"[/i] are deepsand's words and assertions, not Mr. Friedman's.

[i]"....the Perception of Weakness...."[/i] does not equal weakness. President Bush's political enemies (including those in the press) have done a good job advancing that perception -- and "perception" is a common theme in the essay. Perception, however, does not always see eye-to-eye with reality.

[i]"....Woodward intended to embarrass Bush just before the election....."[/i]

It's sad that such an intention would trump all other possible "intentions" one might have. One might think, for example, that a more noble "intention" would be to defeat America's enemies instead of playing politics and selling books.

by maxwell edison

I've been recommending George Friedman's book, [i] America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies[/i], for quite some time.

http://www.americassecretwar.com/about_book_author.html

Regardless of the political war of personal destruction being waged against President Bush, he remains firm in his resolve to wage the REAL war against America's enemies. And although all hasn't gone perfectly for the United States (thanks, in large part, to those political enemies), George Friedman understands all too well where the real threat lies.

Perhaps deepsand read the book before he jumped to conclusions about George Friedman? (No, I didn't think so.)

Too funny! George Friedman's view is more in-line with Maxwell Edison's than it is with deepsand's.

http://www.americassecretwar.com/about_book_excerpts.html

[i]"The war that began on September 11, 2001, might be called the Fourth Global War, the U.S.-Jihadist War, the U.S.-Al Qaeda War, or the U.S.-Islamist War."[/i]

-- George Friedman (and Maxwell Edison!)

by deepsand

"[i]... jumped to conclusions about George Friedman?[/i]"

"[i]George Friedman's view is more in-line with Maxwell Edison's than it is with deepsand's.[/i]"

You've no idea what what my thoughts are, as you've never sought to learn such.

You will, therefore, refrain from presuming to speak for me.

by maxwell edison

I am in total agreement with George Friedman about the severity of the war with ISLAMO FASCISM in which we are engaged. Are you?

You're an unprincipled and uninformed idiot. And this discussion proves it!

by danlm

You have put forth your good arguments, but your not winning any points with me.

I totally disagree with almost all of your posts to be truthful. And unlike others that I have disagreed with, you haven't presented anything to change my mind.

What can I say, I'll still vote for a hard ass for president who knows how to take the fight right at them and feels that children should be protected.

You do put out a good argument though, I just don't agree with any of it.

Dan

by maxwell edison

I am in total agreement with George Friedman about the severity of the war with ISLAMO FASCISM in which we are engaged. Are you?

A difference between you and me is that I base ALL of my opinions on that simple premise, while you play the "hate Bush" political card, and are guided by your hate of the man.

You're an unprincipled and uninformed idiot. And this discussion proves it!

And you wonder why I deem you unworthy of even a minute of my time.

by Member 25348569

[i]"The war that began on September 11, 2001, might be called the Fourth Global War, the U.S.-Jihadist War, the U.S.-Al Qaeda War, or the U.S.-Islamist War."[/i]

All are very different in scope. They didn't, by the way, "begin on September 11, 2001" but it wouldn't be so catchy would it?

Global? Well, that speaks for itself. Bit over the top, though. Lots of "the Globe" don't share the sentiment.

Al Qaeda? A single terrorist group actively attacking the US and Saudi Arabia. These are your enemy! Find 'em and kill 'em. Just f'kin do it. Get on with it! They were trying to provoke you into a wider "War with Islam" and they have, to use an old English expression, stiched you up like a kipper! Success beyond their wildest dreams.

Jihadist? Pretty much sounds like something made up to me. Al Qaeda are laughing their socks off whenever this an Islamist are used.

Islamist? Another catchy catch-all term that fits nicely into the simple mindset. "The Islamist War" sounds good but means nothing.

How about "The Energy War". It's about oil and therefore it's about Saudi Arabia. And back we come to al Qaeda.

Keep driving those SUVs and you fund and arm your enemy.

Maybe I'll read the book...

by maxwell edison

The idiot, deepsand, has argued against almost everything George Friedman has been saying over the years, because I've been saying much of the same thing, and he's constantly disagreed with me. The idiot, deepsand, has also been one to discredit the sources I've used to support my arguments, one of whom has been George Friedman!

And now, the idiot, deepsand, has posted an essay written by George Friedman (misrepresenting its intent with his very misleading title, by the way), because it suggests the Republican Party and President Bush are losing political stature -- or at least that's the "perception". He probably had an orgasm when he found an article that, at first glance, might have appeared to be critical of the administration. And although it was, to some degree, it wasn't at all in-line with the idiot, deepsand's, history in these discussion threads.

It was painfully obvious that he neither comprehended the article that he, himself, posted, nor did he know the first thing about the guy who wrote it. It would almost be like me using Al Gore as a source to support my argument against human-caused global warming, even though I've been disagreeing with almost everything Al Gore has ever said.

I just had to laugh at this one.

by tonythetiger

and more power corrupts more. The answer, I think, is term limits. Two terms lifetime limit for ALL elected offices.

by tony hopkinson

No career politicians. Houses should be popuated by a lottery of electors.

If you are violently opposed to serving in political office
Australian ballot system so electees must appeal outside their natural constituency, cuts down on extremists. Doesn't get rid of them altogether.
as our australian colleagues will mention.

Oh and a minmum IQ to qualify.

Make Lobbying illegal

No votes on anything that will benefit your current financial interests.

Mandatory life sentences or better the death sentence for bringing the office into disrepute, or malfeasance.

by deepsand

I am reminded of a science fiction story, published long ago in [i]Analog[/i], the title of which I've long forgotten, which depicted a system of government quite unlike any we know, in that it's leaders were indirectly determined by those who themselves came to be leaders. Allow me to explain.

1) No political post was filled by election.
2) All elections consisted entirely of propositions re. actions to be taken or avoided by the leaders.
3) While anyone could vote, simple Yes/No votes were disqualified.
4) To have one's vote qualified, it was required that the voter record how he arrived at his decision; such record must include the relevant facts as he knew them, along with the line(s) of reasoning followed to reach his conclusions re. the expected consequences of both the adoption and non-adoption of the proposed action(s).
5) All votes cast were in the public record.
6) Leaders were determined based on their successes and failures to accurately predict the future consequences of measures adopted or not adopted.
7) The title of highest office was the [i]Prime Predictor.[/i]

Needless to say, voter turnout was exceedingly low.

by deepsand

I am reminded of a science fiction story, published long ago in [i]Analog[/i], the title of which I've long forgotten, which depicted a system of government quite unlike any we know, in that it's leaders were indirectly determined by those who themselves came to be leaders. Allow me to explain.

1) No political post was filled by election.
2) All elections consisted entirely of propositions re. actions to be taken or avoided by the leaders.
3) While anyone could vote, simple Yes/No votes were disqualified.
4) To have one's vote qualified, it was required that the voter record how he arrived at his decision; such record must include the relevant facts as he knew them, along with the line(s) of reasoning followed to reach his conclusions re. the expected consequences of both the adoption and non-adoption of the proposed action(s).
5) All votes cast were in the public record.
6) Leaders were determined based on their successes and failures to accurately predict the future consequences of measures adopted or not adopted.
7) The title of highest office was the [i]Prime Predictor.[/i]

Needless to say, voter turnout was exceedingly low.

by tonythetiger

that when most politicians enter the arena, they do so, I believe, with the altruism they ought to have, but as the years or decades roll by, their job changes from one of legislator to one of 'influence peddler'. Once the vigor of newness wears off, all they're really good for is getting money for 'their district' (at the expense, of course, of everybody else), and once [b]that[/b] starts, the people quit being people... they become leverage to move money and power from one place to another. That you have [b]all[/b] of them doing it, it's not suprising that our tax burden is what it is.

