General discussion



By DanLM ·
Do me a favor, read this full thing before you make an oppinion. I think it was a good ruleing.

The defendants had argued that they were improperly subjected to FISA
surveillance since FISA requires that the target be "an agent of a
foreign power" and, they insist, they were never acting on behalf of
a foreign power.

Judge T.S. Ellis, III, rejected that defense argument.

But in doing so, he redefined and significantly expanded the meaning
of "agent of a foreign power" to include non-foreign agents who may
be involved in unlawful information gathering.

FISA "plainly allows a FISC [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court]
judge to issue an order allowing the surveillance or physical search
if there is probable cause to believe that the target... may ... Be
involved in unlawful clandestine intelligence activities, or in
knowingly aiding and abetting such activities," Judge Ellis wrote.

And what are "unlawful clandestine intelligence activities"?

"Although the phrase 'clandestine intelligence gathering activities'
is not defined in FISA," he noted, "such 'activities' would include,
for example, 'collection or transmission of information or material
that is not generally available to the public'."

Some such collection and transmission of information is protected by
the First Amendment, the Court acknowledged, and cannot by itself
serve as the basis for FISA surveillance.

But earlier this month, Judge Ellis ruled that the collection and
transmission of national defense information can be a violation of
the Espionage Act, even if it is conducted by private citizens who
are not spies, if they act knowingly and willfully with an awareness
that the information is restricted and that it could be used to harm
the United States or to aid a foreign nation.

Building on that prior ruling, the Court has now redefined the
meaning of "agent of a foreign power" so as to justify the FISA
surveillance in the AIPAC case.

"The FISC [the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that
originally authorized surveillance of the AIPAC defendants] had
ample probable cause to believe that the targets were agents of a
foreign power quite apart from their First Amendment lobbying

But under the Court's new definition, "agents of a foreign power"
need not be literally "agents of a foreign power." Rather, the term
now includes other persons who engage in unlawful information

"While the defendants' lobbying activities are generally protected by
the First Amendment, willful violations of sec. 793 [the provision
of the Espionage Act that prohibits collection and disclosure of
national defense information] are not, and ... the FISC had probable
cause to believe that such violations had occurred in this case,"
Judge Ellis explained.

Thus, the Court did not find that there was any reason to believe the
defendants were acting on behalf of a foreign power. (The
prosecution has conceded that they were not.)

Instead, Judge Ellis expanded the scope of the term "agent of a
foreign power" to include someone who clandestinely gathers
restricted information in a probable violation of the Espionage Act,
even if there is no reason to suppose he is a spy or a terrorist.

By the Court's logic, it does not take an big imaginative leap to
envision the application of FISA surveillance to members of the
press or others who deliberately solicit classified or controlled
defense information or who report on classified programs in
conscious defiance of official directives to the contrary.

A former FBI official with extensive experience in FISA policy and
practice expressed doubt that the FISA could now be easily invoked
against the press or the public for ordinary reporting or research
activities since, he said, these do not normally involve the
requisite intent to violate the law.

"There is quite a bit on the periphery that is not included in this
Order," the official told Secrecy News.

"The judge referred to the information 'not generally available to
the public' in the context of clandestine activities that are
violations of, for example, 18 USC 793 and 794 [the Espionage Act].
These are statutes that require an intent to harm the United States
or benefit another power. Judge Ellis may have been parsimonious in
his words, but he hasn't advocated the position that worries you,"
he said.

Even so, the FBI FISA expert agreed that the new court order does
"make it possible to be 'an agent of a foreign power' for FISA
surveillance purposes without having any actual connection with a
foreign power whatsoever."

The new order also called for a leak investigation to determine the
sources of a August 2004 CBS news story about the AIPAC case.

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By the same logic...

by BrokenEagle In reply to FISA SURVEILLANCE CAN TAR ...

We are at war and civil rights do not generally apply to combatants, but just for the sake of argument, lets apply the judge's logic to every day situations that most people can relate to.

By the same logic, Traffic Radar Guns target non-speeders.

Police should have to get specific court approval everytime they turn on their radar and then again for each car they point it at. In addition they should not be allowed to follow a car or record a license plate number without court approval.

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No new definitions here

by NickNielsen In reply to FISA SURVEILLANCE CAN TAR ...

Title 50, Section 1801 of the United States Code ( defines an "agent of a foreign power." Judge Ellis did not expand a thing, and in fact, quoted the definitions from 50 USC 1801 on page 11 of his opinion.

In addition, Judge Ellis quotes from Title 50 Section 1805, which states in part: "Provided, That no United States person may be considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States;"

I don't see a need to be paranoid or even remotely alarmed.

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