I find interesting the questions asked about Katrina recovery at this first anniversary of the Mississippi Gulf Coast's most major catastrophe. Answering the three questions of "Deadly Ernest" can not be accomplished in this forum because the answers are not really known and the answers presented are not and cannot be representative of the body of peoples that were involved in the hurricane and the on-going recovery.
I must premise my answers with the suggestion that I live on the Mississippi Coast, stayed during and after Katrina, but was among the lucky ones that did not lose their homes or a large portion of their possessions. Thus, I cannot and will not be a representative of those that have gone through such a greater level of suffering. Further, each of the questions offered by "Deadly Ernest" are important but demand very long and complex answers to be valid.
My perceptions of the immediate recovery response to Katrina are (per the questions asked):
1) The concern for government support and lack thereof is relative to the level of loss and amount of resources available to those that did lose their possessions. I have seen signs where residents give thanks to FEMA for providing temporary housing and limited financial support. However, those giving the greatest thanks appear to be those that have had the internal resources to recover more quickly and return to more normalcy relative to their pre-Katrina life. Regretfully, there are hundreds of thousands on the Mississipi Gulf Coast (including New Orleans) that did not and do not have the resources to build again. The scope and diversity of those that lost so much are beyond the definition of the resource recipient provided by FEMA and, as such, many have suffered losses with no way to regain any form of normalcy for years to come.
Relative to the immediate aid offered by the government; the breadth and depth of the catastrophe was so extensive that one government agency could not handle the recovery process. As suspected by "Ernest", the organization of the varied governmenrt agencies was so poor that aid was delayed for weeks and months. Further, the bureaucratic rulings and inflexibility presented by many of the rules and policies provided by FEMA made recovery a much greater challenge than just providing existing resources to the needy.
The media concentrated heavily on New Orleans and the scope of looting, rape, and criminal activities portrayed in New Orleans was not at the same high proprotion to the east of New Orleans (where the hurricane did the larger scale damage). The Mississippi Coast counties were hit harder by the hurricane and, I believe, the community was more immediate in their attempts to pursue recovery. However, one must consider that the types of catastrophe (primarily large scale flooding in New Orleans and total annihilation in Mississippi and other parts of Louisiana) required different levels of resource allocation to assist those in need.
Not considered in Mr "Ernest's" questions was the time of year and breadth and depth of the components of the catastrophe. Hurricane Katrina hit in late August (the heat and humidity were at extreme levels) and the immediate effects of the hurricane presented utility losses throughout most of central and Southern Mississippi for seven to ten days (longer for rural communities). Compounding the losses created by Katrina were the complementary losses resulting from tornadoes spawned by Katrina. Communications were out for at least that same period and longer. I personally could not communicate with my family for the first week and the media gave such great emphasis to New Orleans that Mississippi Coast residents were anonymous to much of the outlying public.
With resources unavailable, we could not call or transition from our neighborhoods. Luckily, I had 3 five-gallon gas containers filled and available to take my family to Shreveport Louisiana for several days about a week after the hurricane. The six hour trip to Shreveport found travelers without access to gas stations for many miles and several hours. Again, this is days after the hurricane.
2) The suggestion that the victims were whining and sitting around waiting for help is absurd. The victims were not whining, they were without food, water, and, in some cases, shelter. We were proud to see trucks coming into our communities with drinkable water and ice. The media showed you pictures of the poor and homeless (again, primarily New Orleans) that had no basis for recovery. Those people were later shipped across the United States in an attempt to disseminate the extreme poor to multiple reestablishment zones.
Those in Mississippi and other parts of Louisiana, with homes or at least a place to sleep, started recovery as soon as daylight was available and as soon as materials and utilities allowed cleanup and rebuilding to be accomplished. New Orleans posed different problems with the flood waters having to recede and the community without basic services to allow the citizenry to return to a safe community.
3) People forget quickly, diverse social structures require more complex management, the scope of the catatrophe was beyond belief: these are all possible answers as to why America was not prepared. Lack of organization and multi-government involvement is why immediate recovery actions were so bad. New Orleans did not start immediate recovery until the Army was allowed to take controls of the city. City, state, and federal government bodies were in contrast as to who should be blamed and/or praised for recovery actions and, subsequently, the citizens suffered. The Army organized, controlled, and started the recovery process in New Orleans.
The Mississippi Coast was left to fend for themselves more so than New Orleans and, as such, there appeared to be greater cohesion between the city and state governments. Access to resources was more readliy available because we did not have the flood waters that contained New Orleans. However, delays in regaining communications was unbelievable and access to utilities (although very expediently processed by the utility companies considering the barriers presented to them) took days to accomplish. The loss of utilities was the basis for spiraling problems: no electricity meant no pumps which meant no gas and, at times, no drinking water. Lack of electricity meant no access to fresh foods. Stores were destroyed or were not opened due to utility problems. Logistics were hampered by downed trees, damaged roads, and an inability to know where one was traveling in some parts of the state.
Hurricane Katrina presented such a breadth and depth to problems that the Coast will be attempting recovery for 5 to 10 more years. The social structure of the Coast will never return as it was in pre-Katrina days. The ecnonomic structure of the Coast has changed so radically that many cannot afford to stay much less return to their pre-Katrina homeland.
Poor organization and insane rules kept the federal government from assisting at the level that resources could have been made available. The thrust of the recovery fell to two groups of people: the locals that have and continue to work hard to rebuild their lives and the thousands of wonderful volunteers that have come to the Coast to assist the poor and to assist those who have lost all and need a helping hand.