If you keep re-electing the same politicians, you're giving them more power... at the expense of your own!

by maxwell edison

He cut and pasted an essay written by a man about whom he knows nothing, falsely believing that it would support his hate and disagreement with President Bush. He spews politics, while others rely on principle.

He quoted a guy THAT I AGREE WITH!!!!!!

Everything in that essay points to the politics of personal destruction, and not on reality and principle. He proved himself to be the bafoon I've always known him to be!

by nighthawk808

To threaten world stability, you have to have it in the first place. We haven't had that since Bush got himself appointed to the White House and started running around like a bull in a china shop acting like he'd actually won an election.

There is nothing left to threaten. Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld's incompetence has left Iran the most powerful nation in the Middle East, Iraqi civilians resenting us (7 out of 10 of them want us out of their country), and the Taliban growing stronger in Afghanistan. Outsourcing and globalization is letting India eat our lunch and China is, to paraphrase Chairman Mao, selling us the rope to hang ourselves with. Mission accomplished, Republicans.

To all you security moms and brain-dead dittoheads: thanks for nothing. I'm less safe because you are idiots.

by deepsand

Having GWB as President, in charge of land full of people who either have mush for brains, don't give damn, or are intent on perverting all for thier own gain, I am reminded of the adage "[i]In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is King.[/i]"

And they can't understand why I'm against the get-out-the-vote campaigns. I say, if they're not sufficiently self-motivated to vote they are most assuredly equally unmotivated to become adequately informed so as to be able to make a rational decision at the polling place.

by danlm

To vote against everything that I've seen you post.

I vote anyway, just now I have a platform. deepsand has blinders on, and can't see past his nose for his one man crusade against President Bush. I'll vote against everything that I have seen his opinion on.

dan

by deepsand

equally important, [b]when & where[/b] to fight.

GWB certainly fails to know the latter, despite that which his father tried to teach him.

Simply doing something as an alternative to doing nothing is [b]not[/b] necessarily the better choice.

In this case, GWB, in effort to simply do something, anything, has in fact made matters significantly worse. Denying such will not alter the facts.

by mjwx

Where and when to fight. To choose your own battlefield as it were.

I have said this before but I'll say it again. "Battles are fought with tanks and machine guns but wars are still fought with clubs as one side attempts to bludgeon the other beyond its ability to fight back". GWB's doing plenty of swinging but not much hitting.

by deepsand

It cannot be said that he lacked for sound advice; such was in ample supply, beginning with his own father, who he failed to heed.

That he stumbled, and quite badly, must be laid squarely at his own feet, a tribute to his own ego.

by deepsand

If and when you demonstrate that you possess an open mind, admit that you are not omniscient, and seek answers rather than presuming to know them, then and only then will I give consideration to granting you my time.

Until then, you serve but to amuse me.

by nighthawk808

Max is one of those people who loves to see his own words in print. The worst thing in the world for people like that is to be ignored. That's why I do it so gleefully; I know it gets under his skin more than anything else. Besides, trying to actually have an intelligent discussion with him is futile--his head is so far up his a$$ that it would take a search party of proctologists to find it.

by danlm

But, then again. both parties have people that are full of crap and talk so much chit that nobody can figure out what they are saying.

Your our side's example of an idiot.

Dan

by deepsand

Most of those entering law enforcement do so with high ideals.

As time passes, far too many become burnt out and frustrated, with the result that the most idealistic change careers, while others simply take the path of least resistance, either doing the minimum required to retain their positions, or becoming corrupt.

by deepsand

Limiting the delitoriuos effects of long tenure while preserving the benefits of useful accumulated experiences is nign onto impossible.

What would be required is an objective means of determining the net effect(s) of losing both as compared to keeping both, as a means of determining whether or not a specific individual should be retained in or terminated from their position. That can be a Herculean task at best; at worst, impossible.

by deepsand

Do you know what STRATFOR is?

Do you regularly read George's reports?

Obviously, you either do not; or, if you do, you fail to comprehend what he writes, just as you so fail hear.

But, don't stop blathering on that account; we do so enjoy the spectacle.

by maxwell edison

...you nit-pick on a single word, that may or may not be the best choice of words, but is immaterial, at best, all the while ignoring the intent -- just as you've ignored the intent of all my messages. You are being obviously evasive in a lame attempt to save face. But you won't. We all know you're a pitiful fool. And you know we're all laughing at you. Go take your meds, dude. You're apparently way over-due.

by onbliss

But you have not addressed my questions. Or should I assume that you thought the answers were obvious and hence you chose not to offer your thoughts on it? I would like your opinion, that is why I asked :-)

by deepsand

Max has a habit of replying with "answers," but not to the questions or objections raised by you.

He is a master of mis-direction and obfuscation.

Should you seek substantive responses from him, infinite patience will be required.

by delbertpgh

This time, the Washington Post, from yesterday's editorial.

How to Lose a War
The Bush administration's mismanagement of Iraq has been chronicled in shocking detail.

Wednesday, October 4, 2006; A24

IT MAY BE that much of the trouble the United States now faces in Iraq was the inevitable result of the decision to crack open a complex society that had been repressed and brutalized for three decades by Saddam Hussein. The fierce unwillingness of many Sunnis to accept minority status; the uncompromising drive of Shiites and Kurds for power so long denied them; the relative absence of competent or inspiring leaders: All this and more meant that the reconstruction of Iraq could not have been simple, short or entirely peaceful.

It nevertheless seems clear that U.S. chances for success would have been far better than they are today were it not for the overwhelming and shocking incompetence with which the administration has managed the war. From the failure to produce a coherent postwar plan to the disastrous performance by the occupation authority that was belatedly installed, the Bush team turned a difficult mission into a near-impossible one. President Bush and his most senior aides meanwhile stubbornly refused to listen to advisers who warned of the consequences of their policies.

In-depth accounts by journalists are beginning to provide a detailed picture of what has gone wrong in Iraq and why. Most recently, The Post's Bob Woodward reports in the book "State of Denial" how Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld monopolized administration planning for Iraq, repeatedly misjudged the tactics and resources needed for success, and ignored reports from his own top aides about how the war was going wrong.

In "Fiasco," The Post's Thomas E. Ricks recounts how Mr. Rumsfeld's Pentagon excluded the State Department from reconstruction planning, then failed to produce any plan of its own. When L. Paul Bremer was abruptly handed a mandate to rebuild the country from the ground up, still more fateful mistakes were made. As former Post Baghdad bureau chief Rajiv Chandrasekaran details in the book "Imperial Life in the Emerald City," staff members for Mr. Bremer's authority too often were picked on the basis of Republican political affiliation, rather than experience or competence -- with the result that people in their twenties were handed control over matters such as the Iraqi government budget.

Mistakes are inevitable in any war. But the common theme of these accounts is the triumph of ideology and arrogance over the pragmatism that is needed to recover from errors or adjust to changing conditions. Having dispatched too few troops to Iraq at the beginning of the war, Mr. Rumsfeld has perpetuated this signal failing for 3 1/2 years. Having ignored reconstruction in prewar planning, the administration then excluded the professionals who might have made the occupation authority successful.

Mr. Bush himself refused to take one of the essential steps needed to remedy the resulting mess -- replacing Mr. Rumsfeld -- despite repeatedly being advised to do so by his own chief of staff, among others. The result, as Mr. Woodward describes it, is a defense secretary who has lost the confidence of the military he directs. Even more disturbing is the portrait of a president who, with two years left in his term, seems unable to come to terms with the damaging and dangerous situation he has helped to create -- much less imagine a way out of it.

