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Newbie Questions DMZ and Firewalls

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Right now we are running a ISS.net box and I have some questions about DMZ and firewalls. I have been tasked with looking into this and have some very BASIC questions. Right now our webserver is running on the internal LAN behind the firewall (I know, Bad move but it was setup that way before I got here). I want to move the Webserver into the DMZ, my question is this, With the webserver in the DMZ traffic can still go from LAN>>>DMZ right? It will not (theroy)go from the DMZ>>>LAN right? I mean I will still be able to access the webserver from my box on the LAN for management, but they wont be able to get to the LAN from the webserver?

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by cg it

well, yes and no. Sorta depends upon how you have your DMZ configured, what hardware your using, how your LAN network is segmented from your DMZ.

Typically, security people define a DMZ zone an area between your perimeter firewall and your LAN with your LAN segmented from from the DMZ by some type of method either a software firewall or hardware firewall. In the consumer world using consumer level equipment, a DMZ is a switch port on a cable/DSL router that does not have firewall protection [naked].

Security guys typically recommend a layered defense for protecting ones network. A perimeter firewall, a "DMZ" where public accessible services are made available, the network, then security settings such as permissions or access rights on individual machines [including individual firewalls on workstations though that can tend to be a real headache to manage].

Accessing the web server is best done by a workstation on the DMZ with it or remote access from the internet. Web servers tend to get compromised with all sorts of stuff and having a LAN workstation access it for administration opens a risk to the network. The workstation could get compromised from the web server [worms] then compromise the LAN.

by erikdr

Good answer on how to manage the webserver.

BUT not an answer to the other questions.

"DMZ traffic can still go from LAN>>>DMZ right? "
Actually not by default. The idea of DMZ is to have TWO layers of firewalls, the outer (perimeter one) and the inner (filtering) one. Both could be same product and even same machine, as with the 3-homed DMZ on one switch described in the other reply, but even then with different instances/filters.
The inner firewall, and that's what we are talking about here, is locked down in both directions. However usually you need to open up outward-bound HTTP traffic (e.g. for surfing) and if the machine is HTTP-managed yes you can manage the webserver from inside the LAN.

"It will not (theroy)go from the DMZ>>>LAN right"
What you'll filter on the inner firewall is protocols/ports and possibly also some level of intrusion detection / stateful discovery.
What you DO often need to open up are some protocols that the webserver needs to serve internal content: e.g. ODBC and COM+ in a Microsoft-world and JDBC/RMI in a Java-world. This means that a hacker who has gained control to the webserver can also use these 'rich' protocols to come into the Intranet. At the very least, the inner firewall should also lock down the webserver access so that it can only reach certain LAN-nodes. If you can also restrict the protocols from the webserver to more 'poor' ones like HTTP-only (SOAP?), then it's easier to curb the hackers.

So your last question is answered on the negative: not automatically is your LAN shielded from the webserver, especially not if there is internal content needed.

In such a case, considering a reverse proxy in the DMZ and the webserver in the LAN sometimes makes sense...

All the best,

- The Netherlands

by sgt_shultz

hope you guys will jump in here if i am off with what i think i have learned about this:
your dmz device will be double-homed (2 nics). that is because it is gonna 'route' between two network segments, the internet and your lan. so you can only limit/firewall/monitor the exposure. you can only 'examine' and block or allow the traffic. as you know, you have to be exposed to internet or stuff wno't work.
so on basic level you could have router in 'dmz'- blocking most ports and firewalling the allowed ports. plus adding the layer of NAT
then you could add web proxy server that gets the filtered internet traffic from the router (via port forwarding) and uses that proxy program to further examine and log the traffic. you may also need to see about securing mail, dns servers...
So you may wish eventually to put a web proxy server, dns server, mail server? in your 'dmz'.
even more important imho is to keep your current iss box and all servers and clients patched and virus protected. also to implement simple basic best practices like disabling guest accounts, using strong passwords etc. this stuff is the heart of it and i say, start with it, don't finish off with it... goes for mac, linux, windows, netware, whatever.
keep it simple and grow it fancier as you come to understand the issues.
best way imho to see how you are doing on security is to try to hack into yourself. try shields up! , read 'hacking revealed'. getting the big barn doors shut is gonna fix most of the potential problems right away. as you learn more about hacking you can close more and more.
check out www.cert.org for good info in format i could understand. i subscribe to the security alerts found there to nudge me into checking how the automatic updates are running. an explanation of a dmz is there. how to harden os's is there.
remember: no security without physical security. that is a huge gotcha. also, good historical backups is best for stomach while one is learning this stuff...

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