Incentives in Cooperative Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Perspective

Multiuser cooperative communication significantly improves the performance of wireless communication networks. One key challenge of multiuser cooperative communication is how to design a cooperative mechanism to incentivize potential relay nodes to help a source node in its data transmission. In this paper, to address this problem, a contract-based principal-agent framework is proposed in the context of cognitive-radio-based wireless relaying networks in which the sources’ wireless characteristics constitute hidden information which is not known by the relay. The problem is modeled as a monopolist’s problem, in which a mobile relay node acts as the principal who designs Incentive-Compatible (IC) and Individually Rational (IR) contract items, consisting of a set of rate-price pairs.

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Resource Details

Provided by:
Springer Science+Business Media
Topic:
Networking
Format:
PDF