We continue to agree with Mr. Bush that it would be wrong and dangerous for U.S. troops simply to withdraw. But it is also dangerous when leaders such as Mr. Bush, Vice President Cheney and Mr. Rumsfeld continue to resist reality.

? 2006 The Washington Post Company

by deepsand

In several other discussions here, I and others have pointed out that it is not sufficient to invade; one must also be ready to accept responsibilty for the management of the conquered country until such time as a viable local government is effected. This is, in fact, required under the Geneva Conventions!

Of course, several others here assembled, dismissed this as being a "ridiculous notion," one that was of no import.

Needless to say, history has proven the latter to be greatly in error.

by delbertpgh

He came into the office believing there were a dozen great reasons for invading Iraq, which I guess he read about in The Weekly Standard. Apparently he thought it would be a lot easier than it is.

And, my guess is that when airplanes hit buildings in September 2001, he thought, "Why just a war on Al Qaeda? Why not a war on terror? Then I can say Iraq is a terrorist state, we can take it over! And what is the threat to us? Well, we know they have germs, nerve gas, and a nuke program; we're under imminent threat from WMD! (Note sleight of hand: includes gas and germ warfare under the same label as the one true WMD, nuclear weapons.) Better try to build up the terrrorist connections, too." And off went the Vice President and National Security Advisor, talking about mushroom clouds and meetings with Mohammed Atta in Prague.

The actual rationale seems to have been: (1)the bold exercise of American military power would be beneficial, by making other nations look at us with respect or fear, instead of contempt, (2)it would break our tendency to weaken ourselves by relying on international bodies and limp-wristed allies, (3)it would get rid of Saddam, a problem personality, (4)it would help secure oil supplies, (5)we could build a thriving modern capitalist democratic society in Iraq, with the heroic businessman Ahmed Chalabi at its head, proving that Arabs don't have to be stuck with sick economies and backward-looking cultural traditions, (6)we would build permanent military bases in Iraq, helping us stabilize the whole Middle East by keeping it securely in our orbit, (7)it would make Arabs across the Middle East say to each other, "Who needs terrorism? Who needs Wahabis? We gotta get rich and cool and modern like those Iraqi boys!", and Islamic culture and politics would be transformed everywhere, (8)Arabs would become so reasonable that peace with Israel on Israel's generous terms would be possible, (9)if the example of Iraq didn't scare Iran and North Korea into good behavior, we could take care of them the hard way, in GWB's second term.

It looks also like most of the neocon thinkers believed that much or all of this was not only possible, but easy. All you had to be was purposeful and bold. And if so much good could come of something so easy, would it not be almost criminal to not do it?

That's what I believe about George W. Bush.

by sboverie

I have been watching the Bush administration since he put his hat in the ring to be a candidate. I was amazed at the dirty politics used to win the nominationa, slandering and libeling his opponents even when they are in the same party.

I am sorry to say that the people who cared about the truth were marginalized until they have no input to any discussions. This administration was so certain that they had all the answers that they refused to listen to even mild disagreements. Protesters were moved to "Free speech zones" far away from any of the administration, and their concerns ignored and never answered. Over 1000 people in Finland mooned the hotel that Bush stayed in for the G8 meeting in 2001, you probably never heard about it.

The worst problem with the Bush administration is that it does not listen to alternate viewpoints. Dissent is not tolerated and has been frequently called "aiding the enemy" and treason.

Lately, the DOW industrial average is showing signs of life. Look at the market charts for different time periods and you will see that since 2000 the market has been below the heights reached under the Clinton administration. Even under Bush SR the markets grew, and there was an official recession during his presidency. You can make all kinds of excuses, but 7 years of stagnant growth is rare.

What really gets me angry is that this administration has put its interests above the nation and even the Republican party. In 2008, Bush will leave office and leave a mess for his successor (Republican, Democrat or possibly 3rd party). He has squandered the good will America used to have, he has made politics more polorized than it was before he was selected.

The article mentions that seeing the administration in disarray shows them to be growing weaker. If this is so, how is it that congress has caved in and passed the 3 recent bills that allowed a change in definition in torture, allowed the president to declare anyone to be an enemy combatant and have them imprisoned without just recourse and finally got congress to make legal the illegal acts of domestic surveillance and wire tapping. The final bills gave more than the administration asked for.

My favorite Sci Fi author, Robert Heinlein, wrote in one of his books that if he had a choice between a crooked politician and a career politician, he would choose the crook. His reasong is that the crook stays bought. Having lived through the Bush administration, I would say that the only advantage is if I had bought the crook instead of the ones who have the presidents ears.

Flame on, y'all

by deepsand

Such was, in fact, a deliberate effort by Republicans to distance themselves from the President in light of the upcoming elections. Their goals were:

1) Re-focus the public attention on Congress, and away from a President in trouble;
2) Present the public with a demonstration that, while the President may be under seige, Congress was hard at work, dealing with matters of great import;
3) Craft a "compromise" bill that the President would find acceptable one the one hand, while giving the appearance that they, Congress, were in control, and seeking to achieve an equitable balance between the needs of both security and civil liberties.

In this manner Congress, and House Republicans in particular, hope to divert attention public attention away from the chaos within both the White House and their own party, and toward individual Congress members, so as to better ensure tha the fortunes of such individuals will, in the upcoming elections, be decided on their own merits, rather than on those of the party as a whole.

In short, it's politics as usual.

by danlm

lol, sorry. Had to say it.

But your right, it is politics as usual with the up comeing elections. They are too busy doing politics to actualy govern the nation. Hmm, what's there excuse when there isn't an election?

dan

by deepsand

"[i]... against everything that I've seen you post.[/i]"

That's been precious little.

Before you jump to conclusions, and rush to judgment, you would be well advised to first peruse [b]all[/b] of my public missives, beginning with the TR discussions that preceded your presence here.

Absent a knowledge of such, your view of me is but an uninformed knee-jerk reaction.

by delbertpgh

Friedman's article, which you posted at the top of this message, seems like a reasonable piece of political fact and speculation.

The extract of his interview, posted by Max, has some bad thinking behind it.

by deepsand

you will notice that Max gives us nothing more than selected Questions and Answers, with neither context nor attribution, other than that [i]implied[/i] by the inclusion of Mr. Friedman's name.

Based on Max's past behavior, it must be allowed that he himself may be the sole author of "interview."

by onbliss

Yes, you have answered the questions. As answers lead to further questions, I have some more, and some comments. The questions are in bold.

Pawn or Bishop, they the people and the country was used as a piece in geo-stratgies.

Afghanistan. Yes like you say, it is also a kind of 'proxy' war. But there there was a kind of "righteousness" to it. Baring few, almost the entire World was behind the cause.

Factions formenting trouble exist in almost all large countries and countries that have geographical and resource advantages. Granted Saddam could not have contended for a 'Mr.Nice' title, he still had a degree of control on his country. [b]Can you explain how the Iraqi factions were a threat to USA or the world, that it necessiated the action?[/b]. If the primary reason was violation of existing UN resolutions, [b]then why was that not [u]highlighted[/u] when making a case for the war[/b]? Other reasons had the limelight at that time. I understand Mr.Friedman already talked about the 'lying' part of the war. [b]So do you agree with him on that?[/b] If yes, then [b]don't you think UN should have handled it[/b]?

(on your side note: Do not know for sure. Iran seems to be enjoying the high oil prices. I think it is using the "saber rattling" from the world to its advantages. I am tempted to say, nobody at this moment would even think of invading it. Remember you had asked for a million strong force against terror. Unless such force materializes, it would be highly unlikely that a war would be waged with Iran. Especially when there is so much concern for oil and its safe shipment. But if Iraq and Afghanistan turn out fine, then things might be different.)

In answering my question on how to explain or rationalize to the Iraqis, you pointed out to your other answers. [b]Do you honestly believe that a common Iraqi would find such answers digestable?[/b]. Especially when he is seeing death and destruction all around him?

As far as the question regarding your friend, you wrongly understood it. The issue was not between you and your friend. Let me rephrase it. If Max and Onbliss are friends. Would Max tolerate if TR punished him for Onbliss' mistakes?

Since you talk about 'big picture', [b]can you exactly describe it[/b], so that I might think about it?

by maxwell edison

What I've written on this issue in these threads could probably fill a book. (Hummmm ...... thinking......)

I could probably fill several books because I've rewritten so much for each new discussion.

I might answer, and I might not.

I'm especially getting tired of deepsand's crap. He's an idiot, you know, and I hate to hang-out with idiots, so to speak. And since this is "his" thread, ........

How about if you search all of my old discussions and try to answer them yourselves? That would be interesting, and it wouldn't really take you that long.

by deepsand

Actually, anyone who's willing and able to comport themselves in a civil manner is welcome here.

by onbliss

If you do not want to answer then do not. But if you continue to post, then questions can raise in the minds.

Since you had already participated in these threads by posting. I raised questions pertaining to what you posted.

If you are geniuenly tired, then fine. But it is not like that we can not talk about the same topic again and again. We keep reading and receiving inputs and our thoughts would have been influenced.

Your suggestion to me to search your old discussions is at best a silly one.

by deepsand

A [i]little[/i] over the edge? With the possible exception of ippirate, he is the most arrogant and egotistical person hereabouts, and loves to indulge in bouts of mis-direction and obfuscations, 2 tactics that he has mastered well.

Given his past behavior, it simply would have come as no surprise to me learn that said interview was other than it appeared to be.

BTW, thanks for the link. However, at the moment it's not working; it's timing out. I'll try it again later.

by deepsand

He deems himself to be so very superior to the rest of us, and thus does so tire of what he views as supplications for his attentions.

by deepsand

Setting aside the fact that GWB obviously knows little of the history of the Middle East, of the cultures and religions there represented, and eschewed any assistance in that regard that his father tried to provide (remember, "books are Laura's thing"), he had a very personal reason for wanting to eliminate Saddam, one which he accidentally stated in the presence of a live microphone; he wanted revenge for Saddam's alleged attempt on his father's life.

by delbertpgh

I seriously of doubt Bush would have done Iraq just to avenge an insult to his daddy. As you say, Bush wasn't a booky guy, but probably he had Karen or Karl condense the articles down to a single page, and he absorbed them thus. He's not so big on ideas (take too long to explain) as principles (you sense these in your gut.) He's a gut guy, not a head guy. But I think he has too much respect for power to blow it on a personal gesture.

by deepsand

The incident re. his father merely provided the strong emotional motivation; the rest, without which none of what we are here discussing would have happened, provided him with the means and opportunity, such that the actions could be rationalized in a way that looked reasonable and plausible.

BTW, the open mic incident is on the record.

by maxwell edison

You've read enough of my stuff to know where I'm coming from. In fact, based on our past discussions, and what I'm pretty certain you've already read, it seems to me that you're simply asking me to repeat myself. You could answer those questions yourself and probably be pretty close to accurate. So what's the point? You already know; deepsand will continue to be an idiot; and nobody else give a damn.

by deepsand

I particularly like it when the party in control of the legislature trots out that tired old horse after having just blocked, for the umpteenth time, a floor vote on a bill championed by the minority, on an issue to which the majority pays but lip service, so as to not allow the credit for such to fall to their opponents.

by deepsand

those who dwell on it.

You're simply telling onbliss that nothing changes with the passage of time, so that there cannot be anything new since last you met, and it's his fault if he can't recall all that you've said and the meaning of such.

You might try getting out a bit more.

by tonythetiger

if enough of us think we can.

[i]preserving the benefits of useful accumulated experiences[/i]

Personally I can't think of one.

by deepsand

Or, that such is the case with repect to certain endeavors, such as politics?

In either case, why should that be so?

by deepsand

GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
10.10.2006

U.S. Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity
By George Friedman

In last week's Geopolitical Intelligence Report, we discussed the way in which the United States has opened up a window of opportunity for other powers. Iraq and Afghanistan have absorbed a large percentage of U.S. ground combat capability, limiting U.S. military options elsewhere. An internal political crisis has further limited the Bush administration's options. With the outcome of the November midterm elections uncertain, outside powers have a window of opportunity in which to take risks.

This week, the North Koreans took advantage of that window of opportunity. At this moment, it is not clear what Pyongyang actually has achieved: We do not know whether the apparent test of a nuclear device went as planned, was a fizzle or was a ruse carried out with conventional explosives. For the sake of this analysis, however, it does not matter. What matters is that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea decided this was the perfect time to jerk Washington's chain. In Pyongyang's view, the risks were small. The geography of the region precludes a U.S. nuclear strike, even if Washington were so inclined. A conventional airstrike potentially could prompt North Korea to open massive artillery fire on Seoul, just past the border -- and the United States has drawn down its ground forces in South Korea in order to reinforce troops in Iraq. Moreover, the administration has been too preoccupied with other regions and internal politics to frame an effective response.

We recently have seen a similar dynamic involving Russia and Georgia, a U.S. ally: A dustup over espionage allegations prompted Russia to blockade Georgia's air, rail, sea and postal services. How the affair started and who started it is less clear than the fact that the Russians have responded with a general disregard to American views on the subject. Quite the contrary: The fact that the Americans do have views on the subject has increased Russian intensity on the matter. The Russians do not fear U.S. responses. The United States needs the possibility of Russian backing on issues involving North Korea and Iran. If the Russians do lend assistance -- which is unlikely -- they certainly will not do so while the United States is intruding into what they regard as their sphere of influence. However slim the chance of real Russian collaboration might be, the United States can't afford to provoke Moscow. The Russians are not concerned about U.S. responses to their behavior; they see themselves as having a degree of freedom of action that they lacked when the United States was in a stronger position.

For the United States, the crucial problem is that this freedom of action -- for the Russians and others -- could be indefinitely extended. Assume, for instance, that the Democrats win both houses of Congress in November. Using budgetary powers, they could reshape U.S. policies and take them beyond the White House's control. And if the Democrats win only one chamber, they could block White House initiatives and throw the government into gridlock, leaving foreign powers with a two-year window of opportunity to press their own agendas.

While there is clearly a domestic political problem, the heart of the matter is military. Regardless of the political constellation in Washington, the military reality on the ground in Iraq severely constrains U.S. options around the world. That, in turn, constrains U.S. diplomacy. Diplomacy without even the distant possibility of military action is impotent. North Korea is a perfect example of what multilateral diplomacy without a unilateral military option looks like: The United States has recruited Russia, China, Japan and South Korea for diplomatic initiatives with North Korea as it partnered with Russia and European powers for dealings with Iran. Since the interests of these powers diverge, the possibility of concerted action, even on sanctions, simply does not exist. Since the possibility of unilateral action by the United States also does not exist, neither North Korea nor Iran need take the diplomatic initiatives seriously. And they don't.

The center of gravity in the American strategic problem is the need to rebuild the country's military option, particularly its ground combat capability. The decline in this area is the frame around the window of opportunity. In order to rebuild its military option, the United States must address the problem of Iraq, along with the secondary issue of Afghanistan. The Americans either must dramatically increase the capability of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps or else decrease their commitment in Iraq. If the United States does neither, its ability to control and influence events in other regions will decline, even if the internal political crisis is resolved. If that crisis is not resolved -- and Iraq continues to soak up resources -- the outcome will be strategic gridlock for the United States.

The Shape of the Problem

The Army is the heart of the matter. Today's U.S. Army was designed in the 1990s, on the assumption that the need for extended combat operations was a thing of the past. Not only was the Army reduced in size, but many of the key components of combat divisions and critical specialties, such as civil affairs, were shifted to the Army Reserve and National Guard. The administration's expectation for Iraq was that there would be a buildup of forces for several months, a short, intense period of combat operations, then a drawdown in forces in a pacified country. The 1990s force was designed just for these kinds of conflicts. The Reserve and National Guard components were mobilized to join and backfill for units deploying to the combat zone. By the end of the year, it was expected, the force would return to peacetime operations.

Iraq didn't work out that way. The drawdown never took place because major combat operations were followed by a major insurgency. The expectation of the administration was that the insurgency would be dealt with in a reasonable time, so the Army was not reconfigured for extended warfare. At any point, proposals for dealing with the fundamental problem -- that the force was too small -- were rejected, with the thinking that there was no need for a significant overhaul to deal with a problem that would be under control in a matter of months. This expectation turned into hope, and the hope into dogma. Thus, the 1990s Army continued to fight a multi-year insurgency with a multidivisional force, while also fighting a second war in Afghanistan and having to stand by for the unexpected.

Having learned from Vietnam that constantly rotating individuals into units for one-year tours undermines unit cohesion, the Army shifted to rotating entire divisions into and out of Iraq after roughly one year. Had the conflict ended in two years, that might have worked. But it now has been more than three years and divisions are doing their second tours, mobilizing Reserve and National Guard units as they go. Consider this example: The 1st Cavalry Division is now deploying on its second tour to take control of the Baghdad region from the 4th Infantry Division. For the coming year, the 1st Cav is going to be locked down in Iraq, but the 4th ID will not be available for operations elsewhere. Upon arriving back in the United States, they will need to rest, repair and integrate new equipment and integrate new recruits to replace veterans leaving the Army. The 4th ID will not be available to deploy anywhere for many months. In effect, for every division in Iraq, one division is being overhauled. Add to this the weakness in the Reserves and National Guard and the phrase "the force is broken" begins to make sense.

In other words, Iraq is eating up U.S. geopolitical options by eating up the Army. This is the first major, extended ground war the United States has fought in a century without dramatically increasing the size of the Army. World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam all brought massive increases in military size, mostly through conscription. The Bush administration did not view Iraq as a potentially multi-year, multi-divisional combat operation. It maintained the force roughly as it started, and now that force is broken.

It now is becoming clear that the administration understands this.

Momentum for a Strategy Shift

Two important things happened during the past week. First, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, long an opponent of expanding the Army's budget, agreed to allow the Army to plead its case for more money to Congress. In the past, Rumsfeld wanted the Army to find more efficient ways to run counterinsurgency operations, relying more on technology than manpower. That's a good idea, and might happen some day, but it didn't happen for this war. It is now obviously pretty late in the game to cut the Army loose for funding -- plus, any new funding it does get won't impact the battlefield for a couple of years at best. But Rumsfeld's move does signal recognition that the basic assumption up to this point was flawed.

More important is the second thing: James Baker, a former secretary of state and a close adviser for both President Bushes, has been chairing a genuinely bipartisan committee called the Iraq Study Group (ISG), which has been conducting a bottom-up review of the war. Over the weekend, Baker spoke to the media, hinting at the parameters of the recommendations the ISG will make once the elections have been held. He made it clear that a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq is impossible, since that would create a massive vacuum in which Iran and Syria would move. At the same time, he made it clear that the country will have to adopt a new strategy.

At the center of the problem is the fact that the United States has been trying to create a coherent government in Baghdad that is made up of hostile and competing parties. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps have been given the assignment of creating a secure environment in which this can be accomplished. To do this, they must suppress the militias and insurgent groups that want to block the political process. The United States has been trying to do this militarily since the summer of 2003. Its forces have failed for a host of reasons -- ranging from the number of troops, the quality of intelligence, the impossibility of engaging combatants while simultaneously protecting noncombatants (who are themselves frequently hostile to U.S. forces), and so on.

So long as the United States continues to regard suppression of militias and insurgents as the precondition for creating a government -- and the creation of such a government remains the strategic goal of the United States -- the Army and Marine Corps will continue to be sucked up by Iraq, and countries like North Korea will be free to maneuver. Therefore, it follows that the ISG either will recommend that the administration abandon its goal of creating a unified government in Iraq or that the establishment of such a government should not depend on the United States creating a secure environment.

In short, we expect the ISG to recommend that the mission of U.S. forces be shifted away from responsibility for day-to-day security, allowing the United States to act instead as a general guarantor of Iraq's independence from Iranian control, and as a block against the expansion of Iranian power in the Arabian Peninsula. This would mean a withdrawal of U.S. forces from populated areas to enclaves that are close to the cities, and to the south and west of the Euphrates River. It has been suggested by some that U.S. forces be based primarily in northern Iraq, but this would depend on Turkey's willingness to allow the force to be supplied through Turkish ports, which is far from certain.

Thus, regardless of the results of the November elections, we expect a change in strategy by the Bush administration. First, there will be a rebuilding of the ground forces. Second, there will have to be a redefinition of U.S. strategy in Iraq so that American goals match capabilities. Third, the U.S. ground capability outside of Iraq will have to be regenerated rapidly so that forces can be available for insertion in unexpected trouble spots -- like the Korean Peninsula -- if needed.

What the United States has learned with North Korea is that, when a window of opportunity opens, other countries quite reasonably step through it. Diplomacy without a realistic threat of significant action, in the event that diplomacy fails, is just empty chatter. Multilateralism without the option for unilateral action leads to paralysis. In other words, the principles the Bush administration has argued for are incompatible with the reality that Iraq has created. If the principles are correct, U.S. strategy in Iraq must shift and the mission must be brought in line with the force.

Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.

by dawgit

...on "Georgia, a U.S. ally...", That being relative of course. Such things as alliances, in that part of the world, should never be taken with any great latitude.

by deepsand

some are down right ephemeral.

Like marriages, they should never be assumed to be either immutable or permanent.

by deepsand

GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
10.10.2006

U.S. Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity
By George Friedman

In last week's Geopolitical Intelligence Report, we discussed the way in which the United States has opened up a window of opportunity for other powers. Iraq and Afghanistan have absorbed a large percentage of U.S. ground combat capability, limiting U.S. military options elsewhere. An internal political crisis has further limited the Bush administration's options. With the outcome of the November midterm elections uncertain, outside powers have a window of opportunity in which to take risks.

This week, the North Koreans took advantage of that window of opportunity. At this moment, it is not clear what Pyongyang actually has achieved: We do not know whether the apparent test of a nuclear device went as planned, was a fizzle or was a ruse carried out with conventional explosives. For the sake of this analysis, however, it does not matter. What matters is that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea decided this was the perfect time to jerk Washington's chain. In Pyongyang's view, the risks were small. The geography of the region precludes a U.S. nuclear strike, even if Washington were so inclined. A conventional airstrike potentially could prompt North Korea to open massive artillery fire on Seoul, just past the border -- and the United States has drawn down its ground forces in South Korea in order to reinforce troops in Iraq. Moreover, the administration has been too preoccupied with other regions and internal politics to frame an effective response.

We recently have seen a similar dynamic involving Russia and Georgia, a U.S. ally: A dustup over espionage allegations prompted Russia to blockade Georgia's air, rail, sea and postal services. How the affair started and who started it is less clear than the fact that the Russians have responded with a general disregard to American views on the subject. Quite the contrary: The fact that the Americans do have views on the subject has increased Russian intensity on the matter. The Russians do not fear U.S. responses. The United States needs the possibility of Russian backing on issues involving North Korea and Iran. If the Russians do lend assistance -- which is unlikely -- they certainly will not do so while the United States is intruding into what they regard as their sphere of influence. However slim the chance of real Russian collaboration might be, the United States can't afford to provoke Moscow. The Russians are not concerned about U.S. responses to their behavior; they see themselves as having a degree of freedom of action that they lacked when the United States was in a stronger position.

For the United States, the crucial problem is that this freedom of action -- for the Russians and others -- could be indefinitely extended. Assume, for instance, that the Democrats win both houses of Congress in November. Using budgetary powers, they could reshape U.S. policies and take them beyond the White House's control. And if the Democrats win only one chamber, they could block White House initiatives and throw the government into gridlock, leaving foreign powers with a two-year window of opportunity to press their own agendas.

While there is clearly a domestic political problem, the heart of the matter is military. Regardless of the political constellation in Washington, the military reality on the ground in Iraq severely constrains U.S. options around the world. That, in turn, constrains U.S. diplomacy. Diplomacy without even the distant possibility of military action is impotent. North Korea is a perfect example of what multilateral diplomacy without a unilateral military option looks like: The United States has recruited Russia, China, Japan and South Korea for diplomatic initiatives with North Korea as it partnered with Russia and European powers for dealings with Iran. Since the interests of these powers diverge, the possibility of concerted action, even on sanctions, simply does not exist. Since the possibility of unilateral action by the United States also does not exist, neither North Korea nor Iran need take the diplomatic initiatives seriously. And they don't.

The center of gravity in the American strategic problem is the need to rebuild the country's military option, particularly its ground combat capability. The decline in this area is the frame around the window of opportunity. In order to rebuild its military option, the United States must address the problem of Iraq, along with the secondary issue of Afghanistan. The Americans either must dramatically increase the capability of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps or else decrease their commitment in Iraq. If the United States does neither, its ability to control and influence events in other regions will decline, even if the internal political crisis is resolved. If that crisis is not resolved -- and Iraq continues to soak up resources -- the outcome will be strategic gridlock for the United States.

The Shape of the Problem

The Army is the heart of the matter. Today's U.S. Army was designed in the 1990s, on the assumption that the need for extended combat operations was a thing of the past. Not only was the Army reduced in size, but many of the key components of combat divisions and critical specialties, such as civil affairs, were shifted to the Army Reserve and National Guard. The administration's expectation for Iraq was that there would be a buildup of forces for several months, a short, intense period of combat operations, then a drawdown in forces in a pacified country. The 1990s force was designed just for these kinds of conflicts. The Reserve and National Guard components were mobilized to join and backfill for units deploying to the combat zone. By the end of the year, it was expected, the force would return to peacetime operations.

Iraq didn't work out that way. The drawdown never took place because major combat operations were followed by a major insurgency. The expectation of the administration was that the insurgency would be dealt with in a reasonable time, so the Army was not reconfigured for extended warfare. At any point, proposals for dealing with the fundamental problem -- that the force was too small -- were rejected, with the thinking that there was no need for a significant overhaul to deal with a problem that would be under control in a matter of months. This expectation turned into hope, and the hope into dogma. Thus, the 1990s Army continued to fight a multi-year insurgency with a multidivisional force, while also fighting a second war in Afghanistan and having to stand by for the unexpected.

Having learned from Vietnam that constantly rotating individuals into units for one-year tours undermines unit cohesion, the Army shifted to rotating entire divisions into and out of Iraq after roughly one year. Had the conflict ended in two years, that might have worked. But it now has been more than three years and divisions are doing their second tours, mobilizing Reserve and National Guard units as they go. Consider this example: The 1st Cavalry Division is now deploying on its second tour to take control of the Baghdad region from the 4th Infantry Division. For the coming year, the 1st Cav is going to be locked down in Iraq, but the 4th ID will not be available for operations elsewhere. Upon arriving back in the United States, they will need to rest, repair and integrate new equipment and integrate new recruits to replace veterans leaving the Army. The 4th ID will not be available to deploy anywhere for many months. In effect, for every division in Iraq, one division is being overhauled. Add to this the weakness in the Reserves and National Guard and the phrase "the force is broken" begins to make sense.

In other words, Iraq is eating up U.S. geopolitical options by eating up the Army. This is the first major, extended ground war the United States has fought in a century without dramatically increasing the size of the Army. World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam all brought massive increases in military size, mostly through conscription. The Bush administration did not view Iraq as a potentially multi-year, multi-divisional combat operation. It maintained the force roughly as it started, and now that force is broken.

It now is becoming clear that the administration understands this.

Momentum for a Strategy Shift

Two important things happened during the past week. First, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, long an opponent of expanding the Army's budget, agreed to allow the Army to plead its case for more money to Congress. In the past, Rumsfeld wanted the Army to find more efficient ways to run counterinsurgency operations, relying more on technology than manpower. That's a good idea, and might happen some day, but it didn't happen for this war. It is now obviously pretty late in the game to cut the Army loose for funding -- plus, any new funding it does get won't impact the battlefield for a couple of years at best. But Rumsfeld's move does signal recognition that the basic assumption up to this point was flawed.

More important is the second thing: James Baker, a former secretary of state and a close adviser for both President Bushes, has been chairing a genuinely bipartisan committee called the Iraq Study Group (ISG), which has been conducting a bottom-up review of the war. Over the weekend, Baker spoke to the media, hinting at the parameters of the recommendations the ISG will make once the elections have been held. He made it clear that a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq is impossible, since that would create a massive vacuum in which Iran and Syria would move. At the same time, he made it clear that the country will have to adopt a new strategy.

At the center of the problem is the fact that the United States has been trying to create a coherent government in Baghdad that is made up of hostile and competing parties. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps have been given the assignment of creating a secure environment in which this can be accomplished. To do this, they must suppress the militias and insurgent groups that want to block the political process. The United States has been trying to do this militarily since the summer of 2003. Its forces have failed for a host of reasons -- ranging from the number of troops, the quality of intelligence, the impossibility of engaging combatants while simultaneously protecting noncombatants (who are themselves frequently hostile to U.S. forces), and so on.

So long as the United States continues to regard suppression of militias and insurgents as the precondition for creating a government -- and the creation of such a government remains the strategic goal of the United States -- the Army and Marine Corps will continue to be sucked up by Iraq, and countries like North Korea will be free to maneuver. Therefore, it follows that the ISG either will recommend that the administration abandon its goal of creating a unified government in Iraq or that the establishment of such a government should not depend on the United States creating a secure environment.

In short, we expect the ISG to recommend that the mission of U.S. forces be shifted away from responsibility for day-to-day security, allowing the United States to act instead as a general guarantor of Iraq's independence from Iranian control, and as a block against the expansion of Iranian power in the Arabian Peninsula. This would mean a withdrawal of U.S. forces from populated areas to enclaves that are close to the cities, and to the south and west of the Euphrates River. It has been suggested by some that U.S. forces be based primarily in northern Iraq, but this would depend on Turkey's willingness to allow the force to be supplied through Turkish ports, which is far from certain.

Thus, regardless of the results of the November elections, we expect a change in strategy by the Bush administration. First, there will be a rebuilding of the ground forces. Second, there will have to be a redefinition of U.S. strategy in Iraq so that American goals match capabilities. Third, the U.S. ground capability outside of Iraq will have to be regenerated rapidly so that forces can be available for insertion in unexpected trouble spots -- like the Korean Peninsula -- if needed.

What the United States has learned with North Korea is that, when a window of opportunity opens, other countries quite reasonably step through it. Diplomacy without a realistic threat of significant action, in the event that diplomacy fails, is just empty chatter. Multilateralism without the option for unilateral action leads to paralysis. In other words, the principles the Bush administration has argued for are incompatible with the reality that Iraq has created. If the principles are correct, U.S. strategy in Iraq must shift and the mission must be brought in line with the force.

Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.

by dawgit

"...if one wants to marry a woman he can trust, he should marry a prostitute, at least she's honest about herself, and that's more than most people."

by dawgit

where it originated. That is correct however, I also recall something of the sort from 'Mark Twain'. (sounds more like a WC Fields-ism) Could be Samual Clemens had also heard of it and passed it on, as he had done with so much other (un-)'common sense'.

by deepsand

For example, [i]"Better to remain silent, and be thought the fool, than to speak and remove all doubt[/i]" has been attributed to both Twain and Lincoln.

Furthermore, many of Twain's writings remain unpublished, or were only more recently published, owing to their sensitive subject matter, namely sex and religion. [i]Letters From Earth[/i] is in fact a collection of such works, centering on [i]"Letters From The Earth,[/i]" written in 1909, but not published until 1962, owing to the fact that Twain's family felt that they would sully the family name.

And, as you note, the quote in question also hints of the tongue of W.C. Fields. As adages are oft times authored by one, but become well known by virtue of another, it would come as no surprise to learn that both Twain and Fields share parentage here.

by deepsand

The Election and Investigatory Powers of Congress
By George Friedman

There is now only a week to go before midterm congressional elections in the United States. The legislative outcome is already fairly clear. President George W. Bush lost the ability to drive legislation through Congress when he had to back away from his Social Security proposals. That situation will continue: The president will not be able to generate legislation without building coalitions. On the other hand, Congress will not be able to override his vetoes. That means that, regardless of whether the Democrats take the House of Representatives (as appears likely) or the Senate (which appears less likely but still possible), the basic architecture of the American legislative process will remain intact. Democrats will not gain much power to legislate; Republicans will not lose much.

If the Democrats take control of the House from the Republicans, the most important change will not be that Nancy Pelosi becomes House Speaker, but that the leadership of House committees will shift -- and even more significant, that there will be upheaval of committee staffs. Republicans will shift to minority staff positions -- and have to let go of a lot of staffers -- while the Democrats will get to hire a lot of new ones. These staffers serve two functions. The first is preparing legislation, the second is managing investigations. Given the likelihood of political gridlock, there will be precious little opportunity for legislation to be signed into law during the next two years -- but there likely will be ample opportunity and motivation for congressional investigations.

Should the Democrats use this power to their advantage, there will be long-term implications for both the next presidential election and foreign policy options in the interim.

One of the most important things that the Republicans achieved, with their control of both the House and Senate, was to establish control over the type and scope of investigations that were permitted. Now, even if control of only the House should change hands, the Democrats will be making those decisions. And, where the GOP's goal was to shut down congressional investigations, the Democrat Party's goal will be to open them up and use them to shape the political landscape ahead of the 2008 presidential election.

It is important to define what we mean by "investigation." On the surface, congressional investigations are opportunities for staffers from the majority party to wield subpoena power in efforts to embarrass their bosses' opponents. The investigations also provide opportunities for members of Congress and senators to make extensive speeches that witnesses have to sit and listen to when they are called to testify -- a very weird process, if you have ever seen it. Congressional investigations are not about coming to the truth of a matter in order for the laws of the republic to be improved for the common good. They are designed to extract political benefit and put opponents in the wrong. (Republicans and Democrats alike use the congressional investigative function to that end, so neither has the right to be indignant.)

For years, however, Democrats have been in no position to unilaterally call hearings and turn their staffs and subpoena powers loose on a topic -- which means they have been precluded from controlling the news cycle. The media focus intensely on major congressional hearings. For television networks, they provide vivid moments of confrontation; and the reams of testimony, leaked or official, give the print media an enormous opportunity to look for embarrassing moments that appear to reveal something newsworthy. In the course of these hearings, there might even be opportunities for witnesses to fall into acts of perjury -- or truth-telling -- that can lead to indictments and trials.

To reverse their position, the Democrats need not capture both the House and Senate next week. In fact, from the party's standpoint, that might not even be desirable. The Senate and House historically have gotten in each other's way in the hearing process. Moreover, there are a lot of Democratic senators considering a run for the presidency, but not many members of Congress with those ambitions. Senators who get caught up in congressional hearings can wind up being embarrassed themselves -- and with the competing goals of Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and some of the other candidates, things could wind up a mess. But if the House alone goes to Democrats, Pelosi would be positioned to orchestrate a series of hearings from multiple committees and effectively control the news cycles. Within three months of the new House being sworn in, the political landscape could be dominated by hearings -- each week bringing new images of witnesses being skewered or news of embarrassing files being released. Against this backdrop, a new generation of Democratic congressmen would be making their debuts on the news networks, both while sitting on panels, and on the news channels afterward.

Politically, this would have two implications. First, the ability of the White House to control and direct public attention would decline dramatically. Not only would the White House not be able to shut down unwanted debate, but it would lack the ability even to take part in setting the agenda. Each week's subject would be chosen by the House Democratic leadership. Second, there will be a presidential election in two years that the Democrats want to win. Therefore, they would use congressional hearings to shape public opinion along the lines their party wants. The goal would be not only to embarrass the administration, but also to showcase Democratic strengths.

The Senate can decide to hold its own hearings, of course, and likely would if left in Republican hands. The problem is that, at the end of the day, the most interesting investigations would involve the Bush administration and corporations that can be linked to it. A GOP-controlled Senate could call useful hearings, but they would be overwhelmed by the Democratic fireworks. They just would not matter as much.

So let's consider, from a foreign policy standpoint, what would be likely matters for investigation:

* What did the Bush administration really know about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? Did Bush dismiss advice from the CIA on Iraq?

* Did the administration ignore warnings about al Qaeda attacks prior to 9/11?

These, of course, would be the mothers of all investigations. Everything would be dragged out and pored over. The fact that there have been bipartisan examinations by the 9/11 commission would not matter: The new hearings would be framed as an inquiry into whether the 9/11 commission's recommendations were implemented -- and that would open the door to re-examine all the other issues.

Following close on these would be investigations into:

* Whether the Department of Homeland Security is effective.

* Whether the new structure of the intelligence community works.

* Whether Halliburton received contracts unfairly -- a line of inquiry that could touch Vice President Dick Cheney.

* Whether private contractors like Blackwater are doing appropriate jobs in Iraq.

* Whether the Geneva Conventions should apply in cases of terrorist detentions.

* Whether China is violating international trade agreement.

And so on. Every scab would be opened -- as is the right of Congress, the tendency of the nation in unpopular wars, and likely an inevitable consequence of these midterm elections.

We can expect the charges raised at these hearings to be serious, and to come from two groups. The first will be Democratic critics of the administration. These will be unimportant: Such critics, along with people like former White House security adviser Richard Clarke, already have said everything they have to say. But the second group will include another class -- former members of the administration, the military and the CIA who have, since the invasion of Iraq, broken with the administration. They have occasionally raised their voices -- as, for instance, in Bob Woodward's recent book -- but the new congressional hearings would provide a platform for systematic criticism of the administration. And many of these critics seem bruised and bitter enough to avail themselves of it.

This intersects with internal Republican politics. At this point, the Republicans are divided into two camps. There are those who align with the Bush position: that the war in Iraq made sense and that, despite mistakes, it has been prosecuted fairly well on the whole. And there are those, coalesced around Sens. Chuck Hagel and John Warner, who argue that, though the rationale for the war very well might have made sense, its prosecution by Donald Rumsfeld has led to disaster. The lines might be evenly drawn, but for the strong suspicion that Sen. John McCain is in the latter camp.

McCain clearly intends to run for president and, though he publicly shows support for Bush, there is every evidence that McCain has never forgiven him for the treatment he received in the primaries of 2000. McCain is not going to attack the president, nor does he really oppose the war in Iraq, but he has shown signs that he feels that the war has not been well prosecuted. This view, shared publicly by recently retired military commanders who served in Iraq, holds out Rumsfeld as the villain. It is not something that McCain is going to lead the charge on, but in taking down Rumsfeld, McCain would be positioned to say that he supported the war and the president -- but not his secretary of defense, who was responsible for overseeing the prosecution of the war.

From McCain's point of view, little would be more perfect than an investigation into the war by a Democrat-controlled House during which former military and Defense Department officials pounded the daylights out of Rumsfeld. This would put whole-hearted Republican supporters of the president in a tough position and give McCain -- who, as a senator, would not have to participate in the hearings -- space to defend Bush's decision but not his tactics. The hearings also would allow him to challenge Democratic front-runners (Clinton and Obama) on their credentials for waging a war. They could be maneuvered into either going too far and taking a pure anti-war stance, or into trying to craft a defense policy at which McCain could strike. To put it another way, aggressively investigating an issue like the war could wind up blowing up in the Democrats' faces, but that is so distant and subtle a possibility that we won't worry about it happening -- nor will they.

What does seem certain, however, is this: The American interest in foreign policy is about to take an investigatory turn, as in the waning days of the Vietnam War. Various congressional hearings, like those of the Church Committee, so riveted the United States in the 1970s and so tied down the policymaking bureaucracy that crafting foreign policy became almost impossible.

George W. Bush is a lame duck in the worst sense of the term. Not only are there no more elections he can influence, but he is heading into his last two years in office with terrible poll ratings. And he is likely to lose control of the House of Representatives -- a loss that will generate endless hearings and investigations on foreign policy, placing Bush and his staff on the defensive for two years. Making foreign policy in this environment will be impossible.

Following the elections, five or six months will elapse before the House Democrats get organized and have staff in place. After that, the avalanche will fall in on Bush, and 2008 presidential politics will converge with congressional investigations to overwhelm his ability to manage foreign policy. That means the president has less than half a year to get his house in order if he hopes to control the situation, or at least to manage his response.

Meanwhile, the international window of opportunity for U.S. enemies will open wider and wider.

Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.

This report may be distributed or republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com .

by dawgit

before the eggs are laid? Sandy, I think most of the world already has the answers, issues he brings up, the problem is when will America wake up? (and do something positive about it) I'll have to tell you the whole world is watching this election. (the one in the US, as well as in the Congo and other places) Scary times, are back.

by deepsand

All of this is beginning to very much remind me of the 60's & early 70's, after Nixon came to power.

Then, as a youth, it was alarming to the point of fright; now, 40 years later, I've reached the point where I can better put it in a larger perspective and enjoy it for its amusement value.

by dawgit

It's the same people. Those 'Young Repulicans' of the 60's, who helped push Nixon almost to jail, perfected their game during the Regan years, are back. It's all bad, and the American People can't win. (insert: only loose, ie: Freedom & Liberty)
Don't take my word for it check them out, Most had some type of 'job' durning Nixons time. Know that does help to explain this mess we're in.

by deepsand

Rumsfield & Cheney, for example, came of age politically under Ford, where they served as Chief of Staff (1974-1975) & Deputy Chief of Staff, respectively, with Rumsfield eventually becoming the youngest ever Secretary of Defense (1975-1977), whereupon Cheney then became Ford's Chief of Staff.

Although Rumsfield had left the Nixon administration prior to its fall, it would serve us well to recall Nixon's following 197 characterization of him. [i]"At least Rummy is tough enough" ... "He's a ruthless little bastard. You can be sure of that."[/i]

As for Cheney, it is noteworthy to observe that he actively dodged the draft, by way of 5 various deferments, finally succeeding in avoiding induction by way of becoming a father-to-be. In 1989, in defense of such, he stated [i]"I had other priorities in the '60s than military service."[/i]

by dawgit

It goes to show the skunk doesn't change it's stripes.
As for Cheney, I also had other things to do in the 60's (and was having fun doing them too) The local Draft Board did NOT particularly care that much for me, but when called (last # in the last draft) I SERVED.!. (28 Sept. '72-?) ( and did more than asked )
To me it's a question of their true charater. Ruthless?, so are mad dogs, and we put them down.
That's just my take on that, one should not get me started on that subject, I start seeing red.
But again you are right on the Ford years. I had forgoten about that. Ford was for all practal purposes bowled over by those who were less than desireable. Unfortunately them got embeded so deep in the government, that durning the Carter years, they were constantly at work undermining him, and getting ready for the next wave. (the Regan years) But then one has to know History to see the paterns. The NDASP didn't happen over night in Germany either. It took at least 10 years before they had a good foot-hold in the gov. (and a few more before they had total control) -d

by deepsand

while I was in the Navy!!!

The head of the local board had, at one time, been the district manager of the local subscription delivery routes for the Harrisburg [i]Patriot News[/i]. He was as hard headed as they come, and did not take kindly to my not following his every suggestion re. my route as though it were an order to be obeyed without question.

Eventually, the publisher, sufficiently weary of dealing with complaints about him, fired him. He then re-surfaced as head of the local Draft Board.

He decided to retaliate against me by attempting to draft me, and was not about to let the fact that I was already in the Navy deter him from mucking about in my life. As proof of my duty status, he demanded a specific mil form, one that was apparently fabricated by him, as no one in the Navy could find any record of its existence.

Two of the Naval officers assisting me in this matter devised a plan, whereby they would allow me to go through the motions of taking the physical, showing up for induction, refusing to step forward to be sworn in (had I done so I would have committed the crime of false enlistment), resulting in my being detained, at which point the Navy would bring charges against both the Draft Board and the Army.

Unfortunately, this game never got played out, as the NAVSEC BUPERS intervened with a rather pointed Saturday telegram to the ***hole at the Draft Board.

by dawgit

In a prievious life form. My Wonderfull ones, thought it proper to serve their country by getting rid of those who thought of opposing the gov. I wonder if they archieved my letters explaining the errors of their ways. (would make Maxs' posts look mild) They tried (unsucessfully) to draft me while I was still in High School (twice, once before I had even turned 18, just to get me ready) The lotery sys. was slightly better, and they were p*$$ed about that. But History, being what it was, they took me while I was in College. (Local board had revoked my student deferment) Anyway, just like you, it seems, I was in the Navy, or a piece of it, when my father got the letter that they wanted to send the Marshals after me. The good folks at BUPERS did their thing. Oh-well. I never looked back. (although, it does bring up some interesting thoughts from time to time)

by deepsand

That we had already arrived at the destination they desired for us was irrelevant to them; what they most desired was to control our journeys. That we voluntarily chose our paths deprived them of the opportunity to wield their powers, which was, for them, the ultimate unforgiveable offense.

How I do regret not having been present to see the reaction of the old bastard when he got the notice to back off or else.